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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to address and clarify the changing interface between 
copyright law and other forms of regulation in the digital environment, in the 
context of recorded music.  This is in order to explain the problems that 
rightsholders have had in tackling the issue of unauthorised copyright 
infringement facilitated by digital technologies.  Copyright law is inextricably 
bound-up with technological developments, but the ‘convergence’ of content 
into a single digital form was perceived as problematic by rightsholders and 
was deemed to warrant increased regulation through law.  However, the 
problem is that the reliance on copyright law in the digital environment 
ignores the other regulatory influences in operation.  The use of copyright 
law in a ‘preventative’ sense also ignores the fact that other regulatory 
factors may positively encourage users to behave, and consume in ways that 
may not be directly governed by copyright.  The issues digital technologies 
have posed for rightsholders in the music industry are not addressed, or 
even potentially addressable directly through law, because the regulatory 
picture is complex.  The work of Lawrence Lessig, in relation to his regulatory 
‘modalities’ can be applied in this context in order to identify and understand 
the other forms of regulation that exist in the digital environment, and which 
govern user behaviour and consumption.  By combining his work with that of 
other scholars in the field, a bespoke ‘Lessigan’ framework is formulated to 
address and analyse those other regulatory factors in conjunction with 
actions undertaken by rightsholders to secure their copyrights in the digital 
age.  The thesis will analyse the effect such reliance on copyright law may 
have on these regulatory influences, and the creative potential of the digital 
environment. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis seeks to address and clarify the changing interface between 
copyright law and other forms of regulation in the digital environment, in the 
context of recorded music.  This is in order to explain the problems that 
rightsholders have had in tackling the issue of unauthorised copyright 
infringement facilitated by digital technologies.  The problem is that the 
reliance on copyright law in the digital environment ignores the other 
regulatory influences in operation and this thesis will proceed to analyse the 
effect such reliance on copyright law may have on these regulatory 
influences, and the creative potential of the digital environment. 
 
In its conception, copyright could be said to have evolved in line with 
technological developments, (from the printing press and beyond) leading to 
the copyright system that we may recognise today.  Copyright law is 
inextricably bound-up with technological developments; perhaps never more-
so than when users became universally connected on the Internet.  This, and 
other related digital technologies, allowed the opportunity for wide-ranging 
and virtually cost-free sharing of content.  Digital technology has facilitated 
the convergence of content into a single digital form available through a 
digital platform i.e. the Internet.  In the past, there was a stable pattern of 
control over content, but the impact of digital technology has led to a loss of 
‘centrality’ in terms of reproduction and distribution of content1.  This was 
perceived as problematic by rightsholders who have since utilised copyright 
law in order to secure their rights in the digital age.   
 
However, digital technology has operated to the benefit of the user; as such, 
there appears to be a fundamental dichotomy between the interests of 
rightsholders and those of users.  It has also created an environment where 
consumption and production of content may be strongly intertwined, such 
that the creative potential of digital content, digital technologies and the 
digital environment must be appreciated,  The focus of this thesis will be on 
 
1
 See chapter 2, p73. 
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the digital music market with as the music industry was largely the first victim 
of digital technology2, and it is an area close to the author’s own heart3.   
 
The issues digital technologies have posed fo r rightsholders in the music 
industry are not addressed, or even potentially addressable directly through 
law, because the regulatory picture is much more complex.  The use of 
copyright law in a ‘preventative’ sense ignores the fact that other regulatory 
factors may positively encourage users to act, behave, and consume in a 
certain a way that is not directly governed by copyright.  The regulatory 
environment is complex and may encourage as well as discourage behaviour.  
It is intrinsically linked with digital technology through the engendering of 
norms and the opening up of new markets through the opportunities afforded 
by such technology.  However, the focus of copyright regulation was on the 
cause of its diminished effect i.e. digital technologies, thus ignoring other 
regulatory influences. 
 
The author will seek to address and analyse these other regulatory factors in 
conjunction with actions undertaken by rightsholders to secure their 
copyrights in the digital age.  It will determine an answer to the related 
questions of: what other regulatory factors does an emphasis on copyright 
regulation threaten to ignore?  And, what effect might such a course of action 
have on regulation in the digital environment? 
 
In order to do this, the following issues will need to be addressed: 
• An appropriate purpose and justification of copyright in light of digital 
technologies; 
• The issues that digital technology has presented for rightsholders and 
which they have attempted to regulate through copyright. 
 
2
 See chapter 4, pp132-133.  Napster was the first popular (and popularised) p2p file-sharing 
program and its capability was limited to music i.e. ‘sound recordings’. 
3
 As a somewhat of a ‘failed’ musician and also a user who grew up with the technologies 
central to this thesis.  As such, this piece of research marks the end of a journey that began 
in 2000 when he downloaded the Napster software. 
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• The complexity of the digital environment: the additional forms of 
regulation in the digital environment that influence user-behaviour. 
• The impact that the emphasis on copyright regulation has had in 
relation to these other regulatory factors in the digital environment; 
and, 
• The effect has this had on digital technology itself, the behaviour of 
users, and the market for digital content. 
 
The thesis will undertake a systematic analysis of regulation in the digital 
environment.  It will do this through developing a bespoke regulatory 
methodological framework specific to digital music content.  In this context, it 
will then proceed to address the initiatives undertaken by rightsholders and 
creators to safeguard their rights online.  Finally, the effect of copyright 
regulation on the digital environment will be addressed in relation to the other 
established regulatory influences. 
 
1. Research methodology 
This research will be qualitative in nature.  Although it may be asserted that 
research in this field requires a quantitative element, the existing quantitative 
research at the time the thesis was originally undertaken4 demonstrated little 
and was at the time, unreliable5.  Therefore, such research has not been 
chosen as a basis for argument in this instance, and the author believes that 
a qualitative approach to the topic and the surrounding literature will stand 
much more robustly.  Whilst quantitative data has an important role to play in 
 
4
 The process of writing this thesis began in 2007. 
5
 ‘Official’ reports are largely limited to the extent because the evidential base 
overwhelmingly focuses on the negative impact of illegal downloading, see BOP Consulting, 
‘Changing Attitudes and Behaviour in the ‘Non-Internet’ Digital World and Their Implications 
For Intellectual Property’, (2009, Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy), 
pp22-33.  See also, Weatherall, K., Webster, E., and Bently, L., ‘IP Enforcement in the UK 
and Beyond: A Literature Review’, (2009, Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property 
Policy), where the authors eloquently sum up the problems associated with such figures, 
p23: “...the reports themselves are suspect of being self-serving.  There is, after all, no 
incentive for industry players or peak bodies to underestimate rates of infringement.”   
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this field, the author asserts that there is also a need to understand the 
deeper policy issues at stake in order to complement, clarify and help explain 
any related quantitative findings.  Although quantitative sources have been 
rejected as a methodological base for the research, it will on occasion, be 
necessary to refer to some sources of a quantitative nature for illustrative 
purposes where appropriate.  
 
The choice of research topic has been motivated and informed by the 
author’s own experiences6 and interests and this has been reflected in the 
choice of source materials considered which necessarily go beyond the 
purely legal; drawing on philosophical, sociological, historical and economic 
fields.  Sources from these areas have an important and valuable role to play 
in exploring the issues addressed in this thesis.  In particular, the use of 
technological sources is important as understanding the relevant 
technologies in question necessarily leads to a more thorough understanding 
of the legal issues that they have implicated7.  In addition, considering wider 
and more sociological source material relating to the business practices of 
the music industry also provides a valuable context against which the actions 
by rightsholders and users can be examined and understood.   
 
It is unnecessary to delve into the past history of copyright, however that 
does not negate the need for an historical approach to this research.  
Although the issues addressed in this thesis are relatively recent, that does 
not mean that sources used must also be as ‘recent’.  In fact, looking at older 
historical sources (when required) can help provide valuable background and 
context that is lacking in the current debate.  This thesis has both a historical 
and a contemporary context; although many of the initiatives that will be 
chronicled have occurred over the last decade or so, they are nonetheless 
based on copyright law which has much deeper historical roots.  It will be 
unnecessary to delve into these, instead focussing on copyright’s more 
 
6
 For example, see chapter 3, p89 and p127. 
7
 See chapter 2, pp57-70.
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recent history in the context of ‘disruptive’ digital technologies8.  Although 
historical sources will be utilised, these correspond to the more recent history 
of copyright and digital technologies as providing worthwhile and necessary 
context to this research.   
 
Case law forms an important basis for this research and has been used 
accordingly.  Both a chronological and comparative approach to relevant 
case law have been utilised in this work.  A chronological approach is applied 
in chapter 4 on peer-to-peer (p2p) technology9 in order to effectively trace 
and analyse the development of copyright doctrine in line with the 
technological evolution of p2p services.  As a relatively settled body of case-
law, it was felt that this approach would best reflect the developments in 
copyright law retrospectively, before attention turns to more contemporary 
issues.  In chapter 6 on ISP liability10, a comparative approach to case law 
has been adopted in order to highlight the complexities and disparities 
between jurisdictions on this issue at a similar point in time.  As there is little 
by way of coherent case law on this matter, it was felt that a comparative (as 
opposed to chronological) approach would be more effective here in order to 
highlight and contrast the variety of case law that has developed in parallel. 
 
In the digital environment, there are many regulatory forces in operation and 
in competition beyond copyright law which require explanation in order to 
build a more nuanced portrayal of the digital environment as it affects the 
behaviour of users11.  Because the unauthorised infringement of digital 
copyright continues, it is necessary to outline and articulate those factors 
which may affect users who engage in such practice.  This must necessarily 
reflect factors appreciable to users and from this, the limitations and effects 
of the initiatives on the part of rightsholders may be seen.  As a result, a 
theoretical ‘Lessigan’ framework will be developed from the work of 
 
8
 See chapter 2, pp57-70. 
9
 Chapter 4, pp131-165. 
10
 Chapter 6, pp210-264.
11
 See chapter 3, pp84-130. 
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Lawrence Lessig in ‘Code’12 where he deals with regulation in the online 
environment.  Through building a comprehensive regulatory picture by 
combining the work of Lessig with that of other scholars, the actions by 
rightsholders may then be analysed in relation to other competing regulatory 
factors.  On the basis of this approach, this thesis will  build a clear picture of 
regulatory factors in the digital environment and demonstrate how digital 
copyright law can and may influence these. .   
 
The process of writing this thesis has also been marked by a number of 
governmental reviews and reports on Intellectual Property, notably: ‘The 
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (2006)13 and the ‘Digital Britain’ 
report (2009)14.  Most recently, there has been Hargreaves’ report on ‘Digital 
Opportunity: A review of Intellectual Property and Growth’ (2011)15.  However, 
the impact of these consultations has been minimal with little (if any) 
recommendations translated into legislation.  This process seems to be 
characterised by further consultations on various proposals which are 
deemed necessary, 16 such that their outcomes may inevitably be rendered 
obsolete by technological developments.  As such, they are of limited 
substantive relevance to this work.  Instead, the sources used in this work 
are much broader.   
 
The themes of this thesis are international in nature; therefore, the UK, US 
and European jurisdictions have been selected for examination as required.  
It will involve critically analysing and comparing an array of scholarly 
literature and case law in these areas in order to draw a set of conclusions 
on each component issue.  These will then be combined in the overall 
 
12
 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books). 
13
 Available from: http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/other/0118404830/0118404830.pdf 
14
 Available from: http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7650/7650.pdf 
15
 Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS).  Available from: 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf 
16
 See generally, ‘The Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual 
Property and Growth’, (2011), available from: http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/hargreaves.htm 
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conclusion at the end of this work.  The thesis will proceed in a chronological 
fashion detailing and critiquing the strategies that have been employed by 
rightsholders to maintain their control over content in the digital environment.  
This will necessarily involve looking at technological sources in order to 
present a clear explanation of how the relevant digital technology was 
developed, and how it operates.  In order to address the issues effectively 
and because they go beyond the purely legal, it will also be necessary to 
deal with historical sources as well as sources from technological, 
sociological, and law and economics fields.   
 
The thesis can add to the current debate on digital copyright law by providing 
a reasoned critique of foregoing policy and practice in the area.  It is hoped 
that the work and consolidated conclusions presented will stand as an 
authoritative body of research, which can form a basis from which to 
evaluate future policy and regulatory changes in this area.   
 
2. Context 
As this thesis seeks to address the issue regulation in the digital environment 
with regard to digital content (specifically recorded music) and also the 
creative potential that digital technology has created, it is first necessary to 
define the terms and issues in relation to ‘content industries’ and 
rightsholders.  It is also important to highlight the creative potential of the 
digital environment, and within this, the role of users.  As this research 
ultimately concerns copyright law itself, this can necessarily be applied to 
defining these terms. 
 
 2.1 ‘Content industries’ 
Creativity is central to the cultural/creative industries17 and it will therefore be 
necessary to define what such industries are in the context of this thesis.  In 
1998 in the UK, the term ‘creative industries’ was defined to mean: 
 
 
17
 See generally, Hesmondhalgh, D., ‘The Cultural Industries (Second Edition)’, (2007, 
SAGE Publications). 
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 “Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill 
and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the 
generation and exploitation of intellectual Property.”18 
 
Such industries were thus taken to include advertising, architecture, the art 
and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, 
interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software 
and computer services, television and video19.  This definition has become 
more streamlined to an extent (on the current Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport website) to constitute advertising, the arts market, design, fashion, 
film, the music industry and publishing20.  However, as a socio-political 
definition, this does not necessarily aid the task of defining the content 
industries within copyright, and thus the scope of this thesis.   
 
Copyright is thus a dominant feature of such industries and is acknowledged 
to provide incentives to create and disseminate the expression of ideas21: “A 
unifying feature of the cultural industries is that at their core creativity is 
protected by copyright.”22  Therefore, an attempt to define such industries 
must begin with the content they produce, which is thus protected by 
copyright.  As such, it will be necessary to examine this issue from a more 
substantive legal, and statutory base. 
 
18
 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001’, 
p5.  Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/publi
cations/4632.aspx/ 
19
 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001’, 
p5.  Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/publi
cations/4632.aspx/ 
20
 See: http://www.culture.gov.uk/about_us/default.aspx 
21
 Towse, R., ‘Creativity, Incentive and reward: An Economic Analysis of Copyright and 
Culture in the Information Age’, (2001, Elgar), pp9-10. 
22
 Towse, R., ‘Creativity, Incentive and reward: An Economic Analysis of Copyright and 
Culture in the Information Age’, (2001, Elgar), p35. 
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Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (1886)23 provides protection for a broad range of works under this 
heading, stating that:  
 
“The expression ‘literary and artistic works’ shall include every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the 
mode or form of its expression...”24 
 
‘Cinematographic’ works are protected (as coming under ‘authorial’ works25), 
but there is no reference to sound recordings as such.  This was to be 
articulated under articles 3 and 5 in the Rome Convention, 1961; the 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisation26.  Under article 1 of the 
Convention27, such protection was not to prejudice the protection in literary 
and artistic works and therefore exists alongside it (as a form of 
 
23
 Available from: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.  Henceforth, 
the Berne Convention. 
24
 Art.2(1), in full: 
“The expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as 
books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the 
same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and 
entertainments in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic 
works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; 
works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic 
works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; 
works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works 
relative to geography, topography, architecture or science.” 
25
 Art.4(a), Berne Convention. 
26
 Art.3(b): “‘phonogram’ means any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance or 
of other sounds;” and, art.5, Protected Phonograms.  Available from: 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html 
27
 Art.1, Safeguard of Copyright Proper: “Protection granted under this Convention shall 
leave intact and shall in no way affect the protection of copyright in literary and artistic works. 
Consequently, no provision of this Convention may be interpreted as prejudicing such 
protection.” 
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‘neighbouring rights’); thus supporting an ‘industry’ for such works28.  There 
is a very broad list of works which are protected by copyright, but some of 
these may not necessarily seem inherently ‘creative’ (for example, ‘published 
editions’ in the UK29);it is necessary to be more specific.  
 
The author will make reference to the ‘content industries’ throughout the 
course of this thesis which will negate some of the categories stated above.  
However, there is justification for using the term ‘content’ within copyright law 
itself in terms of the requirement fixation as ‘embodying’ constituent 
components of a copyright work; such components can be said to be the 
content of the work.  In particular, this will involve ‘sound recordings’..  In the 
UK, a ‘sound recording’ is defined as: 
 
(a) a recording of sounds, from which the sounds may be reproduced,  
 
or, 
 
(b) a recording of the whole or any part of a literary, dramatic or 
musical work, from which sounds reproducing the work or part may be 
produced 
 
regardless of the medium on which the recording is made or the 
method by which the sounds are reproduced or produced.30 
 
Although the definition of this category of works necessarily limits the 
protection of it to the actual ‘sounds’ themselves, further requirements as to 
‘substantiality’31 indicate that such works can be seen to have constituent 
elements.   
 
28
 Spence, M., ‘Intellectual Property’, (2007, Oxford University Press), p75. 
29
 S.8, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988.  Henceforth, CDPA. 
30
 S.5A, CDPA. 
31
 S.16(2)(a), CDPA: “References in this Part to the doing of an act restricted by the 
copyright in a work are to the doing of it - (a) in relation to the work as a whole or any 
substantial part of it.” 
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For example, a ‘film’ (i.e. a cinematographic work) is defined as: 
 
(1) In this Part “film” means a recording on any medium from which a 
moving image may by any means be produced.32 
 
Although the legislative definition of such a work does not embody any 
constituent elements, it has been held that a film can be a recording of a 
dramatic work and can thus be protected on this related level33.  Similar 
protection exists for such works in the United States where ‘motion’ pictures 
(and other audiovisual works), and sound recordings are protected under 
s.102(a)(6) and (7) in Title 17 of the US Code34.  This is also the case when it 
comes to sound recordings which can embody an underlying composition 
which, in many cases, can involve literary and musical copyrights35. 
Therefore, because such works can  be said to ‘embody’, or consist of, 
different elements, they have content i.e. contain content.  As such, the 
industries which produce such works can thus be said to be the ‘content 
industries’; primarily the music  industry.  As stated, the main focus of this 
 
32
 S.5B, CDPA. 
33
 Norowzian v. Arks (No. 2) [2000] EMLR 67. 
34
 Copyright Law of the United States of America and Related Laws Contained in Title 17 of 
the United States Code.  Sound recordings are defined as: “works that result from the 
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the 
material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.” 
Phonorecords are defined as: “material objects in which sounds, other than those 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now 
known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 
“phonorecords” includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.” 
Motion pictures are defined as: ‘audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images 
which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with 
accompanying sounds, if any.’’  Available from: 
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thesis will be on recorded music (in digital form), although reference may 
also be made to other forms of digital content where appropriate. 
 
 2.2 Rightsholders 
‘Sound recordings’36 are regarded as ‘entrepreneurial works’ under copyright 
law; reflecting the fact that there is not always a single individual responsible 
for creating such a work37.  Although there may be creative individuals and 
performers who may be involved in the process of making a sound recording, 
there is a statutory provision that the owner of a sound recording is the 
‘producer’38.  In many cases, the record company will be the undertaking who 
made the arrangements for the recording to be made, and will therefore be 
the first owner of copyright in that particular piece of content39.  As such, it is 
the copyright owner who has the specified exclusive rights in relation to that 
content40.  Therefore, they may be regarded as ‘rightsholders’.  
Rightsholders operate with a necessary commercial element since they will 
have potentially invested a lot of money in the production and associated 
promotion of the content41: “It can take up to a million pounds or more for a 
major record company to launch a new act.  They will want to own the 
copyright outright.”42  In this respect, the existence and operation of such 
rightsholders is arguably necessary as they possess the resources required 
to ‘launch’ a new act43 and thus facilitate entry into the profession.  
Nonetheless, it is important to understand this ‘commerciality’ as a factor 
behind the actions of rightsholders which will be analysed in this body of 
research. 
 
2.3. Creativity 
 
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37
 See chapter 2, pp42-43. 
38
 S.9(2), CDPA. 
39
 Harrison, A., ‘Music: The Business’, (2008, Virgin Books), p60. 
40
 S.2(1), CDPA. 
41
 Harrison, A., ‘Music: The Business’, (2008, Virgin Books), pp63-64. 
42
 Ibid, p60, and see chapter 7, p285. 
43
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Creativity (in a broad sense) is arguably something which copyright aims to 
promote through encouraging and rewarding the production of creative works.  
It has been stated that: “... the more we talk about creativity, the more it 
disappears from view.”44   However,  ‘creativity’ is nonetheless important to 
this  thesis:  
 
“Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright law should 
seek to promote, yet copyright scholarship and policymaking have 
proceeded largely on the basis of assumptions about what it actually is.”45  
 
Therefore, it must be ascertained what this term actually means in relation to 
recorded music, although: “The very task of definition is suspect.”46  In 
contrast to defining the content industries, creativity has arguably much less 
of a legal dimension, and more of a sociological one.  The etymological 
meaning of creativity is one involving physical activity or an activity that has 
physical and observable results47.  In this sense, it may be distinguishable 
from some form of mental process, products, antecedents, the 
capacity/ability to create, and originality48.  To an extent, the idea of creativity 
can be ascribed by reference to the ‘traditional’ process of creating itself, or 
perhaps more accurately, to the traditional and abstract notion of 
authorship49:  
 
“Each individual is immersed in his/her field of endeavour, and is 
constantly thinking of new literary works, new scientific advances, new 
 
44
 Cohen, J.E., ‘Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory’, (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 1151-
1205, p1152. 
45
 Ibid, p1151. 
46
 Epstein, R., ‘In Response: Defining Creativity’, (1980) The Behaviour Analyst 3(2), 65, p65 
47
 Götze, I.L., ‘On Defining Creativity’, (1981) The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
39(3), 297-301, p298. 
48
 Ibid, p298. 
49
 See chapter  2 pp49-54, and chapter 5, pp190-191. 
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theatrical productions.  These conscious enterprises are interrupted by the 
affairs of daily living.  Distractions abound.”50 
 
This may provide an instructive starting point51, but whilst there are 
undoubtedly creative people in the world, and a commercial structure which 
supports such professionals, “... to define creativity by reference to capacity 
or potential is to define it by what cannot be known until it is actualised.”52  
Although this suggests that some element of the ‘unknown’ may also be 
necessary in the definition of creative behaviour53, it is perhaps necessary 
and more appropriate to consider the ‘actualisation’ itself, under copyright 
law. 
 
2.4 Originality and Fixation 
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Copyright law offers no standard for creativity, it merely defines the scope of 
protection and requires that works be ‘original’54.  According to Dr. Laurence 
J. Peter: “Originality is the fine art of remembering what you hear but 
forgetting where you heard it.”55  Legally, the British and European concept 
of originality is concerned with the relationship between the author/creator 
and the work, and operates as a threshold level for determining copyright 
protection.  More specifically, the British idea of originality reflects the fact 
that works emanate from the author56, but also that they must involve some 
exercise of the requisite skill, labour, or judgement in the production of the 
work57.  The US approach also requires originality, but is framed in a slightly 
different way and judicial reference to creativity here has stated: “Original, as 
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently 
created by the author ... and that it possess at least some minimal degree of 
creativity.”58  ‘Musical works’ (the content which a sound recording may 
embody) must be original59; however, there is no requirement under UK 
copyright law that sound recordings have to be original per se; they are 
deemed to have copyright protection unless they are copies of pre-existing 
recordings60. As such, creativity must be channelled into how the work is 
fixed or recorded.The aspect of ‘originality’ (a requirement for copyright 
subsistence61) is one which can be conflated with creativity; however, “... 
originality as a quality cannot be assumed to be necessarily and invariably 
present in any and every productive process...”62  Similarly, creativity, as a 
 
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requirement for copyright validity has been of little historic significance63 and 
it may not necessarily seem apparent in every original copyrighted work64.  
As such, creativity and originality must be seen as distinct issues.  However, 
both may be said to relate to the content ultimately produced.  As copyright 
can be said to protect (original) ‘expressions’ rather than ‘ideas’, the creative 
process can be said to centre around fixation in terms of originality; therefore, 
the primary focus should be on the ‘fixed’ product65.  In this case, the ‘fixed’ 
sound recording as embodying the creativity of those involved in its making – 
the artists, producer(s) and even remixers66.   
 
Nonetheless, it can be recognised that there is a distinction between creative 
output, i.e. a fixated copyright work, and creativity as an activity or process67 
situated in the digital environment. 
 
2.5 Creative environment  
The distinction between ‘ideas’ and ‘expression’ (fixation) has come to 
represent a theory of cultural transmission unique to copyright that resides 
primarily in the ‘ideas’ contained within the fixation68.  This is still true in the 
digital era: “The digital world is closer to ideas than things...”69  As such, 
focussing solely on the creative product itself is too narrow (especially in the 
digital environment), but trying to provide a definition in terms of creative 
 
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Creativity Standard in Copyright Law’, (2004) 82 Denv U L Rev 259-299, p260. 
64
 For example, art.2(3) of Berne Convention protects ‘translations’ as ‘original works’ even 
though they may not appear inherently creative in themselves (however, the author does not, 
in any way, want to disparage the effort that goes into the production of such works) 
65
 Clifford, R.D., ‘Random Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: a Search for the Minimal 
Creativity Standard in Copyright Law’, (2004) 82 Denv U L Rev 259-299, p271. 
66
 Discussed further below, pp28-32.  See also chapter 5, pp187-109. 
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63(3) 461-478, p474. 
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1205, p1171. 
69
 Lessig, L., ‘The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World’, (2002, 
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behaviour may also not be desirable70: “... creation is an unpredictable 
activity.”71  This raises issues in relation to the behaviour of artists and the 
environment in which they operate, which may be more important than trying 
to define creativity itself.  Such an abstraction-based approach to content 
production marginalises questions of how people use culture and produce 
knowledge, and the conditions that foster and lead to creative 
experimentation72; this is important to this thesis and necessarily involves 
digital technology73 which plays a crucial role in the creative environment.  
Whilst there is a long way to go before effective incentives to individual 
creativity are understood74, there does need to be some examination of the 
‘methodology of production’: 
 
“Consequently, a combination of techniques is needed: a creative 
product is apparently required, but the creativity in the product must be the 
result of a human-based creative process.”75 
 
To the author, such a ‘human-based’ process necessarily requires some 
appreciation of the environment in which the creator operates or 
‘situatedness’76.  Once a sound recording has been realised through fixation, 
the digital environment in relation to a broader creative context (or culture) is 
of crucial importance; as Lessig puts it: “There is a vast amount of creative 
work spread across the Internet.  But as the law is currently crafted, this work 
 
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is presumptively illegal.”77  Furthermore, digital technology has substantially 
reduced the cost of digital creations and potentially enables greater 
participation by users in the creative process78.  Importantly, it has also 
facilitated the opportunity for collaborative creativity by removing restraints 
on time and space.  Such collaborations may also be representative of the 
practice of creativity itself: 
 
 “That’s how creativity happens.  Artists collaborate over space and 
time ... Profound creativity requires maximum exposure to others’ works and 
liberal freedoms to reuse and reshape others’ material.”79 
 
However, this process is still incomplete until the fixation of the work: 
“Creativity is the process or activity of deliberately concretizing insight.”80  
Such ‘insight’ can be seen to result from the creative environment and 
through interacting with content itself, as well as other users81, such that no 
work is ever truly unique or ‘brand new’: “Creators here and everywhere are 
always and at all times building on the creativity that went before and 
surrounds them now.”82  And: “Tomorrow’s makers will continue to use the 
popular culture they interact with as raw material for their own work.”83  As 
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such, the manipulation of pre-existing content figures centrally in processes 
of cultural participation (even in ‘older’ forms of creative practice)84.  This is 
as a result of an environment which facilitates the consumption of  content 
and that helps to inspire and generate new works.  According to Lessig: 
“There is no art that doesn’t reuse.”85  Nothing is created ex nihilo86, but this 
does not inevitably mean copyright infringement will result. 
 
It is therefore, important to note that not every work in some way based on a 
pre-existing work (or works) will infringe.  Making creative use of musical 
materials is a common and ancient feature in musical practice that pervades 
many, if not all, forms of music87.  During the production of a record, the 
producers (as well as the artists and songwriters) will often consider whether 
to reproduce or sample a third-party sound recording for inclusion their own 
record88.  This process, known as ‘sampling’, developed in the 1990s 
(although it is arguably nothing new89) whereby an extract from one sound 
recording would feature in another90.  Although this is a commonplace 
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practice91, artists rarely trouble themselves with the legal or commercial 
implications of such creative endeavours92.   
 
From a legal perspective, there is ambiguity surrounding whether re-use of 
another work, through sampling, will necessarily constitute an infringement.  
Potential infringement may arise in a number of ways: infringement in the 
original sound recording (by reproducing it); breaching copyright in any 
underlying lyrics and/or music; and, constituting an unauthorised use of a 
performance of the original93.  It may also be possible that sampling may 
infringe the right to make an ‘arrangement’ of a musical work94.  Although 
‘sound recordings’ are strictly defined in UK, the reproduction of a sound 
recording through sampling will not inevitably result in a finding of 
infringement:   
 
“Cases of potential copyright infringement must wrestle with two 
vague doctrines: the doctrine that a copyright is not infringed unless the 
whole or a substantial part of the work is copied ... and the doctrine that 
copyright does not protect ideas, but only their expression in a work...”95 
 
Regardless of whether they can be considered as ‘ideas’ or ‘expressions’, 
stylistic elements alone are not subject to copyright protection and this 
dichotomy is of dubious value in relation to music96: “There are ... only so 
many rhythms in popular music and many drum and bass lines are in fact 
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themselves copies of previous works.”97  Furthermore, the concepts of 
‘originality’ and ‘infringement’ are also not static, and consequent difficulties 
can arise whether the creative re-use of another work constitutes 
infringement98. 
 
Assuming re-use has been undertaken without a necessary licence, 
infringement will only arise where what has been taken amounts to a 
‘substantial part’ of the original recording99;  this in itself will always be a 
matter of degree100, being more of a qualitative than quantitative 
assessment101.  In the US, this exists in slightly different form as the doctrine 
of ‘substantial similarity’102 as well as the need to bear in mind potential ‘fair 
use’ defences103.  The UK has developed an unwritten ‘three second rule’ 
whereby if three seconds or less or a work are samples, no action is 
customarily taken against the sampler104.  However: “Whilst this may be the 
custom of the music industry, it is by no means clear that it is sound in 
law.”105  Nonetheless, legal precision in this area may not necessarily be 
desirable, and the apparent vagueness in the criteria for infringement may 
arguably be to the benefit of copyright106.  However this inevitably leads to 
ambiguity as to whether or not sampling may constitute an infringing re-use.  
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Although ambiguity exists from a legal perspective, creators rely on a certain 
degree of flexibility in the way in which they utilise the work of others107.  
Nonetheless, obtaining sample clearance has been a longstanding standard 
practice108, indicating a normative understanding on the part of creators that 
permission is required before using or sampling from another work.  From a 
creative and commercial point of view there appears to be an acceptance 
that sampling requires clearance from the relevant rightsholder so as to 
avoid potential infringement109 and this has been a continuing practice: 
 
“By the time courts explicitly stated that sampling requires copyright 
clearance, they were not imposing new rules on the music industry, but only 
confirming practices that the music business had been following...”110  
 
Where permission to use a sample is granted, payment will usually be 
required111: 
 
“Those making records still need to clear and pay for samples ... As a 
business-to-business activity, sampling is a profitable enterprise for those 
companies sitting on valuable copyrights, and can give rise to valuable 
synergies for both the sampler and the sampled.”112 
 
Although there is an understanding amongst musical creators that they are 
obliged to pay for copyright permission113, this is not always the case in 
those musical genres that pervasively utilise the sound recordings of 
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others114, and where the illegal nature of the ‘remixed’ content may even lie 
at the heart of its appeal115.  However, normative ambiguities still exist here 
as evidenced by the controversy regarding the song ‘Harlem Shake’ by 
American producer Baauer116.  Erupting from a viral dance craze, the song 
features two uncredited samples for which neither original artist (nor 
rightsholder) was approached for permission or received remuneration.  In 
this instance, it appears that the success of the song was what raised this 
issue: “Even if nothing is certain in the field of sampling law, the lesson ... is 
clear: thou can indeed steal as long as the people you’re stealing from don’t 
smell a payday.”117 
 
It may be said that the situation regarding infringing re-use is potentially 
unclear from a substantively legal perspective.  This is less-so when it comes 
to music artists or creators where there appears to be a generally accepted 
norm (although not in all cases118) to seek permission and pay to avoid 
infringing use.  Digital technology has created an environment where 
creativity can be collaborative and one where production and consumption of 
content are becoming strongly intertwined119, (although this is not to say they 
are now one and the same thing120).  In respect of this, it is also important to 
appreciate the role of the ‘user’. 
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http://www.whosampled.com/sample/view/196299/Baauer-
Harlem%20Shake_Plastic%20Little-Miller%20Time/  
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 Lynskey, D., ‘Harlem Shake: could it kill sampling?’ (2013) The Guardian, available from: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2013/mar/13/harlem-shake-internet-killing-sampling 
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 See chapter 5, p190 And chapter 7, p225. 
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 Towse, R., ‘Creativity, Copyright and the Creative Industries Paradigm’, (2010), KYKLOS 
63(3) 461-478, p462. 
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 “Production is different from consumption.” Lessig, L., ‘The Future of Ideas: The Fate of 
the Commons in a Connected World’, (2002, Vintage Books), p13. 
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 2.6 Users 
The process of creativity involves exposure to, and possibly the use of pre-
existing content, it is a vital component in creative practice.  Whilst the 
practice of creativity may have a commercial element (outlined above, in 
relation to rightsholders), the impact of digital technology has had an 
important effect regarding the opportunities for the creation of content on the 
part of individuals.  A distinction may be drawn between ‘passive’ consumers 
of content, and those who may act or ‘use’ such content as the basis for 
producing new creative content.  As such, one can differentiate between 
‘consumption’ and ‘production’.  However, the relative parity between the 
costs of consumption and production facilitated by digital technology, at least 
at the individual user level, suggest that they now share a very close 
relationship: “Digital technology has radically reduced the cost of digital 
creations.”121  ’Dgital’ consumption is a necessary corollary of this, so that 
consumption and production of creative content can now take place through 
the same (digital) medium.  It also suggests an element of choice (as to what 
content to ‘consume’) as well as a market in which to exercise those 
consumption choices122.  It is also important to highlight the normative 
operation of users in this respect.  Whilst artists may operate in line with a 
normative understanding that creative practice involving sampling requires 
conventions to be followed, users arguably operate in accordance with 
different normative beliefs in respect of their consumption choices123 which 
(to an extent) may be engendered by digital technology itself as well as other 
factors124.  Therefore, in light of the ability of users of technology and content 
to (potentially) be producers, their normative behaviour must be further 
understood125.  As such. the terms ‘users’ will be adopted in this thesis as 
 
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 Lessig, L., ‘The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World’, (2002, 
Vintage Books), p8. See also chapter 7, pp267-268. 
122
 Which is an integral part of copyright’s utilitarian foundation, see chapter 2, pp45-56.  
This is also discussed in chapter 3, pp104-119.   
123
 See chapter 3, pp95-103. 
124
 Ibid, pp95-126. 
125
 This will involve utilising the work of Lessig and others to build a model of the factors, or 
‘modalities’ which govern user-behaviour online.  See chapter 3, pp84-130. 
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designating both ‘active’ users of content and technology, as well as more 
‘passive’ consumptive users; since both require the ‘use’ of digital technology 
and of content.   
 
3. Research 
In order to address the aim of the thesis, the author will investigate and draw 
conclusions on the following: 
• The purpose of copyright; 
• Copyright and new technologies; 
• Modalities of regulation; 
• File-sharing of music; 
• Digital Rights Management; 
• Internet Service Provider liability; and, 
• The role of Creative Commons. 
 
It is crucial to understand the philosophical justification for copyright law  as 
any modern view of copyright inevitably depends on which ‘philosophy’ of 
copyright is propounded.  As will be shown in chapter two, the most 
appropriate foundation of copyright law, for the purposes of this thesis, is 
utilitarianism126.  It is within this context (and that of the content industries 
defined above) that this thesis will continue.  The goal of copyright is to 
encourage content production, the fruits of which would benefit society as a 
whole under a utilitarian vision127.  This does have a necessary ‘economic’ 
component; focussing on benefits to the author/owner is important to 
encourage production128.  Chapter two129 will also examine copyright’s 
philosophical foundations in relation to  the development of ‘disruptive’ digital 
technologies (specifically, the Internet, peer-to-peer and MP3130) in order to 
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 See chapter 2, pp41-54. 
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 Ibid, pp41-49. 
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 Ibid, p42-44.
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 Ibid, pp39-83. 
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 Ibid, pp57-70. 
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develop an understanding of the impact such technology has had on 
copyright law.   
 
Despite copyright regulation operating in the digital environment, 
unauthorised reproduction has persisted, and it is important to articulate 
potential reasons for this.  In chapter three131, a conceptual framework based 
on the work of Lawrence Lessig (and others) will be developed to shed light 
on the operation of users in Cyberspace; specifically which regulatory ‘forces’ 
may be in operation and which may guide users’ behaviour, beyond 
copyright law.  This will involve: determining the normative understandings 
by which users operate; the role of the market in regulating the consumption 
practices of users; and, the impact digital technology has in these respects.  
The initiatives undertaken by rightsholders will then be examined in light of 
this framework.   
 
Legal action against peer-to-peer (p2p) networks will be explored in chapter 
four132 in order to establish the status of p2p as a viable distribution 
mechanism for digital content.  The development of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘inducement’ aspects to unauthorised reproduction133 will be examined in 
order to assess whether they are insurmountable obstacles for any p2p 
developer, such that this technology has now come to define how content will 
not be distributed online134.  The control of content through Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) (chapter five135) has, in the past, raised potentially 
important tensions between the application of DRM and copyright exceptions, 
which permit the use of copyrighted content for certain purposes.  However, 
current developments in streaming-based distribution may now be of greater 
importance.  Despite previously being ‘attached’ to content, DRM may now 
be said to operate in conjunction with designated content distribution 
networks which are controlled by rightsholders; this trend will be examined in 
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order to ascertain whether it may adversely affect users’ content 
consumption choices.   
 
Most recently, there have been important developments in the area of 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability (chapter six136) with rightsholders and 
legislators suggesting that ISPs are liable for infringing copyrighted content 
which may be transmitted over their networks.  Whilst laws providing ISPs 
with theoretical immunity still operate, there now exists a complex regulatory 
situation as a result of various cases relating to this strategy which will be 
outlined and critiqued.  In addition to this, it is also necessary to highlight the 
changing nature of ISPs themselves through their evolution to content 
providers137.  As such, it must also be questioned whether the pre-existing 
immunities (contained in the European E-commerce Directive)138, are really 
appropriate in the present day because ISPs’ role as ‘passive’ suppliers of 
information and content is open to challenge.   
 
As a response to the operation of copyright regulation in  the digital 
environment, the Creative Commons (CC) movement warrants consideration 
in chapter seven139 as a notable counter-point.  The viability of the Creative 
Commons movement will be explored in order to assess if  it can operate as 
a viable and successful enterprise, and if it can positively affect the 
consumption and production habits and choices of users As it readily utilises 
copyright law, the interaction between CC and copyright will be examined in 
order to ascertain whether it can operate as a complement to, and achieve 
the same goals as, copyright140.  As well as this, there are also important 
practical issues which necessitate consideration141. 
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In conclusion, the constituent elements of this thesis will be synthesised in 
order to cement and consolidate its component arguments, thus addressing 
and clarifying the changing interface between copyright and regulation in 
relation to recorded music  within the digital environment.   
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Chapter 2: Essential background - copyright and new technologies 
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Essential background - copyright and new technologies 
 
1. Philosophy 
Because copyright law has the potential to affect how we interact with 
creative works, it is important to assess its legitimacy; specifically, why 
copyright is desirable: “Much ink has been spilled over the question of why 
we have copyright.”1  Also, because copyright (and Intellectual Property 
rights in general) confer a monopoly right, it has generally been thought to 
justify this privilege in light if its effect on society: “Property institutions 
fundamentally shape a society.”2  It is essential to establish the purposes that 
an Intellectual Property (IP) system may serve3 and as such, it is crucial not 
only to understand copyright as a legal system, but also as a philosophical 
position, as the latter invariably influences the former.  Technology has had a 
role to play in this instance as well; initially it was the introduction of the 
printing press4 that necessitated protection for publishers and distributors of 
content.   
 
Mitchell compares copyright to a Faustian bargain struck between creators 
and society; creators enjoy a limited monopoly, but cannot stop others 
dealing fairly with their material until such times as copyright protection 
expires and the work “... becomes part of the patrimony of all Mankind.”5  In 
many ways, this is also representative of the theorem of copyright 
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 Mitchell, I.G. (QC), ‘Beyond Copyright or Interesting New Restrictions You Never Knew 
Existed’, (2007), originally published as a guest Editorial in Multimedia Und Recht, available 
from: http://www.murraystable.com/assets/files/articles/Beyond%20Copyright.pdf.  Not least 
in the context of doctoral theses, see Phillips, J., ‘”I Wouldn’t Want to Be starting from Here”, 
or Why isn’t Intellectual Property Research Better Than It is?’, (2009) The WIPO Journal 1 
138-146. 
2
 Hettinger, E.C., ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’, (1989), Philosophy & Public Affairs 18(1) 
31-53, p31. 
3
 Spence, M., ‘Intellectual Property’, (2007, Oxford University Press), p43. 
4
 See generally Litman J., ‘Digital Copyright’, (2006, Prometheus Books). 
5
 Mitchell, I.G. (QC), ‘Beyond Copyright or Interesting New Restrictions You Never Knew 
Existed’, (2007), originally published as a guest Editorial in Multimedia Und Recht, available 
from: http://www.murraystable.com/assets/files/articles/Beyond%20Copyright.pdf 
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justifications; that there is acceptance of the wider import to society resulting 
from the creation of creative goods (under utilitarian arguments), but at the 
same time, that an author is entitled to the fruits of their labour (under natural 
rights).  It is crucial to understand such theories as each plays an on-going 
role in the expansion of copyright6; they will be explored further below.  
Following this, consideration will then turn to the specific digital technologies 
of the Internet, MP3 and peer-to-peer in order to examine their origins and 
effects on copyright regulation. 
 
1.1 Utilitarianism 
Economic theories of copyright focus on what is good for society (or the 
public, in general) by regarding the production of creative works as an 
important and valuable activity.  As such, they emphasise the need to 
provide incentive(s) for the production, dissemination and efficient 
exploitation of creative works7.  The general idea is that protection (or 
availability) of property rights at one level ensures that a market (and as a 
consequence, competition), develops at a higher level8.  As defined by John 
Stuart Mill in 1863, utilitarianism holds that: 
 
 “... actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness ... 
pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and 
that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any 
other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, 
or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.”9 
 
This can provide a useful tool for deciding which characteristics of society 
are useful, and which are not10.  As such, it may be assumed that creative 
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6
 Spence, M., ‘Intellectual Property’, (2007, Oxford University Press), p73. 
7
 Ibid, p63. 
8
 Spector, H.M., ‘An outline theory justifying intellectual and industrial property rights’, (1989) 
EIPR 11(8) 270-273, p272. 
9
 Mill, J.S., ‘Utilitarianism’, (1863), pp9-10. 
10
 Dibble, W., ‘Justifying intellectual property’, (1994) Philosophy & Public Affairs 18(1) 31-
52, p81. 
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practice and the fruits of it are beneficial to society and it thus follows that 
these should be both encouraged and protected.  Under the principle of 
economic ‘utility’11, IP rights are justified on the basis of their contribution to 
social utility and welfare12 (which may include intellectual virtues as 
interwoven with happiness13).  Utilitarian theorists therefore endorse this 
approach in order to induce innovation and intellectual productivity14.  As 
such, this theory is ‘blind’ to (changing) conceptions of authorship/ownership; 
it can overcome the difficulties in alternative theories by focussing more-so 
on the product (content) and its benefits, as opposed to the efforts of a 
particular creator in bringing that content to fruition.    
 
Such a theory is primarily based on two arguments: that institutions are 
necessary in society; and, that people need to acquire, possess and use 
goods15.  The utilitarian argument proceeds on the basis that people need to 
acquire, possess and use things in order to achieve some degree of 
happiness and fulfilment and in order to do this, ‘security’ is then needed in 
the form of property rights16.  As a result, utilitarianism has an important 
‘user’ element; which does not engender the same difficulties as an author-
centric approach.   
 
Involving ‘incentive’ arguments, the reasoning as applied to IP proceeds that 
such rights are necessary to maximise social utility by providing creators with 
rewards for creating their work.  Without such security, creative works would 
not be produced at a socially optimum level.  The ‘reward’ in question is 
copyright which provides a heavily guarded monopoly albeit for a limited 
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 Effectively the benefit a consumer gets from consuming one ‘unit’ of a product. 
12
 Spinello, R.A., and Tavani, H.T., ‘Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World’, 
(2005), p13. 
13
 Donner, W., ‘Mill’s Theory of Value’, in West, H.R. (ed), ‘The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s 
Utilitarianism’, (2006, Blackwell), chapter 4, pp117-139, p126. 
14
 Zemer, L., ‘On the value of copyright theory’, (2006) IPQ 1 55-71, p57. 
15
 Dibble, W., ‘Justifying intellectual property’, (1994) Philosophy & Public Affairs 18(1) 31-
52, p81. 
16
 Spinello, R.A., and Tavani, H.T., ‘Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World’, 
(2005, Information Science Publishing), p13. 
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time; this spurs innovation through recognition of exclusive rights, but is 
limited in scope and duration17.  Therefore, parallels may be drawn between 
copyright and utilitarian theory in terms of a set of rules which would together 
maximise utility if adopted and followed by the majority of members of a 
society18. 
 
The taxonomy of utilitarian arguments proceeds thus19: 
• Society should adopt legal regimes or institutions if, and only if, they 
are expected to yield the optimisation of aggregate social welfare; 
• A legal regime that provides authors with limited rights or control over 
their productions is expected to act as a string incentive for the 
creation of new works; 
• Stimulating the production and creation of intellectual works 
contributes to the maximisation of aggregate welfare; and, 
• A legal regime for protecting IP should therefore be adopted. 
This reflects the fact that utilitarian arguments are consequentialist20; holding 
that the ‘good’ is whatever yields the greatest net utility21 and the ‘right’ thing 
to do is the course of action which best promotes this goal22: 
 
 “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems 
natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end 
to which they are subservient.”23 
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 Zemer, L., ‘On the value of copyright theory’, (2006) IPQ 1 55-71, p57. 
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 Fuchs, A.E., ‘Mill’s Theory of Morally Correct Action’, in West, H.R. (ed), ‘The Blackwell 
Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism’, (2006, Blackwell), chapter 5, pp139-159, p145. 
19
 Spinello, R.A., and Tavani, H.T., ‘Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World’, 
(2005, Information Science Publishing), p14. 
20
 West, H.R., ‘Mill’s “Proof” of the Principle of Utility’, in West, H.R. (ed), ‘The Blackwell 
Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism’, (2006, Blackwell), chapter 7, pp174-184, p174. 
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 Zemer, L., ‘On the value of copyright theory’, (2006) IPQ 1 55-71, p58. 
22
 Sumner, L.W., ‘Mill’s Theory of Rights’, in West, H.R. (ed), ‘The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s 
Utilitarianism’, (2006, Blackwell), chapter 8, pp184-199, p187. 
23
 Mill, J.S., ‘Utilitarianism’, (1863), p2. 
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In the present context, the action in question is to encourage the production 
of creative works from which society will benefit, and as a result of which, the 
author would receive copyright protection.  Mill favoured a utilitarian 
justification for the social policy of establishing and enforcing a set of rights24 
and in this instance, the ‘rights’ necessary to achieve the goal of enhancing 
social welfare may be seen as copyright law25.   
 
The incentive structure in utilitarian arguments focuses on promoting the 
general societal good, not on placing the individual creator as an 
independent entity entitled to a right26.  As a result, such considerations 
usurp the place of the creator (as a creative individual) and treat the process 
of ‘creativity’ as an economic one, which owing to many other circumstances, 
it may not necessarily be27.  Furthermore, there is a presumption on the part 
of the creator that without such protection, they would not always be able to 
recover their initial investments and would thus refrain from creativity in the 
future28.  This highlights the questionable nature of creativity as a purely 
economic concern on the part of the creator (as opposed to, say, a social 
one)29; ‘happiness’ or utility may be inherent in creative activity itself.30  
Nonetheless, viewing copyright in this way, it simply serves the pragmatic 
purpose of inducing creative activity31 and utilitarian copyright theory thus 
has a certain necessary ‘economic’ component.  It should also, in theory, 
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 Sumner, L.W., ‘Mill’s Theory of Rights’, in West, H.R. (ed), ‘The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s 
Utilitarianism’, (2006, Blackwell), chapter 8, pp184-199, p191. 
25
 “Mill’s claim ... is that a society will do a better job of protecting the well-being of its 
citizens – a better job of maximising general happiness – if it puts in place a system of 
conventional rights, including legal rights, which are backed by sanctions.”  Ibid, p192. 
26
 Zemer, L., ‘On the value of copyright theory’, (2006) IPQ 1 55-71, p60. 
27
 See chapter 1, pp21-23. 
28
 Spinello, R.A., and Tavani, H.T., ‘Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World’, 
(2005, Information Science Publishing), p14. 
29
 Investment in this sense, does not necessarily refer to financial investment.  It can include 
any ‘cost’ to the author, such as time etc. 
30
 See Mill, J.S., ‘Utilitarianism’, (1863), p10. 
31
 Spinello, R.A., and Tavani, H.T., ‘Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked World’, 
(2005, Information Science Publishing), p14. 
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diminish the potentially distorting effect which may result from undue focus 
on ‘romantic’ notions of authorship when conceptualising copyright law.  
Utilitarian arguments therefore have merit because it focuses on the users of 
content32.  It premises subjective conduct on the part of the individual (which 
in this instance can be paralleled with the user) in order to maximise their 
individual well-being33.   
 
Utilitarian economic arguments presuppose the existence of a market34 in 
order to determine the appropriate measures for the production and 
consumption of intellectual goods.  This operates through legal 
commodification and protection of content through copyright which should 
further its utilitarian goal.  This is a necessary aspect of utilitarianism, and is 
understandable; because copyright operates as a (limited) monopoly, there 
needs to be a market over which to exercise that monopoly and which would 
allow users to consume creative content35.  However, the existence of such a 
market necessarily implies that there is a producer and/or owner 
(rightsholder) in the economic sense, as distinct from a creator: “Economists 
regard copyright as a trade off between the positive effects of the incentives 
provided to creators and commercialisers of content.”36  This perhaps 
suggests that commercial producers work to different motivations than 
individual creators, who may not be as concerned with economic reward. 
 
In order for content to be produced at a socially optimum level, there must be 
some mechanism in place that affords protection to content to stop it being 
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 Hettinger, E.C., ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’, (1989) Philosophy & Public Affairs 18(1) 
31-52, p48. 
33
 “... it is a maximising doctrine because it requires us to always act so as to bring about as 
much well-being as possible.”  Shaw, W.H., ‘Contemporary Criticisms of Utilitarianism: a 
Response’, in West, H.R. (ed), ‘The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism’, (2006, 
Blackwell), chapter 9, pp201-217, p203,  See also chapter 3, p87. 
34
 Discussed further in chapter 3, pp104-119. 
35
 Ibid, p104, and chapter 5, p161, p166 and p174. 
36
 ‘Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’, (2011) An Independent 
Report by Professor Ian Hargreaves, p27, para 4.9.  Available from: 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf 
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reproduced and redistributed without limit.  Copyright is this mechanism and 
it is argued that without it, creative works would only be produced at a very 
low level (or not at all) if the work was not protected in some way.  The 
‘market’ is central to this approach and any matters relating to copyright are 
to be addressed from the position of how well the market is to function.  
Presciently, this theory arguably applies strongest in the digital age.  Whilst 
considerable ‘investment’ is still needed to produce (and ‘commercialise’) 
creative works37, the ease with which they can be copied and distributed in 
digital form means that rightsholders point to such economic incentive 
arguments as a basis for their strengthening copyright protection.  This is 
because the inherent problem of ‘free-riding’ is much more common with 
digital reproduction and distribution making it much easier to get a ‘free ride’ 
i.e. copying another’s work without cost, and to the copier’s benefit.  
Obviously this creates economic ‘benefit’ to the infringer, but represents an 
economic ‘cost’ to the creator and could threaten to cost society as a whole if 
they then create less because of this problem.  As a result, perhaps the most 
important effect of adhering to this philosophy is the business practices of the 
creative industries it has engendered38; it is the basis on which many of the 
arguments and courses of action that follow in this thesis have been 
predicated under utilitarian incentive arguments.   
 
The problem is that such an approach then leads to the assumption that 
damaging the financial interests of rightsholders will per se discourage new 
content production39.  Any position that attempts to judge the effectiveness of 
copyright based on a hypothetical market can be no more than a theoretical 
exercise as market value is a socially created phenomenon; dependent on 
the activity (or lack thereof) of other producers40.  The variables that exist in 
the real world cannot adequately be incorporated into any cost/benefit 
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 See chapter 1, pp21-22 
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 See chapter 3, p111 and p113. 
39
 Griffin, J.G.H., ‘An historical solution to the legal challenges posed by peer-to-peer file 
sharing and digital rights management technology’, (2010) Comms L 15(3) 78-86, p79. 
40
 Hettinger, E.C., ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’, (1989) Philosophy & Public Affairs 18(1) 
31-52, p38. 
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approach; costs and benefits cannot be gauged solely from looking at the 
market41.  Any theory centred on the market can have the obvious advantage 
of being to the benefit of the industry whose market it essentially is42.  
Benefits can also have potentially disparate effects which may not even 
become apparent until much later43.  Similarly, the issue of ‘cost(s)’ have the 
semantic and cultural nature of always being perceived as being against the 
rightsholder.  This is not always the case; they can be equally detrimental to 
the user or creator, whilst any corresponding benefit to the rightsholder may 
not be proportionate.  Furthermore, the goal of content producers is to 
maximise the production and dissemination of content under a utilitarian 
model.  No commercial private enterprise exists purely, or with the goal to 
benefit others44, although benefits to society resulting from efficiency and 
competition etc. may accrue.  They exist to maximise their own profit; a goal 
in which they can utilise copyright, but which can hardly be said to be a 
justification for it.  Therefore, when content is created with one particular 
‘market’ in mind, such an economic incentive argument fails as a reason to 
extend copyright in that work into another market45.  It could be argued that 
market commerciality may still provide benefits to society through enhancing 
productivity, but it is maintaining such commerciality that has driven the need 
for copyright protection, as opposed to enhancing the benefits from creative 
endeavour.  This is perhaps as a result of the ‘disruption’ digital technology 
has played in the perceived enforceability of copyright law (discussed further 
below). 
 
Nonetheless, a utilitarian justification of copyright law avoids an author-
centric approach which may be evident in other justifications (discussed 
below).  Early copyright law did reflect the prominence of the author; for 
example, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
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 See also chapter 5, pp186-187. 
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 See chapter 1, p12. 
43
 See chapter 3, pp105-110. 
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 For example, see the discussion of ‘rightsholders’ in chapter 1, p21-22. 
45
 Sterk, S.E., ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’, (1996) Michigan Law Review 94(5) 
1197-1249, p1215.  This is discussed more fully in chapter 4, p134, pp150-151, and p155. 
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Works (1886)46 clearly reflected the role of the author: “The works mentioned 
in this Article shall enjoy protection in all countries of the Union.  This 
protection shall operate for the benefit of the author and his successors in 
title.”47  However, copyright has evolved to accommodate technological 
developments in content fixation; namely ‘phonograms’ as enshrined in the 
Rome Convention (1961)48 and the Convention for the Protection of 
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their 
Phonograms (1971)49.  These reflect the changes in content production 
whereby a work may be created by more than one individual (producers and 
performers), or by a commercial enterprise: “‘producer of phonograms’ 
means the person who, or the legal entity which, first fixes the sounds of a 
performance or other sounds.”50  ‘Producers’, or ‘undertakings’, were 
accordingly granted the right to authorise the reproduction of their 
phonograms51.   
 
Such an approach is also reflective of the environment in which copyright 
operates52.  This is especially important in the digital world where new forms 
of user empowerment afforded by technology have both increased the 
number of ‘would-be’ creators as well as providing them with the equipment 
to harness their efforts (individually, or in conjunction with others)53.  Perhaps 
in some cases, the technology may exert more labour than the creator; for 
example, many music production software programmes are available which 
perform tasks that would otherwise be very time-consuming or impossible in 
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analogue format such as drum programming54, auto tuning55, and ProTools56 
audio production.  
 
Nonetheless, other philosophies are available and warrant consideration, but 
these do not necessarily form a more appropriate basis for the purposes of 
this thesis. 
 
 1.2 Natural rights 
The theory that someone (in this case, an author or creator) is entitled to 
control what they create is intuitive57.  John Locke was one of the first 
philosophers to comprehensively articulate justifications for property in ‘The 
Second Treatise of Government’, (1690)58 which has arguably become one 
of the most influential property theories in legal philosophy.  Despite writing 
at a time where copyright (and IP more generally) was not recognised, and 
having in mind physical property, it is logical that this theory may apply to 
copyright as well59.  It has arguably been utilised because the rhetorical force 
of his opinions translates effectively in the digital environment, and for its 
emphasis on personal autonomy60.  It is also not necessarily far-fetched; 
despite concerning ‘physical’ (as opposed to Intellectual) property61, his 
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notion of ‘body’ (that everyone has a property right in their own body) clearly 
also includes the mind.  Furthermore, the ‘mixing’ of labour with an 
(unowned) object must extend to intellectual labour; no labour is purely 
physical.   
 
Locke’s account of a property right derives from the rights in the product of 
labour from prior rights in one’s body62.  Simply put, he states that individuals 
are naturally entitled to the fruits of their own labour, and it is this ‘labour’ 
which establishes the boundaries of one’s property; a person ‘owns’ their 
own body and hence they own what it ‘does’63.Through applying labour to a 
resource, it can thus be said that the individual has appropriated that object; 
provided that labour is useful and purposeful so as to engender a property 
right.  
 
A person’s labour and its product(s) are inseparable and thus ownership of 
one can only be secured by owning the other; ‘property’ is the product that 
joins a person’s body and their labour.64.  His argument for a property right is 
based on the assumption that labour is an inherently unpleasant and 
onerous process, and as such, it is only undertaken in order to reap the 
benefits from it, i.e. a property right.  As a result, it would be unjust not to let 
people accrue the benefits they take such pains to procure65; labour merits 
this reward through the granting of a property right.  This recognises the 
author’s intellectual labour, or the contribution their creation makes to society 
in general.  Following this to its natural conclusion, appropriation of such 
property by others is unjustifiable as it inflicts harm on the ‘labourer’. 
 
In the case of creative property, an author obviously ‘owns’ their own labour 
and therefore should also be entitled to own the products resulting from the 
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exercise of such labour.  As such, the Lockean inspired argument is that 
one’s intellectual labour should entitle one to have a natural property right in 
the finished product of that labour.  Because a property right should be 
awarded per se, it is seen as a ‘natural right’.   
 
Such a ‘labour’-orientated theory is, however, problematic in a number of 
respects.  A major one, the author posits (in relation to the topic of this 
thesis), are the differences between labour as applied to physical property 
and as applied to intellectual property.  Related to this is a further issue of 
the appropriateness of labour for designating the boundaries of intellectual 
protection.  There is no direct correlation between labour (as the author’s 
effort, investment, contribution etc.) and the intangible outcome of such 
labour: “Justified on this basis, primarily on this basis, the intellectual regimes 
would be in danger of or protecting the perspiring, but not the inspired, 
creator.”66  Although labour can be seen to be a physically intensive 
enterprise, this is not necessarily the case with creative ‘labour’67.  As such, 
there is a fallacy between ‘is’ and ‘ought’; the fact that someone is 
responsible for creating a piece of content, does not on its own justify a 
resultant claim to control its use68 (or even, its distribution)69.  The 
motivations behind intellectual/creative labour are much more diffuse and 
hard to measure70.  In addition, the labour needed and invested may not 
necessarily be seen as onerous by the author; it is simply what ‘drives’ the 
author as a result of their (in some cases at least) innately creative nature71.   
 
 1.3 Personality 
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Another normative justification involves the intimate relationship between 
property and ‘personhood’ as a vehicle of self-expression.  This position 
assumes that in order to become a ‘person’, one needs some control over 
the resources in one’s environment in order to bring about such a 
manifestation.  This is premised on the assumption that that the allocation of 
entitlements and control over resources in the external environment (in the 
form of property) is necessary for the development of ‘personality’72.  Again, 
providing adequate justifications for property suggests it could be extended 
to confer IP rights as well73.  It offers protection for the creator by affording 
them some control over the intangibles in which they have invested74 them 
self.   
 
Within this scheme, property rights are more important for their existence 
than for their substantive content75.  However, one wonders whether this is 
really appropriate anymore owing to the importance of copyright’s 
substantive provisions (and related provisions) which have arguably grown 
over the past number of decades (and which are discussed later in this 
chapter).  The core insight of ‘personality theory’ is the notion of ‘embodied 
will’; the relationships we have with the objects that give our lives meaning 
and value.  Because property is about relations and not objects, the precise 
contours of legal doctrine are unimportant so long as property law enables 
people to engage in relations76.  It is these relationships that justify 
ownership77.  As applied to IP then, humans freely externalise their will in 
intellectual products, thus creating property to which they are entitled to, as a 
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manifestation of their personality78.  This theory does, however, avoid the 
pitfalls of Locke’s arguments by side-stepping the requirement of labour and 
imbues copyright theory with a more personable view that the very nature of 
an author is vested in the works he creates.  It is also perhaps more 
amenable to the nature of creativity and associated ‘romantic’79 notions of 
‘authorship’, but these are misconceived according to the author, at least in 
today’s world.   
 
It may be concluded that neither ‘labour’ nor ‘personhood’ are necessarily 
appropriate means through which to value intellectual creations; their 
applicability is not clear where the total value of an intellectual creation is not 
attributable to the labour, or personality, of one individual80.  The ‘romantic 
nature’ of authorship stemmed from the 18th century when authorship 
became associated with the exalting of individual effort81 in the literary 
Romantic Movement where the author was seen as a central and important 
figure82.  However, it is by no means clear whether the total value of an 
intellectual creation is entirely attributable to the labour of one individual, as 
reflected in the development of copyright to encompass new content 
production techniques and formats (discussed above).  Content may now be 
considered as social products that have been influenced by, and/or, are 
based on pre-existing creations in which the original author may not 
necessarily have invested as high a degree of labour: ‘... intellectual products 
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are fundamentally social products.”83  In addition, the value of the product 
may be perceived differently by different users, and also, because of the fact 
that equal labour does not always generate equal results84.  As such, the 
author’s labour can be very subjective in its apprehension.  In addition, what 
is meant by ‘personality’ (or ‘embodiment’) is unclear, and the associated 
claim that content will always be a vehicle of ‘self-actualisation’ will not 
always be the case85.  This reflects the changing nature of authorship such 
that a more accurate perception is that authorship is less about the ‘person’ 
and more about the ‘task’ of making choices and selections of content 
elements as determined by the medium of expression86.  The ‘tasks’ may 
more aptly be described as acts of ‘creation’ as opposed to ‘authorship’ and 
it is in this sense that the term ‘creators’ will be used in the remainder of this 
thesis.    
 
2. Horrible histories87 
It is unnecessary for the current purposes to delve back into copyright’s 
ancient and pre-digital history88.  Therefore, the ‘history’ of more recent 
‘disruption’ to copyright law resulting from the development of digital 
technologies will be examined.  This will invariably necessitate looking at the 
specific technologies in question.   
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Copyright (and IP as a legal system) has essentially resulted in 
commodification of creative content.  By relating the essential intangible 
nature of IP to the idea of physical property, through the requirement of 
‘fixation’89, copyright allowed for the ascribing of commodified ‘value’ to 
creative endeavour.  It is this which represents a fundamental conflict of 
values: “... on the one hand, a common patrimony which should be free, and, 
on the other hand, private property which can be immensely valuable to its 
owner.”90  It may be of financial value to the rightsholder as distinct from its 
creator or even the user; for whom value may be more disparate in nature91.  
The cause of this commoditisation was not initially the law itself, but the 
advent of technology in the form of Guttenberg’s printing press92, which 
necessitated protection for publishers and distributors of content.  Copyright 
has continued to be linked to technology: “Copyright is inherently 
technological, since the things it addresses ... are inherently technological.”93  
To some degree, copyright may be said to be technology-specific; at least it 
was technology that engendered the initial copyright system94 and has been 
a driving force behind many of the developments in copyright law since95.  
However, the problem of copying, or to put it in copyright terms, 
‘reproduction’, is not a phenomenon that is purely restricted to the digital 
 
89
 For example, s.3(2) of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988. 
90Mitchell, I.G. (QC), ’Case law report - Back to the Future: Hinton v Donaldson, Wood and 
Meurose (Court of Session, Scotland, 28th July, 1773)’, (2009) International Free and Open 
Source Software Law Review 1(2) 111-122, p112. 
91
 See the discussion of ‘value’ in chapter 3, pp106-110. 
92
 Mitchell, I.G. (QC), ’Case law report - Back to the Future: Hinton v Donaldson, Wood and 
Meurose (Court of Session, Scotland, 28th July, 1773)’, (2009) International Free and Open 
Source Software Law Review 1(2) 111-122, pp113-114. 
93
 Doctorow, C., ‘Content’, (2008, Tachyon Publications), p15. 
94
 Bettig, R.V., ‘Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property’, (2006, 
Westview Press), pp15-28. 
95
 See below, pp76-78.  See also Mills, M.L., ‘New Technology and the Limitations of 
Copyright Law: An Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of 
Rapid Technological Change’, (1989) 65 Chi-Kent L Rev 307-339, p310. 
56
age96; whenever a new technology has challenged copyright, copyright law 
has been changed97.  In the past, there was a certain stable pattern of 
control over physically-orientated content98, but by the late 1980s, there was 
talk of a ‘crisis’99 due to improving content reproduction technology.  The 
potential problem from increased audio reproduction technologies started to 
become apparent along with the growth of private copying100 at this time.  
According to one scholar writing at the time, private copying “... represents a 
monstrous misappropriation of the copyrights of composers, authors, 
producers and performers.”101  Technological and political change has 
produced an expansion in intellectual and service-based economies 
(compared to traditional industrial and product-based economies) and has 
altered the landscape considerably102.  The continuing commentary of the 
early to mid-nineties reflected a dispute over whether copyright could adjust 
to the rapid pace of technological change103.  It was initially thought that as 
an environment free from boundaries, the online world, or ‘Cyberspace’104, 
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would be free from any regulation or control105.  Moreover, any attempts at 
control would necessarily fail: 
 
“The realisation that there exists a virtual space or cyberspace and the 
discussion of what goes on inside that space excited a number of people 
from the very beginning.”106 
 
However, in the early nineties, there appeared to be a growing acceptance 
that the digitisation of content must, and would, lead to changes in the law107.  
Until then at least, the problem was seen as more theoretical than something 
which was of real concern108.  Nonetheless: 
 
“At this stage, it is easier to point to the challenges and difficulties 
rather than the solutions; but it is already clear that digitisation and new 
technologies must lead, eventually, to changes in the law and in commercial 
practice.”109 
 
These perceived challenges arose as a result of three distinct, but 
interrelated technological developments: the Internet; peer-to-peer (p2p) 
networks; and, the MP3 content format.  The development and subsequent 
effects of these technologies will now be examined as they have had an 
important effect on copyright regulation. 
 
 
2.1 The Internet 
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One of the biggest problems posed to copyright has been the development 
of the Internet; perhaps the most revolutionary social development since the 
printing press110 and is now part of the “... the fabric of our lives.”111  
Therefore it will be relevant to look at its development to see how it has 
become such a major tool of copyright infringement.   
 
There are largely two competing schools of thought on the development of 
the Internet as we now recognise it.  The first was as a product born of Cold 
War paranoia and the need to have in place an effective communications 
network that could withstand nuclear attack.  Work was begun by engineers 
at the Research and Development (RAND) Institute in America to develop a 
decentralised communications system that had no single centre of 
vulnerability.  This involved the principle of ‘distributed communications’ 
which evolved into ‘packet switching’ whereby messages would be broken up 
into smaller chunks (packets) and sent across the network to their 
destination where they would be reassembled.  The technique had the 
advantage over a regular communications network because if one 
communication node is damaged, the information would automatically route 
around it.  The first incarnation of the Internet was known as ‘ARPANET’ due 
to the involvement of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and 
was the main source of what ultimately became the Internet. 
 
Despite being designed as a resource-sharing tool, its use was redefined 
through the advent of electronic mail (email).  This new application came to 
dominate the network and was highly significant; it engaged and encouraged 
people in a new form of human communication.  In this sense, (and 
representing the second school of thought on the matter), the Internet is 
largely a result of work undertaken in academia; largely as a result of work 
carried out by the US National Science Foundation who built a high speed 
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‘backbone’ network to connect regional and local area networks to the 
defence network112.   
 
In 1980, ARPANET was converted to the TCP/IP protocol (Transfer Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol).  This is a universal protocol that is still used 
today, and allowed ARPANET to accommodate other networks that had 
been developed without difficulty.  The TCP/IP protocol effectively makes the 
network transparent to users and allows the Internet to function as a single 
united network113.  In 1989, ARPANET officially became known as the 
‘Internet’, having evolved into a fully fledged operational network consisting 
of over 100,000 connected computers.  At first, the Internet was primarily a 
tool for the research and academic communities and was limited to 
transmitting only text; any commercial activities were banned by respective 
Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs): “Significantly, it was from these beginnings 
that the culture of the Internet – which has important implications for 
intellectual property protection – gained its character.”114   
 
The development of the World Wide Web (WWW) and the accompanying 
release of Web ‘browsers’ provided the graphical interface which have made 
the Internet so appealing for ordinary individuals to navigate and use; 
transforming the Internet into a, “... ubiquitous and multi-functional 
medium.”115  Before this, the Internet’s interface was much more difficult to 
use as it was primarily command driven.  The advent of the Web made it 
much more user friendly by substituting commands for icons and mouse 
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clicks.  It was created by an engineer named Tim Berners-Lee at the 
European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN).  Indeed, it is arguable 
that the events surrounding the development of the WWW were key in both 
inducing and supporting the libertarian Internet ideal as Berners-Lee 
provided the coding for free online.  With the Web came the Hypertext 
Markup Language (HTML) standard.  This supports a system whereby tags 
are attached to a word or phrase that links it to another document located 
somewhere else on the Internet.  Importantly, from a copyright perspective, 
documents created by HTML can be in multimedia format and can include 
pictures, sound and video.  Along with this, the development of Internet 
browsers enabled users to effortlessly explore the Web116 and content on it.  
 
The distinctive feature of the Internet was its ‘openness’ in terms of its 
technological architecture117 and its social/institutional organisation118.  More 
specifically, it is useful to highlight some of the features of the Internet that 
make it such a potentially problematic area (for law119) to govern120.  The 
Internet is ‘asynchronous’.  With communication over the Internet, there is no 
need for coordination between the sender and recipient of a message; 
through email, such communications can be stored and accessed at anytime 
by the user.  It also permits ‘many-to-many’ communications; operating on a 
global scale, it allows communication between users around the world.  It 
also allows for interaction between users by providing them with the ability to 
‘speak back’ instantly.  As a distributed network, the Internet relies on 
packet-based technology and a naturally decentralised environment.  It gives 
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users more control over the flow of information and makes it more difficult to 
locate and obstruct information121.  Additionally, the Internet is highly 
scaleable and allows for a much more flexible expansion or contraction of 
users.  Arguably, its most important feature (and its main strength122) is its 
open architecture.  It is designed to maximise interoperability, and to be 
independent of software programmes, hardware platforms and other 
technologies.  This: 
 
“… is its greatest virtue since it encourages greater participation in the 
form of new technologies and applications that help shape and reshape the 
entire network.”123 
 
Another important design aspect of the Internet is the principle of ‘end-to-
end’ which has been latent in its design for many years124.  This architectural 
principle was envisaged in the early eighties and described the process 
whereby:  
 
“The function in question can completely and correctly be 
implemented only with the knowledge and help of the application standing at 
the endpoints of the communication system.”125 
 
This premises that the ‘intelligence’ in a network should be located at its 
‘ends’; where users put information and applications onto the network126.  
 
121
 “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”  Boyle, J., ‘Foucault in 
Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and Hard-Wired Censors’, p1, available from: 
http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/foucault.htm 
122
 Castells, M., The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and Society’, 
(2001, Oxford University Press), p27. 
123
 Spinello, R.A., ‘Regulating Cyberspace: The Policies and Technologies of Control’, 
(2002, Quorum Books), p30. 
124
 Lemley, M.A., and Lessig, L., ‘The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the 
Internet in the Broadband Era’, (2001) 48 UCLA L Rev 925-972, p930. 
125
 Salzter, J.H., Reed, D.P., and Clark, D., ‘End-To-End Arguments in System Design’, 
(1984) ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 2(4) 277-288, p278. 
62
Central to this is the place of users, whom history has shown to be the key 
producers of technology, through adaption and transformation in accordance 
with their values127.  This trend therefore allows for “... the creation of 
information spaces that are at the core of the online community 
phenomenon.”128  However, due to the technological restraints of the 
physical infrastructure, it was not yet feasible to utilise it to send large files; 
this was greatly facilitated be the developments of new content compression 
formats, notably MP3 technology.  
 
2.2 MP3 
MP3 is a content compression format and has had a crucial impact on 
(musical) content: 
 
 “MP3 has revolutionised the way we listen to music, introducing music 
to the Internet and giving rise to issues that were never previously associated 
with music.”129 
 
MP3 stands for ‘Moving130 Picture Experts Group-Layer 3’, and was 
developed by engineers at the Frauenhofer Gesellshaft in Germany in 
1987131.  However, its origins can be traced as far back as the late 1970s 
(and much like the development of the Internet) to the world of academia; 
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namely a group of PhD students at the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg132.  
The idea of compressing an audio file to produce a high-quality, low bitrate 
audio format was first pursued there by Professor Dieter Seitzer133 as a 
tangent of a research project designed to improve the speed and efficiency 
of speech telephony; it was decided that it would be ‘interesting’ to try and 
send audio files over the network as well134. 
 
It was a doctoral student, Karlheinz Brandenburg, under Seitzer’s 
supervision, who exploited the hearing properties of the human ear to 
develop basic principles for audio coding135.  To make the format work, the 
researchers136 had to engage in an already-existing area of science, known 
as ‘psychoacoustics’.  Psychoacoustics describes the relationship between 
the sound field presented to the listener, and what they actually hear137, i.e. it 
relates to how the brain perceives sound, and more importantly in this 
context, what sound(s) the brain leaves out138.  According to Knopper, “For a 
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long time, nobody had any idea that this obscure German research project 
would turn into anything more than an obscure German research project.”139 
 
The University formed a partnership with the Frauenhofer Institute for 
Integrated Circuits (with European funding) in 1987 when Brandenburg 
finished constructing an audio algorithm.  Frauenhofer saw this as exhibiting 
many characteristics of an audio codec they required, and which they 
subsequently developed resulting in ‘ASPEC’ (Adaptive Spectral Perceptual 
Entropy Coding)140.  By 1991, they had successfully completed their work 
resulting in a suitable compression format and an open standard player for 
computers, and submitted it to the ‘International Organisation for 
Standardisation’141.  It was assigned specifically to the Moving Picture 
Experts Group (MPEG) which deals in the standards for digital multimedia 
formats142.  In total, fourteen different groups submitted their technologies to 
the MPEG143 which perhaps reflects just how many different actors there 
were in MP3’s development.  MPEG merged four of the proposals and 
created the standard known initially as ‘ISO-MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3’144, 
hence ‘MPEG 3’ and most commonly, ‘MP3’: 
 
“The aim of the MP3 algorithm is to make the compression as efficient 
as possible and to reconstruct the audio data so that it sounds identical to 
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the original audio data after compression, at least to the human ear 
anyway.”145 
 
It is an audio compression format that reduces files up to 1/20 of their original 
size with minimal loss of quality.  This is achieved in two ways146: 
• Passing the resulting samples through high and low band filters; and, 
• Discrete sampling of continuous sound waves. 
 
The first stage involves feeding the input through known as a ‘Hybrid 
Filterbank’ where the input signal is split into its constituent frequency bands 
and sub-bands.  Conducted in parallel, a psychoacoustic model is used 
which removes the acoustically ‘relevant’ parts of the audio (the frequencies 
which can be heard by the human ear – between 20Hz and 20kHz).  This 
determines which frequencies need to be rendered most accurately, or 
dropped completely.   
 
Following this, the analogue amplitude values are digitally converted and 
then encoded using Huffman encoding147 (a description of which is available 
on the website/blog of the namesake’s nephew, Ken Huffman148).  Roughly 
speaking, this is a compression method (or algorithm) based on the 
frequency of occurrence of a data item and using a short sequence of ‘bits’ 
for representing common items (for example, a repetitive hi-hat drum rhythm 
in a song149).  This process involves allocating the data to the available 
number of ‘bits’ which make up the ‘bitrate’ which is then an indicator of 
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audio quality; the higher the bitrate, the better the quality: “My uncle’s 
algorithm makes the world a smaller place.”150   
 
In 1993, the description of the MP3 format was published151 and work soon 
began on developing playback engines.  Since 1998, companies have been 
buying rights to develop and sell codecs and decodecs for the format with 
the most popular player being ‘Winamp’ which was released in 1999152 and 
was free.  Much like the Web, the development of user-empowering 
technology was made freely accessible to them, with profound impact153.  
However, the broader technological (and ultimately legal) impact in this 
instance was to arise in conjunction with the operation of peer-to-peer 
networks and the Internet as a distribution mechanism for MP3 files. 
 
2.3 Peer-to-peer 
P2p is a form of distributed computer architecture designed for the sharing of 
computer resources by direct exchange rather than requiring intermediary 
support154 and which aims to aggregate large numbers of computers which 
may join and leave the network frequently155.  P2p technology is one of the 
key methods of supporting the expanded use of digital media and 
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dramatically improves the quality as well as efficiency of digital media 
distribution156.   
 
It facilitates rapid access to digital content by large groups of individual 
users.  With distributed computing networks, many separate computers can 
function collectively together thus enhancing the efficiency of computer 
resource use157.  Such systems threaten the integrity of copyright by 
fostering decentralisation of content control158.  They have the effect of 
empowering users but, at the same time, making rights management much 
more difficult.   
 
At their most basic level, peer-to-peer systems create an environment where 
the content of one computer is, in effect, accessible to all other computers on 
the network159 and all nodes are completely equivalent in terms of 
functionality160.  However, beyond this, there is little further agreement as to 
what is, or is not, p2p161.  It has been suggested that a reason for this is how 
such networks are externally perceived in terms of providing direct 
interaction between computers162.  The author believes this is of 
consequence to the public and content industries’ perception of p2p, not so 
much in terms of distinguishing between the architectures which are 
employed, but in terms of the use which is made of them163.   
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However, p2p has two defining characteristics164: 
• The sharing of computer resources by direct exchange; and 
• Their ability to treat instability and variable connectivity as the norm 
(fault tolerance). 
 
This would seem to remove Napster (considered later in this thesis165) from 
the definition as it did not operate exclusively by direct exchange.  However, 
the ‘history’ of p2p does fall into three distinct ‘generations’166.  The first 
generation operated via a central file list where the user sent a search 
enquiry to this central server.  The server then sent back a list of which peers 
that had the requested file and facilitated the connection and download.  
Second generation networks ditched the central server in favour of electing 
nodes on the network that had higher capacities as indexing nodes, with 
lower capacity ones branching off them.  This allowed for a network with 
much greater capacity.  The third and latest generation peer-to-peer 
networks are those with anonymity features and encryption built in, or so-
called ‘darknets’167.  However, these have not reached mass usage as they 
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have a greater overhead cost involved in sending files that multiplies 
bandwidth.  
 
P2p technology has a range of applications168, but arguably its most 
important in the context of this thesis is that of content distribution, also 
referred to as ‘file-sharing’.  Under this concept however, several different 
technologies are lumped together169  This is a content distribution system 
which creates a distributed storage medium allowing for the publishing, 
searching and retrieval of files by members of the network170 and in general 
terms, is the practice of making files available to other users over the Internet 
and smaller networks via p2p.  Most p2p file sharing applications share the 
following goals of being able to operate in a dynamic network, performance 
and scalability, reliability and anonymity171.  This operation of p2p as a 
content distribution system relies on a network of peer computers and 
connections between them; the network is formed on top of, and 
independently from, the underlying physical IP (Internet Protocol) network 
and may be referred to as an ‘overlay’ network172.  As a result, they build a 
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virtual network at the application level with its own ‘routing’ mechanisms173 
which are dependent on the ‘generation’ of the network. 
 
P2p architectures have a number of benefits; they afford the ability to 
function, scale and self-organise in the presence of an increasing or 
decreasing number of computers/users aka ‘peers’ or nodes, with little or no 
overhead administration costs174.  Furthermore, they create a resilient and 
redundant network; enable real-time collaborative work with remote 
partners175; they are efficient (spreading resources), and consumer-
orientated, as well as being economical and cost-effective176.  Two main 
factors have been identified as being responsible for the expansive growth of 
such systems: firstly, the low cost and high availability of computing and 
storage devices, and secondly, increased network connectivity177. 
 
 2.4 The ‘Holy Trinity’ 
Most broadly in the area of information and communications technology, 
changes were underway178.  The ‘buzzword’ of the era was arguably 
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‘convergence’; described at the time as a blurring between the distinct areas 
of broadcasting, radio communications and telecommunications179.   
 
Furthermore, between the storage of data, the manipulation of data and the 
transmission of data was noted180, with the effect of merging traditional 
media and their existing platforms181.  As such, convergence has taken place 
at an ever more localised way; from industry sectors, to delivery methods, 
and to the content itself; the availability of which is crucial to a healthy 
creative environment.    
 
The spread of digital technology caused many to fear for the continued 
viability of copyright law and marked a sea-change in attitudes towards 
content itself, and the measures in place designed to protect it: “The balance 
between protection and availability has to change in order to enter into the 
digital age.”182  The author would argue that the balance between protection 
and availability had already changed as the digital age commenced; primarily 
with regard to the availability of content which became much more 
widespread.  It was this supposed ‘mis-balance’ that then proceeded to be 
addressed in the digital age through regulation. 
 
To the author, the term ‘convergence’ has further resonance in the early 
digital environment with the independent, yet (chronologically at least) 
related developments of three ‘technologies’, namely’ the Internet, MP3 and 
peer-to-peer.  From a copyright-enforcement perspective, the benefits of 
such technological systems seemed to go unappreciated.  Nonetheless, 
there has always been a consistent pattern of copyright being applied to the 
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digital environment, as opposed to ‘aspects’ of the digital environment being 
applied to copyright.  The author asserts that the former relationship is what 
has engendered the particular tensions between copyright and technology.  
Copyright law has arguably had difficulty accommodating technological 
change throughout its history183 which is perhaps endemic of the problem; 
copyright has always necessarily been applied retrospectively to advances in 
technology (the technology advances first and the law then has to ‘catch-up’ 
with it).  However, in the digital age, the most problematic aspect for 
rightsholder is to manage distribution so as to prevent users from distributing 
content widely and freely to others184.  This is because for the author, digital 
technology has led to a convergence of content into a single digital form185 
available through a unified digital platform (the Internet).  In response to this, 
regulation was chosen and as such could be said to have converged around 
this issue also.   
 
However, any previous technological development that had allegedly posed 
a problem for copyright law (or more aptly, rightsholders) has been confined 
to the analogue world that still had an element of ‘property’ about it (tangibles 
such as cassettes and videotapes etc.).  However, digitisation removed the 
last vestiges of physical property from the equation.  Digitisation refers to the 
translation of information into a digital form: 
 
 “Once digitised, all information is basically the same, so that it is 
readily capable of being carried on any digital transmission system.  Digitised 
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information is also more easily stored or copied.  Of particular importance to 
copyright ... digitised information can be easily manipulated.”186 
 
This has a number of results: 
• Ease 
Digital facilitates replication, transmission and multiple use187; 
• Equivalence188 
All types of ‘work necessarily become the same (i.e. sequences of 
binary code)189 and are thus equivalent; and, 
• Plasticity190 
Information may be merged, manipulated and used much more 
easily191. 
 
This has also led to a loss of ‘centrality’ in terms of not requiring a specified 
supplier of content; and to a lesser extent, the de-materialisation of 
content192.  To the author, these also represent opportunities.  The ease of 
replication and manipulation of digital content may serve to foster creativity in 
terms of the ‘mechanics’ of it i.e., providing the opportunity to be creative in 
the first place, actually creating something, and also distributing it.  However, 
the loss of ‘centrality’ aspect is an important legacy in terms of its effect 
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today which has perhaps resulted in a fundamental change in notions of 
ownership and ‘property’193.  It is now clear that the design of technologies 
and associated architectures is an important aspect in the study of digital 
copyright as a legal system194.  Such ‘disruption’ to copyright law is primarily 
due to the development of three inter-related technologies considered above; 
the Internet, MP3 and peer-to-peer: “Technology that disrupts copyright does 
so because it simplifies and cheapens creation, reproduction and 
distribution.”195  Although there are these three distinct technologies involved 
in ‘digital’, they have all helped to bring about the same result; convergence 
of content into a single digital form which may theoretically be available from 
a single (combined) digital platform.   
 
Instead of copyright being under ‘threat’ from one specific technology, it 
could arguably be seen as under threat from three separate (albeit 
interrelated) technologies in the digital era.  However, this can again be 
distilled down into its core component; the digitisation of content and 
consequent removal of physical technological barriers marked the digital 
revolution as being different from any preceding it.  This also had a 
necessarily social complexion196: 
 
 “The wonderful thing about technology is that people end up doing 
with it something different from what was originally intended.  It is this 
serendipity that underlies creativity in society...”197 
 
However, far from being perceived as ‘wonderful’ by regulators, it seemingly 
proved problematic.  The fundamental problem is that electronic copying is a 
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major threat to copyright holders’ two main exclusive rights of reproduction 
and distribution, and even the position of the content industries themselves: 
“The Internet was making them obsolete.”198  The importance of reproduction 
cannot be overstated; the existence of copies stands for independence: 
“Copies free the user from limits of place and time.  They also free him from 
the right owner’s control…”199  This is especially apt today with, for example, 
portable MP3 player technology200.  In addition: “With advancing technology, 
new means of creating intellectual property have been matched by new 
delivery and copying systems.”201  It was realised that such advances result 
in an extension of ways in which copyright may be utilised, which in turn 
requires a flexible and adaptive copyright system: “... which directs attention 
to the economic benefit derived by the disseminator and user of the copyright 
material.”202  Digital technology poses a number of problems to copyright 
through the digitisation of copyright works, their existence as digital products 
and the growth of networks203, as well as the resultant growth of online 
communities204.   
 
Specifically, the three ‘technologies’ outlined above have combined (or 
converged) not to alter copyright itself, but to alter its application in the digital 
era.  It has not been the rise of production technologies, but the rise in 
delivery technologies that have created problems for a technology specific 
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copyright system205.  However, recognition of these at the start of the 
nineties did not engender any immediate concern206.  However, from this 
point onwards, there did appear to be a growing acceptance that digitisation 
must and would lead to changes in the law207; with emphasis shifting to the 
primacy of protecting and maintaining IP rights online208.   
 
3. Regulation 
Copyright protection itself turns creative works into saleable and marketable 
commodities for the purposes of the law.  By requiring fixation209 and 
providing protection, copyright turns creation into property i.e. the 
commodification necessary for copyright to achieve its utilitarian end: 
 
“The fundamental goal of copyright, to provide incentives for the 
creation and dissemination of works of authorship continues to be important 
to the furtherance of knowledge and culture, no matter what the technology 
of the day.”210 
 
As such, it is necessary for copyright to operate in the digital environment in 
order to realise this end.  However, digitising property raised potential 
questions over the ‘integrity’211 of copyright works where their value and form 
threatened to become meaningless.  To the author, digital ‘expression’ of 
content does have value; just because content has changed in its medium, 
that does not mean that the value of the content itself decreases and it is 
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unfair to describe the digital form has having no value either212.  The low 
costs involved in the digital process is necessarily a result of technological 
advances213 which have served to minimise digital costs to a fraction that can 
barely be measured, let alone ascribed a monetary ‘value’.  Likewise, digital 
content can also have value (not necessarily financial, but at least in the 
utilitarian sense) in its ‘plasticity’; the fact that it may more easily be 
manipulated or changed, which can lead to the generation of new content.   
 
Copyright is a law deeply rooted in the print environment which relied on the 
characteristics of the medium to delineate the boundaries between producers 
and users214.  Confronted with a new set of facts and old legal issues, the 
question is whether copyright has been stretched to breaking point, or 
whether it can be effectively ‘translated’ for the digital environment215.  Far 
from ceasing to be relevant216, as a result of digitisation copyright now has 
an important role to play in the creation, upload, transmission, access and 
use of content217: 
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“The issue that regulation must resolve is whether the destabilisation 
will result in a more tightly controlled, a more freely flowing, or a more-or-less 
similarly controlled environment.”218 
 
Furthermore, the argument that copyright was even more applicable than 
previously; because of the ‘blurring’ of roles digital technology engendered: 
“Peer-to-peer file sharing had turned consumers into distributors.  CD 
burners had turned them into manufacturers.”219  The regulatory reaction 
which set in could be seen ‘interventionist’, ‘regulatory’, or even, 
‘expansionist’, but the essential claim is that the Internet is too important not 
to regulate220.   
 
 3.1 WIPO Treaties 
In 1989, the governing body of WIPO decided to deal with the impact of 
computers and networks on copyright221; the first milestone was reached in 
1996 with the negotiation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).  In contrast to the 
more prolonged period of negotiations over previous international IP treaties, 
these may more aptly be described as being ‘fast-tracked’222.  However, it 
should be noted that the increased regulation is not necessarily confined to 
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copyright or even IP law: “Across all fields of law there is a clear trend for 
legislation and regulation to become increasingly detailed.”223  As such, 
copyright law is no different in this respect, but serves as a clear example of 
this phenomenon.  Primarily, the WCT updated the pre-existing international 
copyright conventions to address the developments in digital technology, as 
the ‘Agreed Statements concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty’224 states: 
 
 “The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne 
Convention, and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the 
digital environment, in particular to the use of works in digital form. It is 
understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an 
electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 
of the Berne Convention.”225 
 
Similarly, with regard to the WPPT: 
 
“The reproduction right, as set out in Articles 7 and 11, and the 
exceptions permitted thereunder through Article 16, fully apply in the digital 
environment, in particular to the use of performances and phonograms in 
digital form. It is understood that the storage of a protected performance or 
phonogram in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction 
within the meaning of these Articles.”226 
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The WCT also went some way to combining the fragmented rights of the 
Berne Convention (articles 1, 11bis, 11ter, and 14227) by combining them into 
a single right of communication under article 8.  This assumes a greater 
importance when one remembers that from 1994, the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was also in force obliging all World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) members to instigate certain IP protection.  Whilst 
this could arguably have been seen as purely solidifying ‘current’ IP rights, 
the WIPO Treaties could arguably be viewed as extending them into the 
digital era: 
 
 “While the TRIPS Agreement was pursued to protect existing 
intellectual property rights, the WIPO Treaty of 1996 related more directly to 
the impact of the Internet on the future of copyright.”228 
 
Such laws form a cluster of regulation attempting to establish the terms of 
control over information flows resulting from a shake-up of the technological 
parameters that defined the boundaries of control in the pre-Internet era229.   
The legal response could be viewed as a process of ‘consolidating’ copyright 
rules to apply to the digital era; however, they maintain a narrow focus on the 
control a rightsholder can exercise, at the expense of the benefits digital 
technologies provide:  
 
“The narrow focus on threats to copyright owners’ control of their 
works can lose sight of the potential value, to authors as well as to reader, of 
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a digital network permitting high-speed transmission of a variety of material 
with few constraints.”230 
 
Whilst the foundations of copyright law have been outlined above as being 
utilitarian-based, this period of copyright development has little to do with the 
traditional goals of benefitting society: 
 
 “In stabilising control over digital information goods, the regulatory 
response has been fairly consistent, and it has consistently been on the side 
of expanding the powers of the owners to control the use of their 
products.”231 
 
As a result, the era of digital technology has affected both sides of the 
utilitarian justification for copyright which was established at the beginning of 
this chapter.  Such technology could be said to be the ultimate embodiment 
of ‘benefitting society’, but this impacts on the balance between this and 
encouraging production.  As a result, the warning signs of what was to follow, 
and what will be outlined in the remainder of this thesis, are evident from this 
period (even though it took a further five years for them to be tested232).  This 
is of further importance when one realises that the WIPO system is one of 
‘guided’ development to assist national legislatures in the development of 
national responses to the challenge of digital technology233; therefore these 
warning signs are of crucial importance as they laid the groundwork for much 
of what was to follow. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Ultimately, it has been suggested that network rules and policies themselves 
should guide regulatory policy options, but this does not particularly relate to 
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the issue of content234.  The (then) ‘new’ WIPO rules did no more than 
reaffirm copyright as existing and applying in the digital environment, but 
over-emphasis on the information policies and practices as they exist online 
has almost threatened to disturb copyright as a legal mechanism through 
emphasising ‘reward’ (through control) over ‘creativity’.  This is despite the 
fact that the challenges posed by digital technology were not necessarily 
anything ‘new’: 
 
 “The copyright and other intellectual property issues implicated by the 
information infrastructure are ... not fundamentally different from those 
already faced by authors and rightholders in the pre-networked world...”235 
 
Nonetheless, law has the capacity to parry many of the challenges of the 
Internet236 and copyright still applies in the digital environment, perhaps more 
than ever.  As such, so does regulation: “The new technical possibilities 
brought about by the Internet make it even easier for governments to 
cooperate in the enforcement of their common rules.”237  Therefore, we can 
view convergence as occurring over content (including distribution) and also 
over regulation.  However, the two do not sit comfortably with each other.  
The consolidation and application of regulation can have a negative effect on 
creative environment as defined in the introduction238 and which digital 
technology can benefit:  
 
“That network can both encourage creation and dissemination by 
reducing the costs associated with it, and can enhance the value of material 
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made available over the network because of the ease with which it can be 
linked239 to other valuable material.”240 
 
Simply stating that technology and regulation are at odds with each other 
does not fully address the issue.  Copyright commodifies content, and it is 
therefore copyright that would logically apply when something affects that 
commodification.  However, it is suggested that the argument should be 
phrased the opposite way around; copyright should not be applied to 
technology, rather the possibilities engendered by digital technology should 
be applied to copyright itself241.  Understanding the issue in this way would 
remove at least some of the tensions inherent in this relationship by applying 
patterns in the digital environment to copyright law242.  What is clear is that 
the digital revolution was seen to warrant increased regulation and that 
regulation should theoretically apply in the digital world as it does in the 
physical.  Nonetheless, regulation cannot be solely applied to technology, it 
must also be applied to society, and users who have their own specific set of 
values and whose behaviour may be guided by different factors.  As a result, 
the analysis will now move on to consider in more detail the effect regulation 
has (or has not) had on users. 
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Chapter 3: Modalities of Regulation 
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Modalities of Regulation 
1. Introduction 
Consumption habits regarding digital content, specifically recorded music, 
continue to demonstrate the persistence of copyright infringement; indicating 
an important disjunct between the existence (and operation) of copyright and 
its influence.  As part of such an evaluation, questions regarding why people 
engage in such behaviour should reflect factors readily appreciable to users 
and therefore recognise the digital environment in which they operate.  
Central to the understanding of regulation of the Internet, and in this context, 
regulation of behaviour, is ‘Code’ by Lawrence Lessig1 in which he attempted 
to extend ‘traditional’ models of regulatory analysis into Cyberspace2.  His 
work also has relevance more generally in relation social regulation3.  A 
‘Lessigan’ approach has merit as it addresses issues surrounding legal 
control with regard to the regulation of users who may be influenced by 
factors beyond copyright law.  Although (or perhaps because) he is widely 
considered the leader of the copyright reform movement4, Lessig himself 
attracts criticism: “Like many other I.P. Reformers, Lessig is routinely 
denounced as a communist.”5  As his work deals with both Internet 
regulation6 and its consequences7 a ‘Lessigan’ model may be formulated to 
address those factors which may impact upon user decisions to engage in 
unauthorised downloading of digital music.. 
 
1
 Lessig, L., ‘Code (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books). 
2
 Murray, A.D., ‘Regulating the Post-Regulatory Cyber-State’, in Brownsword R., and Yeung, 
K. (eds) ‘Regulating Technologies’, (2008, Hart), 287-316.  Available from: 
http://works.bepress.com/andrew_murray/7 
3
 Lessig, L., ‘The Regulation of Social Meaning’, (1995) The University of Chicago Law 
Review 62(3) 943-1045. 
4
 Hunter, D., ‘Culture War’, (2005) 83 Texas Law Review 1105-1136, p1114. 
5
 Hunter, D., ‘Marxist-Lessigism’, Legal Affairs, available from: 
http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/2004-12_legalaffairs_marxist_lessigism.pdf 
6
 See generally, Lessig, L., ‘Code (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books). 
7
 Lessig, L., ‘The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World’, (2002, 
First Vintage Books Edition), and, ‘Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity’, (2004, 
Penguin Books). 
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There are many regulatory mechanisms in operation in the digital 
environment which may carry with them their own forms of regulatory 
influence, or ‘social power’, which warrant consideration8.  A ‘Lessigan’ 
approach deals with real-world factors which may be more perceptible to 
users as a form of regulation or governance9.  Lessig’s central idea is that 
‘code’, i.e. the instructions embedded in the hardware and software of 
Cyberspace, is the main regulator of this environment; or its architecture10.  
However, this is insufficient on its own: “Which way societies will go does not 
certainly depend on the code itself, but on the ability of societies and their 
institutions to impose, resist, and modify the code.”11  As such, four main 
factors which govern regulation in the ‘real world’ may be extracted: law, 
norms (social constraints), the market12, and architecture (i.e. what Lessig 
refers to as ‘code’13).  Before the digital era, they could be seen as all 
effectively being in balance with each other14, but they are also 
interdependent: 
 
 “Technologies can undermine norms and laws; they can also support 
them.  Some constraints make others possible; others make some 
impossible.  Constraints work together, though they function differently and 
the effect of each is distinct.”15 
 
At first glance, this may not seem to provide any further explanation of the 
behaviour of users.  However, further examination of these modalities in this 
 
8
 Bowrey, K., ‘Law & Internet Cultures’, 2005, Cambridge), p169. 
9
 Ibid, p169: “... the more diffuse expressions of identity and social power should not be so 
readily ignored.”   
10
 Lessig, L., ‘Code (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p121 
11
 Castells, M., The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and Society’, 
(2001, OUP), p183. 
12
 Ibid, pp122-123. 
13
 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p81.  This is also discussed in 
chapter 5 regarding Digital Rights Management (DRM), pp171-172, and chapter 6 on ISP 
liability, pp243-244. 
14
 Lessig, L., ‘Free Culture: The Nature of Creativity’, (2004, Penguin Books), p125. 
15
 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p124. 
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chapter reveals a practical applicability in relation to the regulation 
surrounding users’ consumption practices16.  Nonetheless, it must also be 
borne in mind that they also have objective and subjective perspectives17; 
each modality has a subjective and an objective aspect18.  A subjective 
approach, by the very definition of the term, is dependent on how users 
perceive them and can only be speculated upon.  An objective view can 
provide clarity as to how these modalities act and interact; however their 
specific applications and effects can only be gauged subjectively.  Lessig 
posits that subjective constraints may operate before one acts in the first 
place19.  Their subjective nature is important; a Lessigan model has the 
further advantage of perspective based on the fact that Lessig also thinks 
about ‘what’ (i.e. the ‘thing’) is regulated20 and the fact that as well as 
regulation, enablement may also be considered21.  As such, it is crucial to 
appreciate the nature of the ‘thing’ that is regulated. 
 
The author’s development of a Lessigan model of Internet regulation and 
associated behavioural aspects will now be outlined.  It is important to 
highlight that this model is specifically formulated to relate to recorded music, 
as a form of digital content22, in light of the technologies discussed in the 
previous chapter23.  It will begin by outlining the characteristics if the ‘things’ 
which are subject to regulation i.e. the user and digital music content.  
However, copyright (as the legal modality) only operates to link the user and 
 
16
 As identified by Bowery: “What has been missing from discussion so far is a consideration 
of how this legal control over production and distribution fits with the consumption practices 
that support the development of new digital products and services.”  Bowrey, K., ‘Law & 
Internet Cultures’, 2005, Cambridge), pp139-140. 
17
 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p344. 
18
 Ibid, p344. 
19
 Ibid, p344. 
20
 Ibid, p121. 
21
 Ibid, p122. 
22
 Where the term ‘content’ is thus used, it will therefore correspond to recorded music 
available in digital form. 
23
 See chapter 2, pp54-75 
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digital content.  Therefore, a wider exploration is necessary and attention will 
then turn to the modalities of norms, the market and architecture. 
 
2. The Law 
The law operates in relation to copyrighted content, but it also affects users.  
Any consideration of behavioural aspects of illegal digital copyright 
infringement must therefore focus on the individual who is compelled to act in 
such a way. Theoretically, control is the fundamental premise of regulation24 
and in a perfect society, the mere existence of laws would be sufficient to 
ensure adherence to them25.  However, there is obviously a disjunct between 
the existence (and operation) of the law and its influence as illegal copyright 
infringement persists: “... unintended consequences are central to any 
understanding of the process of regulation.” 26  The continuation of 
unauthorised digital copyright infringement (as an ‘unintended consequence’) 
suggests that any legal component is minimal.  Instead, the most that could 
perhaps be said is only that: “...the opportunity to stick it to the Man appealed 
to some downloaders.”27  This perhaps relates to a perceived lack of fairness 
(both substantive, and arguably, procedural) and mistrust on the part of the 
public28 implying some sort of moral29 or ethical30 dimension31.  Although this 
 
24
 Murray, A.D., ‘Symbiotic Regulation’, (2008) 26 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 207-228, 
p225. 
25
 Ouma, M.N., ‘Optimal Enforcement of Music Copyright in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reality or 
Myth?’, (2006) Journal of World Intellectual Property 9(5) 592-627, p593. 
26
 Lessig, L., ‘The Regulation of Social Meaning’, (1995) The University of Chicago Law 
Review 62(3) 943-1045, p957. 
27
 Kot, G., ‘Ripped: How the Wired Generation Revolutionised Music’, (2009, Scribner), p46.  
See also chapter 5, p190. 
28
 Jensen, C., ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital 
Technology, and Social Norms’, (2003) Stanford Law Review 56(2) 531-570, p541. 
29
 Hill, C.W.L., ‘Digital piracy: Causes, consequences, and strategic responses’, (2007) Asia 
Pacific J Management 24(9) 9-25, p13. 
30
 “Downloading is an ethically confused activity.”  ‘Copycats? Digital Consumers in the 
Online Age’, (2009) A CIBER report for the Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property 
Policy, p3, available from: http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-ipresearch/ipresearch-
policy/ipresearch-policy-attitude.htm 
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may imply that users who illegally download music suffer from low levels of 
‘moral development’32, this is to do them a disservice33.  The author has 
grown up in such a culture (having also engaged in such practice) and 
having posed similar questions to students, would argue that there is more to 
this issue than such theories suggest.  Such considerations are nonetheless 
valid; especially in evaluating the fact that appealing to users’ ‘morality’ (to 
stop illegal downloading) may be perceived as a form of hypocrisy34.  
However, moral or ethical considerations also do not correspond to 
copyright’s philosophical foundation: “Copyright isn’t an ethical proposition, 
it’s a utilitarian one.”35   
 
Because copyright is a utilitarian instrument with a necessary user element36, 
it is necessary to look at the behaviour of users37, in terms of other regulatory 
(as opposed to ‘ethical’) influences.  However, there has to be some 
appreciation that not all regulators regulate, and not all ‘regulatees’ are 
merely actors to be regulated38.  It must also be borne in mind from the 
    
31
 Gopal, R.D, Sanders, L.G., Bhattacharjee, S., Agrawal, M., and Wagner, S.C., ‘A 
Behavioural Model of Digital Music Piracy’, (2004), p10.  Available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=527344 
32
 Assuming they would aware of what ‘moral development’ is.  This explained in Hill, C.W.L., 
‘Digital piracy: Causes, consequences, and strategic responses’, (2007) Asia Pacific J 
Management 24(9) 9-25. 
33
 As Bowrey states further: “Fans have a common-sense of appreciation of commodity 
cycles and an understanding of the control that music consortiums exercise globally over 
artists and their music.”  Bowrey, K., ‘Law & Internet Cultures’, 2005, Cambridge), pp160-
161. 
34
 Lantagne, S.S., ‘The Morality of MP3s: The Failure of the Recording Industry’s Plan of 
Attack’ (2004) Harv J L & Tech 18(1) 269-293, p280. 
35
 Doctorow, C., ‘Content’, (2008, Tachyon Publications), pp20-21.  See chapter 2, pp41-49. 
36
 See chapter 2, p42, and p45.
37
 Hill, C.W.L., ‘Digital piracy: Causes, consequences, and strategic responses’, (2007) Asia 
Pacific J Management 24(9) 9-25, p10. 
38
 Murray, A.D., ‘Regulating the Post-Regulatory Cyber-State’, in Brownsword R., and 
Yeung, K. (eds) ‘Regulating Technologies’, (2008, Hart), 287-316.  Available from: 
http://works.bepress.com/andrew_murray/7 
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outset that although these factors may regulate in a preventative way, they 
may also function to ‘encourage’ behaviour.  Lessig states:  
 
“We pretend that the public matters ... but really only take the public 
into account as an object of legal regulation – as really little more than slaves 
to structures determined elsewhere.”39   
 
When referring to the ‘thing’ that is being regulated; he talks about a ‘dot’40.  
In reality there is not one ‘dot’, but two; identified below as being the user 
and the content (in this instance, the ‘content’ referred to is recorded music 
existing in digital form41), with copyright as the legal modality operating as an 
axis between them: 
 
 
 
Furthermore, they may be active as Murray postulates: “What happens if we 
change the dot’s role from passive receiver to active transmitter?”42  This 
suggests that what is regulated is much more active than Lessig believed.  
Firstly, users are obviously ‘active’ on the Internet with their actions being 
governed by a variety of subjective, individual choices and preferences (the 
specifics of which it is not necessary to examine): “... the collection of 
understandings or expectations shared by some group at a particular time 

39
 Bowrey, K., ‘Law & Internet Cultures’, (2005, Cambridge), p141. 
40
 Lessig, L., ‘Code (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p122. 
41
 As per the scope of this thesis, see chapter 1, pp10-11  See also the description of the 
MP3 format in chapter 2, pp62-66 
42
 Murray, A.D., ‘Symbiotic Regulation’, (2008) 26 J Marshall J Computer & Info L 207-228, 
p215.  This leads to the problem of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ where subjects of regulation have 
sufficient mobility that they can choose to be regulated by one regime rather than another.  
See Murray, A.D., and Scott, C., ‘Controlling the New Media: Hybrid Responses to New 
Forms of Power’, (2002) MLR 65(4) 491-516, p494. 
91
and place.”43  Secondly, content may also be active in the sense that it can 
exert a certain ‘pull’, ‘influence’, or ‘desire’ to users to consume or act upon.  
The digital environment facilitates this ‘pull’ by making it easier for content to 
‘transmit’ its value and by making it much easier for content to be acted upon.   
 
The consensus is that regulators design regulatory systems44.  Assuming 
that the basis of copyright law is utilitarian, it is (in theory) ‘designed’ to 
benefit society through promoting the creation and dissemination of new 
works45.  Therefore, some interaction with the material copyright law protects 
(in this instance, content) is necessary to achieve this end46.  Although 
copyright applies to ‘works’ (i.e. content47), it also applies to those who may 
deal with such works (including by-proxy) without authorisation48.  Therefore, 
it is possible to view copyright as an ‘axis’ which links and operates between 
users and content. 
 
From the perspective of copyright and intellectual property, emphasis on the 
legal modality is needed when the other modalities leave property, or content, 
vulnerable49.  Lessig states: “To say that law plays a role is not to say that it 
always plays a positive role.  The law can muck up norms as well as improve 
them...”50  There is a mistaken presumption that the only form of power that 
counts is power conceived in formal and bureaucratic forms51, however, it is 
necessary to consider what other ‘forces’ may be in operation.  As an 
illustrative metaphor, Newton’s Third Law of Motion states: “To every action 
 
43
 Lessig, L., ‘The Regulation of Social Meaning’, (1995) The University of Chicago Law 
Review 62(3) 943-1045, p958. 
44
 Murray, A.D., ‘Regulating the Post-Regulatory Cyber-State’, in Brownsword R., and 
Yeung, K. (eds) ‘Regulating Technologies’, (2008, Hart), 287-316.  Available from: 
http://works.bepress.com/andrew_murray/7 
45
 See chapter 2, pp41-49 
46
 See chapter 1, pp27-28. 
47
 Ibid, pp17-21. 
48
 S.16(2), Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA), 1988. 
49
 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p171.  See also chapter 2, pp70-75. 
50
 Ibid, p129. 
51
 Bowrey, K., ‘Law & Internet Cultures’, 2005, Cambridge), p168. 
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there is always opposed an equal reaction: for the mutual actions of two 
bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.”52  
Whilst this is not strictly the case in this instance, Newton recognised that it is 
impossible to have a single force53 in operation.  This applies just as much to 
extraneous forces which may be in effect in the digital environment.   
 
The behaviour of users and participants on the Internet, like that of citizens in 
the offline world, is regulated by a plurality of rules (or forces); some coming 
from states and others coming from a wide variety of private groups54.  
However, in the digital environment: “These movements lead to a 
disintegration of connective threads which bind individuals together as a 
social body in Realspace.”55  However, whist this may be true in terms of 
proximity, it is not necessarily so in terms of ideology and behaviour.  The 
only ‘constant’ in this scenario is that of copyright law; this is unchanging 
insofar as it exists and will not cease to be; the author does not make the 
argument that copyright law should be abolished, however, it is necessary to 
examine what other factors can come into play in this context. 
 
The digital environment is never limited to just two individual points56; Murray 
recognises that it is a ‘polycentric’57 environment.  The Internet is a vast 
communications system of assimilated networks with multiple interconnected 
 
52
 Available from: http://physics.info/newton-third/ 
53
 Shipman, J.T., Wilson J.D., and Todd, A., ‘An Introduction to Physical Science’, (2007, 
Cengage Learning), p56. 
54
 Cannataci, J., and Mifsud-Bonnici, J.P., Weaving the Mesh: Finding Remedies in 
Cyberspace’, (2007) International Review of Law Computers & Technology 21(1) 59-78, p65.  
See also the discussion of the Creative Commons movement in chapter 7, pp265-305. 
55
 Murray, A.D., ‘Internet Regulation’, in Levi-Faur, D. (ed), ‘Handbook on Regulation’, (2011, 
Edward Elgar).  Available from: http://works.bepress.com/andrew_murray/4 
56
 See, for example, Paul Baran’s distributed communications network diagram, available 
from: http://www.rand.org/about/history/baran.html 
57
 Murray, A.D., ‘Regulating the Post-Regulatory Cyber-State’ , in Brownsword R., and 
Yeung, K. (eds) ‘Regulating Technologies’, (2008, Hart), 287-316.  Available from: 
http://works.bepress.com/andrew_murray/7 
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users58.  Therefore, the above diagram is overly simplified as applying in the 
digital environment; the Internet is a vast communications system of 
assimilated networks with multiple users as illustrated below (on a vastly 
simplified and reduced scale) where the dots represent interconnected users: 
 
 
 
As well as multiple users, there are also multiple pieces of digital content 
available59, which can be presented thus: 
 

58
 See chapter 2, pp57-62. 
59
 At a broad level, it is irrelevant in the present context to discern between different types of 
content, for example categories of works or even whether they are protected or in the public 
domain.  Their only unifying feature is that they are digital in format, see chapter 2, p72 and 
chapter 7, p279 and p290.  Nonetheless, the proceeding examination will focus on the 
impact of the ‘modalities’ in relation to digital music. 
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This now presents a seemingly complex situation, but is merely the legal axis 
of copyright multiplied as it may apply on a network.  Copyright law (as the 
‘legal’ modality) is the link between the user and content.  Having explained 
the role and operation of the legal modality in this instance, it is now 
necessary to explain and apply Lessig’s other modalities as they may 
operate to disrupt this relationship in the context of digital music.  The ‘effect’ 
of these modalities will be presented as ‘blades’ extending along the axis 
between the user and content.  These blades are designed to be variable in 
light of their subjective appreciation referred to above and as such, their 
influence may vary depending on the influence each has on the individual 
user60.  In contrast to the way they were originally presented by Lessig (as 
four modalities regulating upon the ‘dot’61), their conception as blades has 
been designed to demonstrate that as well as having the effect to discourage 
behaviour, they may also act to encourage behaviour; in this case, the illegal 
downloading of digital music. 
 

60
 I.e. they may be of varying thickness. 
61
 Lessig, L., ‘Code (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p122. 
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3. Norms 
The law sets the rules and norms and the norms by which society should 
adhere to62.  However, within Cyberspace there are different types of 
communities (as there are in the physical world) who have different cultures 
that intersect with regulation63.  Just as social norms can reinforce legal rules, 
legal rules can also reinforce social norms, however, this feedback loop can 
be short-circuited if social norms diverge widely from legal rules; this often 
occurs when legislation (or indeed, a ruling) changes a legal rule without 
directly affecting the underlying norms of conduct64.  ‘Norms’ constrain 
through the stigma a community imposes65 and can also be regarded as 
‘reputational cost’66.  This reflects how failure to comply with social 
conventions can increase the ‘cost’ of violating legal rules as well as failing to 
comply with standard norms of behaviour: 
 
“Consequently, the disapproval, ostracism, or guilt that arises from 
failure to comply with conventional standards of conduct can supplement or 
even completely replace the threat of punishment as a means of ensuring 
that these rules are obeyed.”67 
 
 
62
 Ouma, M.N., ‘Optimal Enforcement of Music Copyright in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reality or 
Myth?’, (2006) Journal of World Intellectual Property 9(5) 592-627, p592. 
63
 Bowrey, K., ‘Law & Internet Cultures’, (2005, Cambridge University Press), p14. 
64
 Jensen, C., ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital 
Technology, and Social Norms’, (2003) Stanford Law Review 56(3) 531-570, p563.  This 
was perhaps the case in Napster which is discussed in chapter 4, pp133-148 and p159.  In 
contrast, the Creative Commons (CC) movement discussed in chapter 7 could be seen as 
an attempt to regulate the use of conduct in accordance with perceived norms in the digital 
environment, see pp268-269, and p274. 
65
 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p124. 
66
 Oksanen, V., and Valimaki, M., ‘Theory of Deterrence and Individual Behaviour – Can 
Lawsuits Control File Sharing on the Internet?’, (2007) Review of Law and Economics 3(3) 
693-714, p705. 
67
 Jensen, C., ‘The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital 
Technology, and Social Norms’, (2003) Stanford Law Review 56(3) 531-570, p535. 
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Lessig defines these as normative constraints imposed by members of a 
community68: “A norm governs socially salient behavior (sic), deviation from 
which makes you socially abnormal.”69  Norms exist in Cyberspace as much 
as they do in the real world; however, their origins and forms are different.  
Norms in the physical world generally state that the law should be obeyed 
because it is the law and because of the stigma that may result from 
conviction.  Although this may be true in other aspects of life, this norm 
appears to have bypassed copyright in relation to the digital environment and 
in relation to digital music content.  This may be for several reasons.  
Copyright has always been somewhat ‘ethereal’ in nature by granting 
protection to original expressions70 that in this case, can exist apart from the 
material object in which it may otherwise be embodied.  In addition, 
intellectual property is non-rivalous as opposed to traditional forms of 
property.  Enjoyment of a copyrighted work by one user in no way impairs 
the utility another user may receive.  Furthermore, norms exist differently in 
the digital environment because they are different; online norms are a 
product of the development of the Internet71.  Norms are also rooted in the 
relevant cultural values of their associated ‘community’, as Castells states: 
 
 “... social movements in the Information Age are essentially mobilized 
around cultural values.  The struggle to change the codes of meaning in the 
institutions and practice of society is the essential struggle in the process of 
social change...”72 
 
To this extent, they may be considered as a corollary of ‘architecture’ 
(discussed further below) as they were engendered from the development of 
the Internet and associated digital technology.  However, the two may now 
be seen as more distinct due to the time-span that now exists between the 
 
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 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p340. 
69
 Ibid, p340. 
70
 See chapter 1, pp24-25. 
71
 See chapter 2, pp57-62. 
72
 Castells, M., The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business and Society’, 
(2001, OUP), p140. 
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initial development of digital technology from the mid-nineties to today.  It 
could hardly be said that those who now engage in illegal copyright 
infringement do so as a direct result of the culture that developed from the 
emergence of the Internet and the Web; they are simply too young.  
Nonetheless, the gap between law and social practices among people 
appear to reinforce each other and can establish a pattern of unlawful 
behaviour73.   
 
In order to increase copyright compliance, the interaction between litigation, 
norms and deterrence is important; however, norm-effects may cancel out 
deterrence effects if anti-copyright norms are bolstered at an equal rate74, 
such that there may strong social norms in favour of infringement75 and thus 
operating to encourage infringement.  This is also likely to, “... increase the 
fallout between copynorms in action and copyright law in the books.”76  If 
anything, the early trend could be described as an ‘anti-copyright norm’77.  
“Given that norms are hard to dislodge, imposing laws that are perceived as 
unjust or illegitimate might strengthen the underlying opposition against 
those laws.”78  This is further complicated when one considers the 
‘community aspect’ to the normative modality. 
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3.1 Community 
As mentioned above, norms could be closely related to the issue of online 
communities, but what makes such communities different in the present 
context is the fact that they do not require geographical proximity and they 
are mediated by technology79.  It may be accurate to describe norms and 
community as two separate concepts because norms operate within a 
community context, but one cannot function without the other80.  Such 
communities are aimed at building and sharing resources81 and this requires 
a degree of normative behaviour.  Norms cannot exist without a ‘community’ 
to develop and enforce them, and at the same time, communities are (initially) 
built from users with similar interests and by implication, who exhibit similar 
normative behaviour.  Such communities have developed from the ethos 
inherent in the development of the Internet82.  This fostered the development 
of an important aspect of the digital environment; ‘online communities’, which 
may be defined as: “... endogenous, spontaneous and informal ‘economic 
institutions’ generating a new model of inter-individual interaction...”83  Such 
communities necessarily contain their own normative meanings: “... the 
semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statutes, with a 
particular context ... its contingency (depends) on a particular society or 
group, or community within which social meanings occur.”84 
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This community development could perhaps be seen as a result of the need 
of the Internet’s culture to write its own history85; necessarily involving the 
very culture inherent in its development: “... communication of values, 
mobilization around meaning, become fundamental. Cultural movements ... 
are built around communication systems...”86  Such communication systems 
and the ‘stories’ behind them are essential to the creation of a community 
and its identity, and which influence how the power of such communities is 
exercised87; in this context, the Internet (and digital architecture) is the 
organisational foundation of this structure88.   
 
It is also important to appreciate how such communities may exercise control 
or at least perform some sort of ‘regulatory’ function.  Communities generate 
their own practices and in order to operate in such a community, new 
members must behave in accordance with the relevant norms. In this sense, 
they can be seen as mutually reinforcing and consequently, hard to change.  
Nonetheless, what makes norms different from the other modalities is that 
they are imposed by a community, not a state, and therefore, have a different 
mechanism and source of sanction89: “There is a social end, and deviation 
from supporting that end is individually sanctioned.”90 Furthermore, each 
community is fed by its own sense of history, experience and attitude91.  The 
idea of ‘community’ is very important regarding the actions of users in 
Cyberspace: 
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“… it should be noted that p2p file-sharing networks have become 
indispensable components of numerous pan-global virtual communities … 
for members of these burgeoning online communities, file-sharing is less a 
convenient vehicle for anonymous and selfish gain, and more an altogether 
novel forum for the formation and maintenance of music-based 
relationships.”92 
 
Although social norms exist in the community in which one lives, they 
nonetheless guide one’s actions accordingly and are part of the benefits and 
costs associated with individual action93.   However, norms in such online 
communities are different:   
 
“These communities have standards and norms which are designed to 
reflect the aims and objectives of that community, and are quite distinct from 
the community values the member recognises in their everyday (offline) 
life.”94 
 
The community basis thus constitutes the normative understanding of its 
members: 
 
“... they are reconstructed when contexts of understanding change; 
but contexts change when collections of individuals change, and hence the 
problem of social meaning making is how to get these groups to change.”95 
 
These norms conflict with the conventional business model of the music 
industry based on copyright law, but conform within the file-sharing 
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community96 and in this sense may operate to promote the unauthorised 
downloading of content.  Many individuals also operate from a normative 
basis that such technology is wealth-maximising and that copyright law is 
biased in favour of the creative industries: “Such norms are in conflict with 
the conventional business model of copyright law, but these norms, of course, 
conform within a file-sharing sub-culture.”97  As such, they provide an 
explanation for the fact that despite the possible costs of file-sharing and the 
incentive to ‘free-ride’ on peer-to-peer (p2p) networks, many users store their 
files in a shared folder.  This may also be partly explained by the technology 
itself (which also related to the architectural modality, explained below).  In 
this instance, the benefits from ‘sharing’ content on p2p networks arise from 
increased performance and reduced download times98.  Here file-sharing is 
not seen as wrong, in fact it is the norm and it compels others to add to the 
network by sharing their own files.  Furthermore, as opposed to having a 
negative effect resulting from community sanctions, it may have a positive 
effect with the community operating to encourage and support such 
behaviour.  This is because, aside from governing behaviour, there may also 
be the conception that the practice of file-sharing itself is rooted in the 
‘mutual benefit’ or satisfaction of such behaviour; through community, mutual 
aid and support (as well as improved efficiency99):  
 
“The self-reinforcing qualities of that aid would, in turn, prompt others 
to give equally to you ... It would take the arrival of virtual worlds for us to 
finally see larger economies built in mutual benefit actually work.”100 
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Therefore norms can potentially operate to compel users to act in a certain 
way; in this case illegally downloading music content.  It is difficult to 
envisage sanctions being imposed by a ‘community’ as the activity in 
question is more removed from active participation in the ongoing ‘life’ of an 
online community; for example, as may be the case in online role-playing 
games (known as ‘massively multiplayer online role-playing games’, or 
MMORPGs101).  As such, there may be less imposition of social sanctions as 
there are less proximate relationships between the parties involved.  This is 
further heightened by the increasingly remote nature of p2p technology102 
itself and also the ability to download content from file-hosting services103 
where there is even less direct interaction between users.  As such, the issue 
of norms is intrinsically linked with that or architecture, discussed further 
below.   
 
Furthermore, the social aspect of norms can serve to enhance creativity and 
play a dual-role in the creative process functioning as both users and as 
immediate cultural environments for users104 (in combination with the forums 
established by architecture): 
 
 “Social groups also can consciously seek to channel creative practice 
in a variety of ways and for a variety or reasons.  Along with validating 
institutions, social groups play important roles in determining both 
conceptions of artistic and intellectual merit and conceptions of the 
appropriate social domains of creative practice.”105 
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Social meaning of copyright infringement may, in the past, have been 
resistant to change106, or ‘sticky’107.  Changing them in their community 
context thus requires:  
 
“... a collective effort, which in turn requires the construction of an 
array of selective incentives, sufficient to overcome the selective incentives 
that act to support the status quo structure of social meaning.”108 
 
Again, this can be added to through the positive conception of the user who 
is being regulated; the dot is part of a community of dots109.  In conclusion, 
the normative modality may be factored into the initial diagram as a ‘blade’ 
which runs parallel to the legal axis between users and content: 
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4. Markets 
Consumers’ sense of identity (in the community context discussed above) is 
also dependent on their consumption choices110 thus implicating markets111 
as highly applicable.  The market constrains through scarcity and price112; 
pricing structures constrain access113, and thus consumption.  Again, this is 
related to the modalities of law and norms; market transactions do not exist 
outside of these boundaries114:  
 
“The constraints of the market exist because of an elaborate 
background of law and norms defining what is buyable and sellable, as well 
as rules of property and contract for how things may be bought and sold.”115 
 
However, it may seem that market is inapplicable to the digital environment 
as law and norms operate (or do not operate) to seemingly remove market 
constraints116.  Whilst the architectural modality has also extended the 
potential market, it may also have caused a breakdown in traditional market 
controls117: “... as both the market and architecture relax the regulation of 
copyright, norms pile on.”118  Again, this may have the effect of driving users 
to view market constraints as an incentive to infringe. 
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4.1 ‘Free’ 
It is necessary to consider why infringement is so high in the case of digital, 
as opposed to physical, goods119.  In the past, before digitisation, it was 
claimed that home taping would ‘kill’ music and the hesitation of the industry 
to embrace new technology, and thus new markets, was not surprising120.  
Nevertheless, to a certain degree the music industry accepted a limited ‘gift 
economy’ of private use as beyond their realm of control121.  Digitisation has 
changed this: 
 
“Digitisation removed the quality/copy trade-off, by allowing 
generational copies to be for all intents and purposes exact copies of the 
original digital artefact.  This disrupted the grey area of de facto accepted 
illegal copying by reducing the utility costs incurred by the non-authorised 
user.  Now, copies were as good as original, the monopoly on high quality 
reproduction was removed from authorised distribution channels.”122 
 
Enjoyment of protected content in no way deprives someone else from the 
same experience and as such, infringement could be seen as a victimless 
crime123; serving to reinforce the psychological as well as social distinctions 
between copyright and real property rights124.  The effect of this on the 
market is also reflected in the grey literature claiming that ‘free’ is the most 
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common reason why digital copyright infringement takes place125.  However, 
‘price’ makes the user think about choice:  
 
“If you charge a price, any price, we are forced to ask ourselves if we 
really want to open our wallets.  But if the price is zero, that flag never goes 
up and the decision just got easier.”126 
 
‘That decision’ could thus easily be a decision to infringe.  It may be possible 
that ‘free’ sharing is a norm in itself, or at least ‘normal’ practice127 due to 
architectural considerations discussed below.  Just because content is ‘free’ 
does not mean that a market cannot form, or that a market does not exist, as 
Anderson in his exploration of ‘Free’128, states: 
 
“’De-monetization’ is traumatic for those affected.  But pull back and 
you can see that the value is not so much lost as re-distributed in ways that 
aren’t always measured in dollars and cents.”129 
 
However, the current operation of the market is at-odds with any early (and 
now outdated) cyber-libertarian conception whereby there would be amarket 
free of regulation in which users would be able to operate in a way that best 
suited them130.  This view has been greatly challenged by Lessig (and 
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others).  In this instance, the pre-existing operation of the Law, and 
subsequent enforcement of it, have served to negate a free (cyber-libertarian) 
market as an option to influence behaviour.   
 
According to Anderson: “Somewhere in the transition from atoms to bits, a 
phenomenon that we thought we understood was transformed. ‘Free’ 
became Free.”131  It is important to bear in mind that feelings about ‘free’ are 
relative and not absolute132; for Lessig, ‘free’ translates as the freedom or 
‘liberty’ to use a resource (or content)133, but it can it can also constitute 
‘freedom’ from the physical medium134.  However, the issue of free use is 
paramount: “... whenever one says a resource is ‘free’, most believe that a 
price is being quoted – free, that is in zero cost.  But ‘free’ has a much more 
fundamental meaning...”135  The ability to engage and interact with the 
resource can also constitute value136 through simply being in possession of it 
in order to do so.  It has been stated that “... the idea of loving a song and not 
owning it in some way doesn’t yet make sense.”137  Although this is not a 
‘legal’ statement (and although ‘ownership’ is a legal concept in copyright 
law138), it is one which resonates strongly with the author as it asserts the 
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importance of ‘value’ to the consumer, but a ‘value’ which extends beyond 
monetary or financial terms.  The author suggests that the fact that 
something is ‘free’ may constitute value in itself; either in terms of welfare or 
possession. 
 
The digital environment can be said to be one of ‘abundance’ which reduces 
(financial) cost:  “Where abundance drives the cost of something to the floor, 
value shifts to adjacent levels...”139 This may not be captured by financial 
indicators.  A realistic analysis of the welfare effects of downloading requires 
information of the distribution of value among (legal) buyers and (illegal) 
downloaders140 which may be handicapped by the likelihood of ‘truth’141 in 
relation to admitting to an unlawful activity on the part of downloaders.  It is 
also problematic due to the nature of the content itself and how it is 
‘experienced’142: 
 
“Because music is an experience good, the ex ante valuation 
determining purchase is not the same as the ex post valuation, which 
becomes known only after purchase.”143 
 
Therefore, although the user may ‘value’ a particular piece of content (and 
may also appreciate the work and effort that went into its production), they 
may not necessarily place any value on the distribution of that content, as 
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opposed to the creation of that content.  This can also correspond with 
normative modality relating to ‘attitudes’: “... the file-trading generation’s 
innate understanding of digital economics helps usher in the conclusion 
that ... payment for that transfer should also be zero.”144  Conversely and 
perhaps more recently, downloading content for ‘free’ could be seen as 
reward for the time it takes to actually find the content nowadays since p2p is 
no-longer as prevalent, and even when it was, content was blocked/removed 
or the network was flooded by corrupted copies released by the industry145.   
 
This is in contrast to the general consensus that the Internet would lower 
consumers’ search costs and thus intensify price competition146.  If users 
view downloading content freely as commensurate with the relative lack of 
time it takes to locate the content in the first place147, this implicates an 
‘equity’ theory of social exchange and justice which describes an individual’s 
search for fairness and equity in social exchanges: 
 
 “An equitable exchange is one in which distributive justice is seen to 
exist, that is, when the individual perceives that participants in an exchange 
are receiving outcomes commensurate with their inputs.”148 
 
Such action on the part of the industries would also have a negative effect; 
undercutting compliance with copyright law.  Therefore, the operation of the 
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market modality in this sense may operate in such a way as to drive users to 
infringe.  Given the fact that norms are hard to dislodge, imposing such laws 
may strengthen the underlying opposition against those laws149, and also 
those associated with such laws (including bands and musicians150).  This is 
to the extent that private ordering has tended to result in a balance151 of 
rights and obligations more favourable to the rightsholder that may otherwise 
be the case under default copyright law152. 
 
4.2 Market Concentration 
The market modality has another dimension in terms of potentially causing 
users to leave the market, or rather, the ‘traditional’ distribution market.  The 
operation of the law and (pre-existing) market did not operate to the benefit 
of the user: 
 
 “Through the breach rushed a new generation of bands and fans 
empowered by personal computers and broadband Internet connections.  
Willy-nilly they forged a new world of music distribution that seized control 
from once all-powerful music and radio conglomerates.”153 
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This can be looked at in terms of exposing users and consumers to different 
types of musical content (including musical styles and genres): “Knowledge 
about art adds to consumption capital, and increases in consumption are 
subject to increasing returns.”154  This can then empower users, arguably to 
the extent that the changes brought about by technology should theoretically 
induce entry into the market.  Digital technology, with particular regard to the 
beginnings of Napster, evidences this: “The new firms were often product 
innovators, and their products became popular with consumers.”155  However, 
this is counter to the way in which the content industries’ market structure 
developed; specifically in terms of distribution, with substantial increases in 
music industry concentration from the 1950s until the present-
day156:”Consolidation was the era’s trendiest business strategy.”157 
 
This may be related to the concentration of content production and 
distribution outlets: “This narrowing has an effect on what is produced.  The 
product of such large and concentrated networks is increasingly 
homogenous.  Increasingly safe.  Increasingly sterile.”158  The music industry 
is focussing on fewer acts and taking on fewer risks159, in contrast to the 
opportunities for markets to develop160.  Instead, the opportunity for 
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‘dissent’161 or to seek out new markets was weakened; compounded further 
by the legal modality which has expanded and been enforced to govern the 
digital environment, notably in the realm of p2p162.  Despite the alluring 
usability p2p (arguably) being negated163 by the launch of legal music 
services such as iTunes, the issue of ‘value’ is still disputed164.  Attempts to 
reflect this have been undertaken by the market, for example with the launch 
of the ‘Spotify’ music streaming service165 which operates on a ‘freemium’ 
pricing structure166.  However, even this has its limitations, as evidenced by 
their decision to reduce the amount of free music its users can listen to167.  
 
Such market concentration has again been evident recently with the launch 
of Apple’s ‘iCloud’168 which integrates the iTunes music service and allows 
remote storage and access of content169.  Google170 and Amazon171 also 
offer similar services, however, Apple’s attempt is notable as it is the only 
one of the formats with industry backing172.  This serves to demonstrate the 
increasing constriction of ‘approved’ content outlets and rightsholders’ control 
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over new content distribution models which began with the ruling in 
Napster173.  To an extent174, this negated any opportunity for price 
competition to develop and a market to develop accordingly along these 
lines175.  Rather than facilitating this, ‘free’ eliminated any such possibility:  
 
“The problem with Free is that it eliminates all the price discrimination 
texture in the marketplace.  Rather than a range of products at different 
prices, it tends to be winner-take-all.” 176   
 
Successful legal outcomes against p2p operators thus allowed the pre-
established content industries to re-unify their business model, and negate 
an opportunity for other actors to participate177.  In this instance market 
concentration persisted; the legal action in this area resulted from ‘free’, 
rather than embracing the phenomenon itself178.  This was perhaps 
misguided:  
 
“... unauthorised reproduction is a natural consequence of the 
institutional setting and generates the peculiar dynamics of a market based 
on a double push to diffusion and exclusions.  It is possible to assert that 
copyright and piracy are closely connected and probably inseparable.”179 
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The effect of this is to negate what the Internet has created or enabled; new 
markets180: 
 
 “the revolutionary moment never arrived for the music industry; the 
accumulated advantages of an industry with more than a century of gate-
keeping predictably held sway over the potentially destabilizing effects of 
Internet distribution.”181 
 
Furthermore, in contrast with the pre-operation of a market system, copyright 
law was used to protect the history of music industry consolidation and 
preserve market concentration: “This tends to limit the extent of competition 
in the industry, and possibly reduces the diversity and variety of product 
offerings.”182  At this point, such arguments relating to the regulation (by the 
law) of markets could be inverted; that markets require some regulation in 
order to function, but only a minimal amount183.  Theoretically, the impact of 
digital technology should promote greater competition in the relevant industry, 
provided the technologies are non-exclusionary184.  Although copyright itself 
already acts in a (limited) exclusionary way, it was the exclusion of new 
technology through the application of copyright law that consolidated market 
concentration; for example, in relation to peer-to-peer (p2p) technology 
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where digital music distribution came to be concentrated in the hands of 
rightsholders following legal action against Napster and its successors185.  
This ensured the continuation of an old, and ill-fitting, market structure to the 
digital environment which contradicts wider economic and market theory: 
 
 “Looking beyond popular music, a positive relationship between 
competition and innovation has been found in a wide range of fields ... it is 
most likely to hold in regulation-free market situations where demand is 
elastic, barriers to entry are low, and research and development costs are 
not high.”186 
 
Although there is a market on the Internet for music with fewer gatekeepers 
to creativity than ever before187, over-regulation from the legal modality can 
have a negative effect on the market itself188.  This increased regulation has 
arguably been beneficial to the market by undermining the ability of other 
interests to operate (such as Napster189) and allowing its continuing 
operation, but consequently, has been detrimental to users190:  
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“... the balance between stimulating production and allowing public 
use of information is being lost, as information is commodified and 
increasingly geared towards high -paying markets”.191 
 
This has seemingly created a ‘closed’ market192 in terms of distribution, 
industry consolidation, technological change and legal adjustments which 
have all acted to reinforce the pre-existing model193.  At this point, there are 
now two ways of looking at this situation.  Firstly, the availability of high-
quality content (although in the non-qualitative sense) has increased through 
such outlets mentioned above.  This could arguably be said to lower the 
‘opportunity cost’ to users of trying to find similar content illegally and for free 
which would arguably require much more time194.  However conversely, it 
could be said to increase such costs through depriving the user of choices of 
outlet(s)195 and contrastingly; financial costs as well.  There is the broader 
idea that as the digital ‘marketplace’ expanded, there was actually a 
proliferation of entertainment content competing for consumer attention (and 
money) such as the DVD and videogame industries: “Both these industries 
were exploding creatively.  The same could not be said of the mainstream 
music industry...”196  Therefore, the wider content market may not 
necessarily be an inhibiting factor in terms of choice and variety (outside of 
the music market), but perhaps the actual business practices in this industry 
may have had more of an effect by ignoring new content consumption 
patterns of users: “The industry’s efforts to rein in consumers were 
exacerbated by the lack of viable alternative to the rogue file-sharing 
services.”197  P2p arguably facilitated the process of ‘discovery’198 to users 
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and enabled a shift in consumer tastes away from the traditional offerings199 
from the established industry: “Culture has shifted from following the crowd 
up to the top of the charts to finding your own style and exploring far out 
beyond the broadcast mainstream...”200 
 
This can also relate to the empowerment afforded by digital technology to 
discuss and critique content (in addition to consuming it).  Along with the 
architectural modality as well as the community aspect of the normative 
modality, digital technology allows for powerful information gathering and 
collective processing which can form a new information infrastructure201.  
‘Niche’, non-mainstream musical genres and content can now be opened up 
to a wider audience through online music press, journalism, blogs etc.: 
 
“... the Internet’s ability to lower the costs for artists to reach their 
audiences and for audiences to find artists suddenly renders possible more 
variety in music than ever before.”202  
 
As well as enabling artists, it has also enabled users to become creators and 
distributors of musical content203, and also has allowed them to be creators 
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and distributors of ‘tastes’204; playing the same market role as ‘word of mouth’ 
and ‘enlightening’ consumption205.  This also invokes the community aspect 
mentioned above: “Virtual communities ... became new economic tools 
enhancing consumers’ power.”206  However, the music  industry had no 
reason to shift its market activities as it had previously been enjoying an 
unrivalled period of prosperity207: “By the end of the nineties, the major labels 
had become a high-priced speciality business addicted to blockbusters.  It 
was a fatally flawed system...”208  This was based, to a certain extent, on the 
more ‘primitive’ means of distributing and consuming content.  However, it 
was also based on copyright as a pre-existing factor allowing for the initial 
commodification of such content209.  The operation of copyright in this has 
not changed, but pre-existing models of content production, dissemination 
and consumption may no longer be appropriate: “Cultural change, and the 
diversity of global demand, make it increasingly difficult to resort to 
standardized, mass production to satisfy the market.”210  At this juncture, the 
regulatory modality of the market ceases to be related to law, and moves into 
business practice.  However, this dimension may amplify this modality in the 
current context as well as complementing a normative modality to move 
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away from the pre-existing market which potentially results in unauthorised 
copyright infringement to satisfy the users’ musical tastes etc. 
 
The operation of the market modality may now be represented as a second 
blade on the diagram: 
 
 
 
5. Architecture 
The modality of ‘architecture’ represents the physical burdens in existence, 
or as Lessig puts it vaguely: “... the way the world is, of the ways specific 
aspects of it are.”211  He relates this to norms and the operation of 
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architecture in real-space212, and in the current context, which may also be 
manifested online through digital architecture213.  Nonetheless, there is a 
relationship between these two modalities; if architecture is ‘the way the 
world is’ then this must necessarily invoke norms as they way people are 
within that ‘world’214.  This is perhaps also the vaguest modality under 
Lessig’s model.  Theoretically, such architectural constraints may serve to 
limit the functioning of norms as Lessig believes them to be ‘self-
executing’215, but in terms to the communal aspect of norms as discussed 
above, there may be little restraining execution in this respect with 
architecture facilitating the enablement and execution of such norms 
discussed above. 
 
Regulatory models may be said to be based on the common foundation that 
regulatory designs are based on active choices by regulators who operate 
within a settled environment and have the opportunity to consider policy 
decisions.  This can correspond to the architectural modality as ‘the way 
things are’, but also represents a fundamental divergence between the way 
things are in the physical world (the world within which copyright traditionally 
operated) and the way they are in the digital world.  The regulatory approach 
embodied in, for example, the WIPO Treaties216 did not necessarily misjudge 
the digital environment, but perhaps more-so, they misjudged the way in 
which those rules (and hence the legal modality) would operate.  This is 
perhaps understandable as regardless of hindsight: “... Cyberspace does not 
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exist in a separate state.”217  Nonetheless, explaining architecture within its 
digital context is arguably more realistic and appropriate. 
 
5.1 Digital Architecture 
The regulation exercised by ‘real world’ constraints does not necessarily 
operate to the same extent in the digital environment.  Instead, the author 
believes that architecture may more appropriately represent the specifics of 
digital technology218: “Communications technologies are clearly one of the 
current forms of social and cultural regulation.”219  Part of the regulatory 
complexity in this context has resulted from the attitudes of the participants 
involved, notably that of users, but also because of the network architecture 
itself.  The growth of the Internet arguably rests primarily upon its design 
principles220 (notably its openness and the end-to-end principle mentioned 
below) and its history has been shaped by communities; initially surrounding 
ARPANET221 and then from university computer-science departments in the 
form of Usenet222: 
 
“The organisational structure of these communities works with rules 
that emerge on the level of mutual agreements ... such agreements may 
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resemble the terms of an explicit convention, but they may also resemble a 
regime of binding obligations, sanctioned by expulsion.”223 
 
Such ‘conventions’ or ‘regime’ building may not necessarily constitute 
‘architecture’ in itself, but hints at the development of architectural rules 
governing user behaviour. The emergence of the Web which reflected a 
deeper policy rule at the heart of the network itself: “... information policy 
rules located deep within the architecture of networks, such as those built 
into the transmission protocols, will have greater force...”224  Below this level, 
there also operated more informal ‘rules’ which have been labelled as 
‘Netiquette’ which have an informative character, presume voluntary self-
constraint based on technical insight225 and may correspond with norms 
discussed above.  As such, the ‘rules’ or ‘laws’ of the Internet and how they 
apply to copyright could initially be said to be self-regulating. 
 
Specifically, at the heart of the Internet’s architecture is the operation of the 
TCP/IP protocol which embodies two key concepts: open architecture and 
connectivity226.  This allowed for interoperability of networks and also the 
applications which can run on the Internet as a unified network.  Along with 
the end-to-end (e2e) principle which premises that the ‘intelligence’ in a 
network should be located at its ‘ends’; where users put information and 
applications onto the network227.  This also relates to the normative modality 
as it was not just the architecture itself which is important, but the promotion 
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of communities and culture associated with the use of the technology228: 
“Networks are increasingly being seen as a key modality of social and 
economic coordination.”229  As such, there is an important degree of 
‘feedback’ between this modality and the modality of norms in the community 
context.   
 
Technical and cultural interoperability therefore have an important impact on 
the environment in which copyright operates230, and therefore the digital 
creative environment: 
 
“... the copyright regime faces the challenges presented by peer-to-
peer file sharing networks and other manifestations of the online 
community’s endemic disregard for copyright protections.”231 
 
However, instead of assuming an ‘endemic disregard’, it is more accurate to 
view the scenario such that it is simply not possible to suppress the social 
meaning of the digital architecture that is part of content consumption232 and 
which may thus actively influence users to illegally download music.  This 
also relates to the normative modality described above which has been 
resistant to change.  As such:  
 
 “... because of that it is hard for any player in the information economy, 
no matter how large or well connected to law-making bodies, to simply 
compartmentalise that depth of experience and seek to smother unwelcome 
parts of it by old legal stories about creativity and the evils of piracy...”233 
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Perversely, this modality could have been most effectively utilised in the 
more ‘primitive’ first-generation of p2p technology embodied by Napster234: 
“It would be the major labels’ last, best chance to harness digital distribution 
under a centralized (sic) server.”235  The architecture of Napster involved a 
‘gatekeeper’ who could be utilised, but the record companies were not ready 
to replace these services with equally compelling alternatives and the public 
was not willing to wait236.  Furthermore, in the absence of an architectural 
alternative from the industry which offered such usability, file-sharers had no 
reason to break from their practice237: “... there isn’t a single authorized 
music service that can compete with the original Napster.”238  As it is, the 
architecture has developed from this to more remote systems239 which now 
makes such an opportunity impossible.  
 
The Internet’s ‘conscience’ traditionally lies with its end users (evident from 
the end-to end principle); it has no inherent ‘consciousness’ itself and was 
not designed to240.  Whatever conscience may reside with users can 
arguably be traced back (to an extent) to the early days of the Internet and 
the Web where ‘hacker’241 culture was prevalent.  As such, the digital 
architecture perhaps initially engendered the normative modality through its 
process of development.  Ultimately, the nature of digital architecture has 
impacted on its very features with regard to copies themselves: “Uses that 
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before were un-regulated are now presumptively regulated.”242  This then 
relates to the law as a means of regulation: “The technology expands the 
scope of effective control, because the technology builds a copy into every 
transaction.”243  As a result, this has disturbed the previously settled norms 
that existed between private rights and public use244 creating a so-called 
‘blowback’ effect: 
 
“The desire to enact monopoly controls has led content users to 
become more cynical about perceived profiteering by content providers, and 
hence the rhetoric of responsible consumption has started to crumble.  Both 
these problems represent a breakdown in social norms which have 
previously underpinned the recognition, use and acceptance of IPRs.”245 
 
This modality can be seen to bring the debate full-circle; it is the architectural 
modality that the legal modality has, to an extent, tried to regulate (in addition 
to user behaviour).  In addition, the regulatory effect of the law (specifically 
copyright) has been diminished by the digital architecture246.  Put another 
way, law has operated to regulate the very cause of its diminished effect; 
digital architecture.  Architecture may have been influential with regard to the 
normative modality as this was initially specific to the development of digital 
technology itself (although now perhaps less-so).  Furthermore, the 
consumer expectations it has fostered make it harder for them to accept any 
anti-piracy message247: “The Internet isn’t going to get harder to use.  Better 
confront this challenge head on, turn it into an opportunity, than to rail 
against the future.”248  These can then be seen as important factors when 
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looking at the modality of the market; normative behaviour and digital 
technology could arguably have created a market for ‘free’ content; efforts 
resulting in the convergence of market outlets for digital content could thus 
be seen to further re-enforce both movement away from such outlets and 
normative perceptions of them.   
 
Finally, the architectural modality represents the last blade on the diagram: 
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6. Conclusion 
It is clear that the modalities (presented as blades) in the author’s ‘Lessigan’ 
model both re-enforce each other, but have also been made to work at 
cross-purposes to each other.  Aside from the legal modality (i.e. copyright), 
the author asserts that the other variable forces in existence have more of an 
impact on user behaviour, and any discussion of digital regulation must 
appreciate this; not only to understand how to regulate effectively, but also to 
understand why existing regulation may be ineffective.  Although each blade 
is presented of equal strength (thickness) in the above diagram, this will not 
necessarily be the case as their strength will be specific to individual users 
owing to each modality’s varying subjective influence.249 
 
It is not the point of this chapter to articulate a theory of effective regulation, 
but to compose a scheme that reflects the complexities of such an issue 
specifically in the context of digital music content.  It is too simplistic to view 
the problems allegedly created by digital technology on a one-dimensional 
axis between the user and the content.  This axis represents the law and as 
such, can never be discounted as it will always be in existence; it is therefore 
a constant.  It will never exclusively exist between two ‘isolated’ points on an 
axis as it must correspond to a realistic conception of the environment in 
which it functions.  This environment is the Internet so it may effectively be 
‘mapped’ over the networked structure of the Internet.  Each variable (norms, 
market, and architecture) operates along its own specific ‘blade’ which is 
determined by the relevant propensity of each individual user.  Therefore, 
some may operate more in accordance with one variable more than they do 
with regard to another.   
 
This Lessigan model does not provide a single ‘reason’ for such behaviour.  
However, the applicability of these modalities does provide valuable 
information as to the factors which may govern such behaviour; either 
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directly or more subtly.  The consumer and copyrighted content do not 
operate in a vacuum250.  Initially, it can be said that both are ‘active’; the 
individual’s actions may be shaped through community participation and 
influenced by the market modality, and the community context of the user 
also links via the architectural modality to content.  Although this relationship 
is technically mediated by copyrighted law, the architectural modality 
facilitates the two-way nature of this relationship.  Digital architecture allows 
for interaction between consumer and content (through architectural 
distribution systems) which can be heightened through experience 
enhancing communities.  As such, this may help overcome the limitations of 
the market modality through opening up new means of discovery and 
consumption.   
 
However, they have also been deployed to work at cross-purposes to teach 
other.  Norms in Cyberspace grew primarily from the development of its 
architecture; with the operation of law and the market arguably (although 
temporarily) ignored.  Along with the features of the Internet considered 
above (e2e etc.), this created a positive norm (as opposed to a ‘preventative’, 
negative one).  This is further facilitated by architecture which has removed 
significant cost barriers to content and is completed by the market which it 
has also helped create; that of ‘free’ content.  Because of the actions of 
rightsholders the opportunity for resultant services to develop and provide 
the easiest way for the public to get what they want was negated; services 
like the original Napster; easy, well-designed, and functional251.  The 
architecture has had an effect through its realisation in the market such that 
by the mid-2000s: “The generation now coming of age has grown used to the 
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idea that everything accessed on the Internet is free.”252  What consumers 
don’t want are managed services with limited rights; the demand signal won’t 
go away253.  The modality of the market is consequently limited; hindered by 
the fact that it fails to see ‘free’ as a value in itself; despite the fact that norms 
could be said to be resistant, or at minimum, unrestrictive of unauthorised 
downloading activity. 
 
Ultimately, regulation became converged and reinforced254 at the expense of 
these other modalities; it was this choice that has affected copyright 
enforcement ever since.  This seems strange; the specific problems digital 
technology posed (generally put, the removal of ‘physical’ restrictions on 
copying) were already recognised255, but the ‘traditional’ means of regulation 
and enforcement were chosen as a means to overcome these (for want of a 
better phrase) non-traditional problems.  Whilst initially, legal regulation 
through copyright was worthwhile as it maintained the utilitarian aspect of 
benefitting society, the regulation since has failed to represent this and has 
not had the desired effect of controlling behaviour.  This has not been helped 
by a ‘slow’ market which the law has initially served to create, but latterly 
closed-off.  This is in response to the modality of the digital architecture 
which threatened to affect the extent of the market256 however, the legal 
modality has stepped in to prevent this to a degree.  Along with a 
convergence in the legal modality through the WIPO Copyright, and 
Performance and Phonograms Treaties257 there has been a perceptible shift 
within the market in terms of an increasing convergence of content platforms; 
however, the law had already negated the opportunity for any independent 
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market to develop: “... publishers have us over a barrel, controlling the 
narrow and vital channels for making works available...”258  This was sealed 
as a result of the Napster case259:  
 
“It was the turning point in the file-sharing wars, the moment when the 
recording industry walked away from a compromise that could’ve turned their 
adversarial relationship with millions of music downloaders into a lucrative 
revenue stream.”260 
 
If the business model cannot survive the emergence of a general-purpose 
tool, then another business model is needed: “There’s one thing that every 
new art business model had in common: it embraced the medium it lived 
in.”261  
 
This chapter has sought to build a conceptual framework from which to 
proceed with analysing regulation in the digital environment.  This has been 
done by critiquing, modifying and applying Lessig’s model of modalities as 
they have strength in that they deal with factors which are perceptible to 
users.  The modality of the ‘law’ can be discounted to a certain extent; it has 
been concluded that its operation is a constant, but nonetheless has an 
impact on the other modalities discussed.  The modality of norms has also 
been explained and is a necessary component to consider.  In this instance, 
it has been concluded that they function at minimum in a de-regulatory way.  
Although norms may also have an impact on the other modalities, the author 
asserts that the modalities of market and architecture are the most dominant 
in the digital environment.   
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Napster and peer-to-peer 
 
1. Introduction 
It is a little over ten years since the litigation involving the Napster peer-to-
peer (p2p) file-sharing network and the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA).  As such, a timely analysis of the case (and those following 
the decision, most recently The Pirate Bay) is warranted to examine both the 
legal impact of the rulings: “The case is viewed as a landmark decision on 
copyright in cyberspace, and is seen as defining how music...will be 
distributed online.”1  However, it has not defined how music will be 
distributed, rather, how it will not be distributed.  Furthermore, the cases 
involving Napster and its successors have changed how copyright law is 
applied with regard to p2p networks.  Napster was the original and most 
notorious file-sharing service2, but despite its demise, it was still seen as a 
dirty word in the music industry3.  Fundamentally, the Napster litigation exists 
within an environment underpinned by a broader power struggle, where 
vested interests have long fought for control4.  In the music distribution 
market, the record industry had previously enjoyed an effective monopoly 
and control over the release of content.  However, p2p changed this by 
empowering users and jeopardising the incumbents’ position; copyright law 
was the weapon chosen to regain control.  Arguably, legal action against p2p 
networks formed the first part of the jigsaw in the enforcement of copyright in 
the digital era. 
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 “Like Hector and Achilles, the entertainment industry and file sharers 
have locked horns in an encounter from which the former at least may 
emerge having had major reconstructive surgery.”5 
 
As it is not always possible to identify and prosecute direct infringers 
appropriately, a policy choice was made to pursue actions against those not 
directly connected to infringement, but who nevertheless have some power 
to prevent such conduct6.  However, such a course of action may have the 
effect of deterring other legitimate, non-infringing activities (for example, 
time-shifting), as well as negating p2p as a viable content distribution 
mechanism.  Napster is also significant as representing the first incarnation 
of p2p technology7 as it functioned via a central server.  Successive cases, 
whilst essentially dealing with the same scenario of online file-sharing, have 
differed in that the technology in question differed from this architecture.  As 
a result, it is also important to examine the Grokster and The Pirate Bay 
cases as they utilised more developed and de-centralised network 
structures.  This chapter will critique these cases in chronological order to 
determine how copyright evolved with Napster onwards and how it currently 
stands today; specifically the development of ‘knowledge’ and ‘inducement’ 
aspects.  It is argued that these are effectively insurmountable obstacles for 
any p2p developer and that the virtues of p2p technology8 have been lost. 
 
2. Napster 
Beginning with Napster, computer file-sharing software has created a unique 
obstacle for the recording industry in preventing copyright infringement9.  As 
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Lessig states: “Napster is an ‘ah-ha’ technology: you don’t quite get its 
significance until you use it.”10  Whilst it may be a happy ‘ah-ha’ for users 
who discovered it (the author included), it was perhaps more of an ‘uh-oh’ for 
the music industry.  In December 1999, legal proceedings were instigated 
against Napster by the four major record labels and Napster was charged 
with ‘vicarious and ‘contributory’ copyright infringement; that it knowingly 
facilitated infringement by its users.   
 
The District Court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Napster: “... from 
engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, 
transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical compositions and 
sound recordings.”11 Napster accordingly appealed and the case was heard 
before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit12 who affirmed in part, 
reversed in part and remanded the decision of the District Court.  The Court 
agreed that Napster users infringed at least the rights of reproduction and 
distribution of the copyright holders; the uploading of file names to the search 
index for other users to copy infringed the distribution rights and the 
downloading of files containing protected material infringed the reproduction 
right13.  In each of the matters, the Circuit Court upheld the reasoning and 
points of law of the lower court. 
 
2.1 Infringement 
The Napster case is relatively uncontroversial is terms of the application of 
the basic elements of direct and contributory infringement to the facts.  The 
plaintiffs were adjudged to have established a primary facie case of direct 
copyright infringement; the evidence produced showed that virtually all of 
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Napster’s users engaged in unauthorised downloading or uploading of 
copyrighted music14.   
 
Although copyright law in the US is based on a statutory regime, both 
contributory and vicarious infringement have been developed through 
common law15.  Contributory infringement has three aspects16: an infringing 
activity; knowledge by the alleged contributor; and, the inducement of 
infringement by the alleged contributor.  The existence of actual infringing 
activity by a third party was not disputed whilst both ‘constructive’ and ‘actual 
knowledge on the part of Napster was evident17.  The requirement of actual 
inducement/material contribution was found to be apparent as Napster 
(supposedly) actively strived to create such an environment for infringement 
to occur; this was exemplified through the nature of the programme itself18.  
Nowadays, Napster is classed as a ‘first generation’ p2p network; meaning 
that it operated via a central server that indexed users mp3 files and 
facilitated connections between them19.  Although the central server was at 
the heart of Napster’s operation, it was also the heart of its downfall.  The 
Ninth Circuit recognised the fact that the system was limited by the fact that 
Napster did not have access to users’ computers and instructed the District 
Court to take this into account when framing the revised injunction20.  As 
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such, Napster could only be liable to contributory infringement if it received 
reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files, knew (or ought to have 
known) these were available, and failed to prevent their distribution21.  It was 
thus found insufficient that infringing files were available and Napster failed 
to remove them without actual notice22.  However, this has been countered 
recently by the District Court in the case of Viacom v. YouTube (Google)23.  
Knowledge of a prevalence of copyright infringement is insufficient; to let 
knowledge of a generalised practice impose responsibility on service 
providers to discover which files infringe copyright contravenes the structure 
and operation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act24. 
 
The case highlights that liability for contributory infringement exists if one 
engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists copyright 
infringement25.  Essentially, the case rested on proving that Napster knew 
about its users sharing copyrighted music; thus it could easily be shown that 
they were hardly an innocent middleman like Sony was in the Betamax 
case26.  However, it must be questioned just how ‘innocent’ Sony were.  
Their advertising slogan at the time, ‘Watch whatever whenever’27, was 
blatantly a public proclamation from which it was not hard to imply the 
technology’s application to copyright infringement.  Similarly, Apple’s ‘Rip.  
Mix.  Burn’28, publicity material could be viewed in the same way.  However 
this was not the case with Napster.  In contrast, they had apparently been 
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very careful not to make any public statements suggesting the potential use 
of the technology for copyright infringement29.  During the discovery phase of 
the proceedings, the RIAA asked for internal Napster documents, one of 
which was an email from Sean Parker (Napster’s co-founder) to Shawn 
Fanning explicitly using the phrase ‘pirated music’30.  As such, the District 
Court had the evidence to rule that Napster had the requisite knowledge and 
material contribution necessary for contributory infringement31. 
 
For the purposes of vicarious infringement32, the party accused must have 
the ability to supervise/control the infringing activity and they must derive a 
financial benefit from the infringement.  Napster intentionally distanced 
themselves from their users by not requiring any ‘registration’ in order to 
download the software, not having any tracking information on users and not 
tracking uploading/downloading patterns33.  Nonetheless, the element of 
‘control’ arose from Napster’s ‘terms of service’ which allowed them to 
terminate a member’s use of the service and also their ability to able to block 
users.  As such they were held liable for vicarious infringement by failing to 
utilise this ability positively; to patrol and prevent access as necessary on 
their network through their central search index34.  Finally, it was held that 
although Napster generated no revenue at the time, it had a direct financial 
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interest in the infringing activity to the point that its arguments about 
legitimate uses seemed disingenuous: 
 
“The ability to download myriad popular music files without payment 
seems to constitute the glittering object that attracts Napster’s financially-
valuable user base.”35 
 
As a result, the claim for vicarious infringement succeeded despite the fact 
that Napster’s owners had done all they reasonably could without completely 
disabling the network36.  Napster was offering a service to its users which 
theoretically gave them control over what infringements were taking place 
and which the courts ultimately viewed as amounting to failure to exercise 
such control37.   
 
2.2 Fair Use 
Napster’s defence sought to expand  the fair use doctrine38 , under the 
Betamax ruling39, that users were not infringing because they were making 
personal, non-commercial copies of songs.  A finding of fair use constitutes a 
defence to the copyright liability of the direct infringer, and furthermore for 
Napster, would constitute a defence for contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability as these require the existence of direct copyright 
infringement40.  As such, the defence of fair use was critical in the case.  The 
Fair Use Doctrine under US law, consists of four factors: purpose and 
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character of the use; nature of the use; portion used; and, the effect on the 
market41. 
 
Because its users were engaged in the uploading and downloading of 
content that they would normally have to buy, and because this was done 
with Napster’s assistance, the ‘purpose and character’ of the ‘use’ was held 
not to be private and therefore commercial42: 
 
“The substantial or commercially significant use of the service was, 
and continues to be, the unauthorised downloading and uploading of popular 
music, most of which is copyrighted.”43 
 
This appears to be conflating a commercial use of content with the supposed 
‘commerciality’ of the Napster enterprise mentioned above.  However, both 
were matters of speculation.  The Court found precedent44 for its conclusion 
that repeated and exploitative copying of works can constitute commercial 
use, even in the absence of direct economic benefit, and without offering the 
copies for sale45.  Until Napster itself started earning revenue from its 
service, it would technically not meet the element of ‘commerciality’, although 
they did eventually plan to monetise their service46.   Nonetheless, in such a 
period of time a substantial amount of infringement could occur; as such, the 
interests of rightsholders were protected47.  Furthermore, the Court found 
there to be commercial use as sending a file cannot be said to be personal 
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use when it is sent to an anonymous user48.  This seems to be adjudging 
‘commercial use’ by defining that it is not personal use, and therefore if it is 
not personal, it must be commercial.  The Appeals Court explained that 
direct economic advantage is not required to demonstrate a commercial use; 
instead, a repeated and exploitative copying of protected works (even if they 
are not offered for sale) may constitute a commercial use49.   
 
Whilst there is support for this reasoning50, to the author it seems as though 
‘commerciality’ was defined by what it is not.  Napster was a free service and 
its users did not pay for music tracks, therefore it appears that this term was 
decided negatively; the recording industry was not losing money at the 
expense of Napster users gaining money.  There was no correspondence 
between revenue lost (from the industry) and revenue ‘gained’ (by users), 
except perhaps a financial loss for the former and a welfare gain for the 
latter51.   
 
It has been argued that it is distinctly different from the situation in the 
Betamax case where the recorded programme was not concurrently 
available to millions of other users52.  However, the recorded program had 
the potential to be distributed to others, although on a much reduced scale 
due to purely physical constraints53.  Users did also not necessarily have to 
make content available and could function on the network by only 
downloading (‘recording’); thus making purely private use of the content 
itself.  In addition, both technologies were limited to the extent that the 
Betamax recorder could only record broadcasts, while the Napster 
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programme was only capable of sharing mp3s.  Whilst this may restrict the 
applicability of ‘significant non-infringing uses’, the logic still persists that both 
technologies still shared the characteristic of being limited in what they could 
perform and as such, may have more in common with each other than would 
be first apparent. 
 
The need to derive financial benefit was more difficult to establish and 
arguably speculative54.  It was deemed that despite the current lack of 
revenue for Napster, its future revenues were dependent on increasing its 
‘customer’ base, which in turn, was drawn by the availability of copyrighted 
music55.  This interpretation gave effect to the wider policy purpose of the 
doctrine; if current benefit alone were examined, substantial copyright 
infringement would occur before liability could accrue on the party facilitating 
it56.  This arguably became a self-fulfilling prophecy; the immediate effect of 
the proceedings was to generate enormous publicity for Napster and 
increase its number of users from 50,000 to 150,000 in the space of one 
month57.  By July 2000, its user-base numbered almost 20 million58.   
 
The ‘nature’ and ‘portion used’ factors are relatively straightforward; musical 
works were copied in their entirety by users59.  The nature of the use was 
judged to be for entertainment purposes60 and because it was undisputed 
that the downloading of mp3 files constituted copying the entirety of the work, 
the ‘portion used’ factor did also not lend itself to finding fair use61.   
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Finally, with regard to the effect on the market, it was found that Napster 
allegedly reduced CD sales and raised barriers to entry into the digital music 
market, which was deemed to have an adverse effect on the market for 
copyrighted music62.  The judge’s analysis focused on evidential 
considerations and excluded evidence from Napster that use of its service 
led to increased purchases of CDs by its users63.  Even if considered correct 
information and admitted, Napster would still not have had a valid argument 
as a matter of Law; past cases have clearly illustrated that even if the 
defendant’s conduct in an emerging market increases sales in a current 
market of the plaintiff’s, it does not deprive the plaintiff of the right to develop 
the new market and profit accordingly64.  In this instance, the plaintiffs were 
found to be particularly vulnerable to direct competition from Napster65.  This 
suggests that the copyright holder has the exclusive right to enter new 
markets, even when a ‘developer’ has stolen a march on them; something 
that the music industry has been traditionally reluctant to do66. 
 
Concluding that Napster’s users were not ‘fair users’ is arguably 
unobjectionable from an economic perspective67:  
 
“Judge Patel’s rejection of a general fair use exception for Napster 
simply makes sense.  Napster and its users are engaged in a commercial 
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activity that involves copying of protected material and ultimately has an 
adverse effect in the record companies’ market.”68 
 
However, this economic focus is one-sided.  Equally valid is the user 
standpoint69 from which a lowering of transaction costs would be beneficial 
for user-welfare as fair use can lower transaction costs.  Furthermore, these 
statements imply an unfair correlation between the action of users in 
downloading music files and the purely criminal (and commercial) enterprise 
of piracy.   
 
2.2.1 Sampling 
Napster primarily identified two further specific fair uses, these were: 
sampling and space-shifting70.  Ultimately, because users ‘sampled’ the 
entirety of the work, could permanently keep it, and because of the adverse 
economic effect mentioned above, sampling was held not to constitute a fair 
use in this context71; the resulting enhancement of sales from unauthorised 
use should not deprive the rightsholder of the right to licence the material72.  
At this point, a distinction should be drawn between individual songs and 
albums to understand the nuances of this argument73.  Both can be 
categorised as ‘works’ under copyright, however, downloading an album 
track could be viewed as effectively ‘sampling’ the album itself which users 
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could then purchase legitimately.  This could also be stretched to artists who 
have a back-catalogue of albums.  Although it is pushing the argument, given 
that the ‘entirety’ of an album would be copied, the logic could still be inferred 
that the user is sampling an artist as opposed to just an album.  As such, 
they are then equally capable of legally purchasing the rest of the work by 
the artist in question. 
 
However, arguing that its users were merely sampling the work (in any 
sense) was a difficult proposition for Napster to make74.  ‘Samples’ 
distributed by record companies were, and are, tightly controlled; however in 
this case, users obtained permanent high quality copies of a whole song and 
their use was deemed commercial75.  Additionally, as a matter of fact, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the more sampling users download, the less likely 
they are to purchase the music legitimately76 thus negating Napster’s 
argument that users were sampling merely to ‘trial’ a work before 
purchasing77.  Nevertheless, one must ask whether this really constitutes a 
difference to ‘home taping’ and whether it is that different to copying songs 
from the radio.  Record companies tightly control the release of music to 
radio prior to general (commercial) release, yet users had the ability to record 
these from broadcast onto cassette tape.  However, the manufacturers of 
such recording equipment were not held liable for secondary infringement 
under UK law78; they merely provided the power to copy.  Similarly, many 
songs available through Napster’s p2p service were, at the time, of a lower 
quality (bitrate) than those which are available today.  However, this is at 
best a secondary concern.  Disparity between bitrates is no more than 
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minimal and it is only recently that iTunes upgraded its bitrate79.  If there was, 
however, a greater difference, it could be possible, although unlikely, that 
parallels could be drawn; there is no reason why individuals would not 
legitimately purchase music they have ‘sampled’ for a more pleasurable 
listening experience.  However, such a conclusion seems, at best, optimistic.  
The truth is that ‘digital’ simply trumps ‘analogue’. 
 
2.2.2 Space-shifting 
This is perhaps the more controversial aspect of the rejection of the fair use 
defence80.  Napster was differentiated from the similar cases81 where the 
work(s) in question in these cases were only exposed to the original users 
(although there was nothing to stop the exposure of the work extending 
beyond the individual in either of those cases). 
 
The reasoning behind this denial was less ‘convincing’82.  Although the 
Supreme Court in Sony failed to provide clear definitions, it did offer (perhaps 
more usefully) a principled account of the need for the doctrine and the role it 
should play in future copyright cases83.  They held it was necessary to 
protect the public’s right to engage in areas of commerce that were 
substantially unrelated to infringement whilst at the same time expressly 
recognising that liability of manufacturers may be necessary to give 
adequate protection to copyright holders84.  ‘Space-shifting’ was expressly 
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analogised to the process of ‘format-shifting’85 and as such, the process of 
space-shifting should have constituted a fair use86.  However, the analogy of 
space-shifting can only be taken so far.  After the Mp3.com case87, there 
arguably has to be some degree of proximity (between user and content) of 
the ‘shifting’.  Because the court in Sony found that the Betamax recorder 
could be used to record programs that were not protected by copyright, it 
was entitled to a fair use defence88.  Nevertheless, the same argument can 
easily be applied to music; with files capable of being shared that are no 
longer in copyright protection or in which the author has chosen to share 
voluntarily89.  The decision in Diamond90 further demonstrates that the courts 
will interpret statutory grant narrowly if they perceive copyright owners are 
trying to stop technology91.  Judge Patel attempted to dispel this argument by 
claiming that the Ninth Circuit was applying a provision of the Audio Home 
Recording Act (AHRA)92 which is inapplicable in this case; therefore the 
analysis of space-shifting was irrelevant93.  However, the application of the 
time-shifting analogy is not limited to the AHRA; properly applied, it indicates 
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that space-shifting of mp3s is the sort of non-infringing commercial use 
envisaged by Sony94. 
 
Since Sony, the courts have struggled to define how much non-infringing use 
counts as ‘substantial’95.  Judge Patel attempted to support her finding on the 
basis that space-shifting accounted for a de minimis portion of Napster use96.  
This was upheld on the basis that the methods of ‘shifting’ in previous cases 
did not simultaneously involve distribution of the material to the general 
public, only to the original user97.  Unlike Sony, Napster maintained an 
ongoing relationship with them and played a continuing role in their 
infringement98.  It was concluded that because Napster could exercise 
control over the use of its service, this was enough to render the Betamax 
defence inapplicable99.  Because Sony only involved a one-time product 
sale, it did not address a core issue presented in Napster100: whether such 
defence applies to a defendant whose continuing relationship with the direct 
infringer(s) gives it at least the theoretical ability to prevent acts of 
infringement as they occur101.  As a related point, this now reflects the 
current importance of networks for digital content distribution102.  In Sony, the 
company did not own or control the (broadcast) network from which content 
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could be recorded, however, there was a much closer relationship in 
Napster. 
 
The court’s focus on knowledge seems to suggest that parties must do 
everything within their power to eliminate known infringement on their 
system103 which fails to accomplish the ultimate goal stated by the Supreme 
Court in Sony: to protect consumers’ ability to make non-infringing uses of 
technology, whilst at the same time preserving copyright incentives104. 
 
3. Grokster 
The decision in the MGM v Grokster105 engendered a particular interest as 
one of the first decisions to examine the liability of a p2p service in the wake 
of Napster and is now the seminal case on p2p in the United States106. 
 
The RIAA and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) brought a case 
against Grokster and StreamCast claiming that they should be liable for 
facilitating copyright infringement committed by users of their p2p 
software107.  The critical question was whether Grokster and StreamCast did 
anything (besides distributing software) to actively facilitate infringing activity, 
or whether they could do anything to stop such infringing activity108.   
 
 
 
 
 
103
  Dogan, S.L., ‘Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other Internet 
Technologies’, (2001) 52 Hastings Law Journal 939-960, p952. 
104
 Ibid, p952. 
105
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 US 913 (2005) (Supreme Court).  
Henceforth, Grokster. 
106
 Schlesinger, M., ‘Legal Issues in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, Focusing on the Making 
Available Right’, in Strowel, A (ed), ‘Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in 
Copyright Law’, (2009, Elgar) 43-70, p63. 
107
 Grokster, 920-921. 
108
 Stokes, A., and Rudkin-Binks, J., ‘Online music – P2P aftershocks’, (2003) Ent LR 14(6) 
127-131, p128. 
149 
3.1 Supreme Court decision 
As in Napster, evidence of primary infringement was easily deduced (and 
also conceded by the defendants109) and thus the issue of ‘knowledge’ had 
to be similarly considered.  Although it was accepted by the court that at 
least some users were engaged in direct infringement of the plaintiffs’ 
content, it was initially held that liability for contributory infringement only 
accrues where a defendant has ‘actual’, and not merely ‘constructive’, 
knowledge of the infringement at a time when the defendant materially 
contributes to that infringement110.   
 
Here, the analyses of the Napster and Grokster courts diverged.  Grokster 
had successfully argued previously that they must have actual knowledge of 
infringement at a time when they can use that knowledge to stop the 
particular infringement111.  There was no actual knowledge because of the 
lack of a central server or index function; this meant that Grokster had no 
way of knowing whether specific files were being exchanged, at least of the 
moment of exchange itself112.  The Court concluded that actual – not 
constructive – knowledge was required at the time at which Grokster 
materially contributes to the infringement in question113 and as Grokster only 
had knowledge of infringements after they occurred, it did not have the 
requisite knowledge when it would have been able to take action114.  The fact 
that they could communicate with users of their software and provide 
updates was judged to have no bearing on whether they facilitated or 
enabled the exchange of copyrighted materials115.  Regarding the issue of 
material contribution, the Circuit Court held that Grokster did not have the 
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same ‘control’ over the network as Napster, and as such, did not provide the 
‘site and facilities’ for the alleged infringements116.  Crucially, the Court 
distinguished the Napster case on the basis that neither Grokster nor 
StreamCast operated a centralised file-sharing network and as such, even if 
they were to shut down their websites (where users could download their p2p 
programme), users could still continue to trade files117 (unlike the situation in 
Napster).  The functioning of Grokster’s website was not connected to the 
functioning of their p2p software.  The lack of knowledge (based on the 
absence of an ongoing relationship) precluded liability118. 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied 
the Sony standard119; specifically that they failed to appreciate that such a 
standard is irrelevant when the defendant is actively inducing infringement120.  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of summary judgement 
for the defendants, clearly indicating that technology entrepreneurs could be 
held liable for actively inducing acts of infringement by users121. 
 
3.2 Inducement 
To combat the challenge to secondary liability that p2p technology 
presented, the Supreme Court devised a new theory; that of inducement122.  
They established that the circumstances in Grokster differed from those of 
Sony (previously, the only occasion when Supreme Court had considered 
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contributory liability123).  The lower courts misapplied Sony in ruling that mere 
theoretical non-infringing use was sufficient to exonerate the provider124 
where there is evidence of intent and/or actions directed at promoting 
infringement125. 
 
The Court set out three elements probative of such intent to induce 
infringement126: 
• The defendant promoted the infringement enabling virtues of its 
device; 
• The defendant failed to filter out infringing uses; and, 
• The defendant’s business plan depended on a high volume of 
infringement. 
 
In this instance, all three elements were evident, amounting to a clear 
intention to foster infringement127.  Firstly they advertised their services as 
being similar to those offered by Napster to capture Napster users after its 
demise128 and even the name ‘Grokster’ appeared to be derived from 
‘Napster’129.  As a matter of evidence, it was found that they had attempted 
to divert search queries for Napster to its own website130.  There was also an 
absence of filtering in place to reduce the amount of infringing activity; a fact 
which helped the Court adduce ‘facilitation’131.  Finally, it was found that the 
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plaintiffs derived revenue from selling advertising132 leading the Court to 
conclude that, “The ulawful objective is unmistakeable.”133  In its analysis, the 
Court used the term ‘distribution’ regardless of the fact that the system did 
not involve anything more than users opening up their folders for sharing, 
that is, ‘making available’ files for onward distribution134.  Furthermore, it was 
noted that there is no need to prove any causative link between the 
inducement and any acts of copyright infringement135. 
 
Having ruled that bad intent, if proved, was sufficient to find liability for 
induced infringements, the Court declined to analyse what the standard for 
contributory infringement would be when intent to foster infringement cannot 
be shown136, apart from indicating that none of the three criteria would be 
sufficient on its own137. 
 
As has been shown, the Napster and Grokster cases drastically extended 
the scope of copyright liability.  More recently, file-sharing has come to the 
fore again following the much reported Pirate Bay case.  However, this case 
differed from those above for several reasons.  Apart from the obvious 
jurisdictional distinction, the furore surrounding it was arguably much more 
political due to the site’s links with the Swedish anti-copyright party, 
‘Piratbyrån’.  Nevertheless, the case is worth examining in light of the 
principles which have been developed above. 
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4. The Pirate Bay 
The Pirate Bay decision in 2009 warrants consideration as it can be seen to 
be a natural development of the Grokster ruling and because the technology 
involved in the case represents a further development from the first 
generation p2p network utilised by Napster.  The Pirate Bay utilises torrent 
technology and the website operates as a torrent-indexing and tracking site; 
as such it does not ‘host’ any material itself, acting instead (effectively) as 
search engine for torrent files enabling users to download them from other 
host locations138.  In contrast to Napster and Grokster, who essentially began 
as private and to an extent, social operations, The Pirate Bay originally 
started in 2003 by the Swedish anti-copyright organisation ‘Piratbyrån’ but 
has operated as a private entity since 2004139.   
 
Formal proceedings were instigated in January 2008 with prosecutors 
alleging the defendants were involved in contributory copyright 
infringement140.  Despite the fact the case was based on Swedish law, 
certain parallels are evident between it and the US law, notably ‘acts of 
complicity’ which may be aligned with contributory infringement.  The 
applicable statutory framework concerned how The Pirate Bay assisted in 
‘making available copyrighted works’141.  In April 2009, the District Court of 
Stockholm rendered its judgement in the Pirate Bay case and as against its 
founders142.  The central legal question in the case was whether someone 
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can be found guilty of contributing to an offence that they are unaware of143.  
In order for someone to be liable for contribution under Swedish Copyright 
law, a principle offence must exist144.   
 
4.1 Principle Offence 
The Pirate Bay was deemed to have satisfied the condition of ‘making 
available’ since users could effectively access the work whenever they 
wanted145 providing that it has an effect on the rightsholders’ exploitation of 
their works in that country146.   
 
This seems to have been applied rather expansively by the Court, the fact 
that the website did not host files specifically meant that The Pirate Bay did 
not directly infringe copyright, nor did it make such works available for others 
to infringe147.  This was effectively done by the torrent technology. 
 
4.2 Complicity 
The Court went on to consider specific acts of complicity148.  As with 
Grokster, the issue of ‘intent’ was important; specifically it was found that the 
defendants had the requisite intent for liability even if they did know the 
specific file(s) involved.  The case for contributory infringement was primarily 
founded on three grounds149: 
• Offering a database that was linked to a catalogue of torrent files 
pointing to infringing content; 
• Enabling users to search and download the torrent files; and, 
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• Offering a tracker functionality through which users could contact each 
other. 
 
It was decided that The Pirate Bay satisfied these grounds as it facilitated 
and consequently aided and abetted infringement150.  Furthermore, the 
charges also stated that the majority of files found through The Pirate Bay 
contained unlicensed copyrighted works and that the service was funded by 
advertising revenue; thus fulfilling the prerequisites for commercial 
exploitation151.  Under Swedish law, liability may attach to each person 
involved in the offence if they are acting collectively and as such, the Court 
concluded that the four defendants were thus collectively liable152.  However, 
the Court did not clarify the necessary relationship between the activity and 
the infringement, nor did they elaborate on the particular features of The 
Pirate Bay’s activity that led to liability153.   
 
It appears then, that once again (as with Napster), it was found that because 
of the user-friendly nature of the programme and its administration/tracker 
facility, The Pirate Bay had itself participated in infringement154.  The Court 
concluded that it was not necessary for the defendants to have knowledge of 
each infringing act, but that it was sufficient that they knew copyrighted 
material was being shared155.  As they did nothing to prevent such illegal 
activity, they were adjudged to have been ‘wilful’ in contributing to 
infringement; underscoring the lack of nuanced analysis on the link between 
conduct and liability.  Nonetheless, the defendants certainly could not be said 
to have helped their cause through their aggressive responses to 
 
150
 Carrier, M.A., ‘The Pirate Bay, Grokster, and Google’, (2010) 15 JIPR 7-18, p9. 
151
 Manner, M., Siniketo, T., and Pollard, U., ‘The Pirate Bay ruling – when the fun and 
games end’, pp198-199. 
152
 Carrier, M.A., ‘The Pirate Bay, Grokster, and Google’, (2010) 15 JIPR 7-18, p9. 
153
 Ibid, p11. 
154
 Wistam, H., and Andersson, T., ‘The Pirate Bay trial (Case Comment)’, (2009) CTLR 
15(6) 129-130, p130. 
155
 On the basis of evidence produced in the case, this was clear much like in Napster.  Ibid, 
p130.  See also chapter 6 pp251-252. 
156 
rightsholders.  In addition to not disposing the Court to a considerate attitude 
to the defendants, the letters they had received from rightsholders clearly 
demonstrated the existence of infringing material that they refused to take 
steps to address156.   
 
5. ‘If it looks like a duck...’ 
The digital era has so far seen an expansion of secondary liability in two 
main ways157.  Firstly, producers and suppliers of technology that has both 
infringing and non-infringing uses have increasingly been held liable for 
infringements committed by their users158.  Secondly, the directness of the 
financial interest in infringing activity required before a defendant is held 
vicariously liable has been significantly loosened.  The convergence of digital 
technology159, the Internet and a significant body of case law contributed, at 
the time, to a rather confused legal situation.  Furthermore, the important 
‘social’ aspect160 to file-sharing added to this uncertainty161. 
 
Ultimately, the Napster decision hinged on a number of key-facts that were 
entirely specific to the circumstances which could perhaps be more 
accurately described as sheer bad luck.  The infamous email certainly did not 
help Napster’s cause and made it much harder for them to appear victimised, 
at least in the eyes of the music industry.  Nevertheless, whether or not the 
same conclusion could have been drawn without this aspect is unclear; 
although it was somewhat of a ‘smoking gun’, that is not to say that 
‘knowledge’ would not have been inferred without it. 
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With regard to having ‘control’ over the network for vicarious infringement, 
they were again held liable due to the architecture of the programme; their 
central server proved sufficient to demonstrate their ability to exercise control 
over the network.  However, this was largely dictated by the technology at 
the time.  While digital technology was growing, the associated infrastructure 
to support it was still catching up.  Furthermore, while the technology behind 
p2p was not new, it was the first that was widely distributed, used and 
useable.  As such, it proved rather a test-bed for copyright law before the 
architecture involved was surpassed by second generation and torrent 
services.  However, this ‘test-bed’ developed from the prevailing attitude of 
the industry: 
 
 “At first, the music industry tried to ignore Napster.  The future was 
bearing down, and the industry’s first instinct was to stand and fight for an 
older, safer, more profitable, and more easily controlled way of life.”162 
 
Arguably, there is little wrong with the Courts’ interpretation of the fair use 
factors.  However, as Napster did not actually make any revenue from its 
service, there are question marks over the issue of commerciality with the 
term being applied negatively; seemingly shifting the burden of proof on to 
the defendant to show that they were not deriving financial benefit rather 
than having the prosecution prove that they were.  The specific fair use 
defence of ‘sampling’ was also difficult to overcome.  Whilst Napster may 
have had a point in claiming that its users were more likely to purchase 
music legitimately, that it (at a stretch) may have stimulated the music 
market, it is difficult to extend the term to cover, basically, entire songs. 
 
Problems do arise, however, with the fair use defence of space-shifting.  The 
judicial reasoning on this point may have been suspect; it is arguably at this 
juncture where the interests of rightsholders were favoured at the expense of 
users.  The author asserts that whilst the outcome of the case may have 
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been legally valid, the lasting effect of it has been to take with one hand what 
was given with the other; the Betamax defence has been surpassed by the 
extension of the burden of ‘knowledge’, and furthermore, ‘inducement’ as 
discussed in the Grokster case.  Perhaps more so, the ruling has vested in 
the industry the power to engage in commerce at the expense of 
entrepreneurial individuals or groups who may possess more vision and can 
act more quickly in the marketplace. 
 
However, the courts must ensure that copyright incentives are only 
compromised to accommodate a valid competing goal163.  Independent 
markets should be protected with no affirmative obligation on rightsholders to 
create technology markets.  Whilst Napster itself may have been judged to 
have been facilitating copyright infringement, the underlying technology of 
p2p is not exclusive to this effect; in carrying out this analysis, the technology 
in question must be considered as a whole164.  The difficulty, however, lies in 
embodying this in a legal rule, if indeed it even can be.  Perhaps it is a job, to 
use a familiar phrase, ‘for Congress, (or Parliament), decide’165. 
 
In many ways, one could argue that p2p networks have been ‘marked’ as 
inherently bad tools of copyright infringement166.  Rather than inquiring into 
the raw amount of non-infringing uses, the question should be asked as to 
whether any injunction would interfere with users’ access to a product or 
service for which a market would likely have developed in the absence of 
infringement167. 
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Despite Napster’s best efforts, it is clear that those involved clearly knew that 
the company’s very existence was based on digital copyright infringement.  
Nevertheless, Napster marked a profound change in the balance of power 
between the music industry and consumers.  Whilst the advent of the CD 
introduced greater convenience and sound quality for the listener, Napster 
changed the dynamics of distribution and cost. 
 
How much control rightsholders may exercise over their content turns on the 
scope of copyright protection, particularly with respect to new markets 
created by technology168.  The approach adopted in Napster has enhanced 
the ability of copyright owners to wield significant measures through the 
courts.  However, it should not be assumed that when technology creates a 
new market, the copyright owner ought to control it169: 
 
“...an injunction might close off the market at a time when more 
information could reasonably have been expected.  It might render a 
technology capable of legal and beneficial services inoperable in its 
entirety.”170 
 
To some extent, the hyperbole surrounding Napster has displaced measured 
reflection about the real user interests at stake, especially with the strong 
psychological advantage Napster had with the public.  Under the rightsholder 
control view, so long as the new technological means of dissemination 
comes within the general scope of the statutory grant, copyright holders 
should continue to exercise their exclusive rights171.  It is perhaps this aspect 
that seems to have been Napster’s legacy.  Instead, a better practical 
strategy may have been to engage the parties in some form of practical co-
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operation (although efforts were underway behind the scenes by Napster to 
engage the music industry, this was not helped by four record companies, all 
with different management and executive personnel).  Whilst any co-
operation would have created formidable hurdles172: 
 
“...any chosen tactic – even if limited in scope – would allow more 
information to be drawn into the process, thereby enabling in the end a more 
reasonable, if not more efficient, adaptation of technology to market 
needs.”173  
 
Instead, the result has been a long-lasting cultural revolution that has 
outlived the technological revolution embodied by Napster: “...  it made the 
need to run to a record store to buy an album seem like a quaint twentieth-
century tradition.”174  Arguably now, the choice is not between being paid 
more or being paid less, but between being paid less and not being paid at 
all175.  Furthermore, creators and rightsholders do not entirely enjoy an 
exclusive right to exploit their works, but only narrowly defined and uneasily 
tolerated opportunities to extract compensation, which should not hamper the 
progress of technology176. 
 
However, in the absence of specific statutory guidance, the courts’ approach 
to ‘dual-use’ technologies has necessarily been empirical, depending on the 
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application of existing copyright rules and which produce results that are 
governed by the nature of the disputes before them177.   
 
As the technology continued to evolve further, the matter was by no means 
settled.  Whereas the architecture of the Napster and Grokster systems were 
different, the experience of using both was largely similar178.  However, 
Grokster allowed for the transfer of media files of all types179.  This could be 
seen as enlarging the scope for a finding infringement since it effectively 
allowed more material to be shared and downloaded, but could also allow for 
more non-infringing material to be shared, and implies the possibility that 
some files may have emanated from, or have been created by, the user with 
the intention that they be distributed and shared.   
 
Initially, it could be argued that Grokster had learned from Napster’s ‘mistake’ 
(or perhaps more accurately, the limitations or liabilities of Napster’s 
architecture)180 to overcome the problems faced by Napster; the lower court 
Grokster decisions demonstrate: “... that the more decentralised systems ... 
are legitimate, in contrast to their more centralised predecessors.”181 
 
However, Grokster could not emerge from Napster’s shadow182.  Suing 
intermediaries/facilitators fundamentally differs from suing counterfeiters; 
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 Wadhwa, A., ‘Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright 
law: from Betamax to Grokster’, (2007) JIPLP 7(2) 487-491, p487. 
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 Corwin, D., ‘Contributory copyright liability in Napster versus Grokster: a distinction 
without a difference’, (2004) 24 Loy LA Ent L Rev 605-618, p608. 
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 Ibid, p608. 
180
 Meisel, J.B., ‘Entry into the Market for Online Distribution of Digital Content: Economic 
and Legal Ramifications’, (2008) Scripted, Vol.  5, Issue 1.  50-69, p55. 
181
 Nasir, C., ‘Taming the beast of file-sharing - legal and technological solutions to the 
problem of copyright infringement over the internet: Part 2’, (2005) Ent LR 16(4) 82-88, p80, 
and Meisel, J.B., ‘Entry into the Market for Online Distribution of Digital Content: Economic 
and Legal Ramifications’, (2008) Scripted, Vol.  5, Issue 1.  50-69, p69. 
182
 Although according to Cary Sherman of the RIAA, “Shawn Fanning was genuinely a kid 
with a great idea ...  The second generation of peer-to-peer operators were definitely in this 
for the money....”  Quoted in S Knopper, ‘Appetite for Self-Destruction: the Spectacular 
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such cases do not, and cannot, address specific conduct by particular end-
users183.  As such, all p2p users were effectively tarred by the same brush.  
As such, the courts face an unpleasant choice; to either ban unquestionably 
lawful conduct in order to get at the infringing conduct, or let the infringing 
conduct remain in order to protect the legal uses184. 
 
Whilst it may be hard not to side with the Grokster decision that p2p 
operators would be held liable because they have done ‘something 
wrong’185, the result is that the knowledge requirement has been replaced 
with intention186.  Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the Court chose to 
discuss the important detail of system ‘design’ in a short paragraph and 
footnote, demonstrating an inappropriate balance between the issues at 
stake in such a case187.  The inducement rule in Grokster premises liability of 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct188 and thus, in theory, should 
do nothing to discourage ‘lawful’ innovation’189 and the Court talked about the 
‘tension’ between creative pursuits and technological innovation190.  
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Crash of the Record Industry in the Digital Age, (2009, Simon & Schuster), p193.  In 
contrast, the other and perhaps more common perception among the music industry was: 
“Fanning, in their eyes, was a thief, pure and simple.”  Kot, G., ‘Ripped: How the Wired 
Generation Revolutionised Music’, (2009, Scribner), p28. 
183
 Lemley, M.A., and Reese, R.A., ‘Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without 
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 Wadhwa, A., ‘Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright 
law: from Betamax to Grokster’, (2007) JIPLP 7(2) 487-491, p490. 
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 Daly, M. ‘Life after Grokster: Analysis of US and European Approaches to File-sharing’, 
(2007) EIPR 29(8) 319-324, p320. 
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 Ganley, P., ‘Surviving Grokster: innovation and the future of peer-to-peer’, (2006), EIPR 
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 Grokster, 937. 
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 Daly, M. ‘Life after Grokster: Analysis of US and European Approaches to File-sharing’, 
(2007) EIPR 29(8) 319-324, p320.  The court ‘sensibly’ limited the ambit of the active 
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specifically on ‘purposeful, culpable expression and conduct’, Ganley, P., ‘Surviving 
Grokster: innovation and the future of peer-to-peer’, (2006) EIPR 28(1) 15-25, p17. 
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However, they concluded that the previous judgements in favour of Grokster 
gave too much weight to the latter of these concerns191.  On the other hand, 
it now seems from the judgement that simply having ‘bad intent’ is enough to 
prove liability; although easily proved in Napster, ‘bad intent’ appears 
inextricably linked with p2p and the onus is on the p2p organisation to 
disprove it.   
 
It should be remembered that when Sony invented its Betamax recorder, 
there was nothing preceding it to suggest that it was ‘lawful’ innovation.  It 
could be suggested that because they were an established technology 
company, they were incapable of inducing unlawful conduct by virtue of their 
reputation192.  They were also permitted weeks of testimony to demonstrate 
how the Betamax would not harm the industry allowing the Supreme Court to 
fully understand the issue.  However, the Betamax recorder existed in a 
world of ‘atoms’ and not ‘bits’; the phases of product design and the inherent 
checks and balances within the structure of legitimate business help ensure 
that companies will engage in legitimate revenue avenues: “Sony was a 
vindication of this thought process.”193 The Supreme Court carefully 
differentiated Sony to leave its principle intact, but with the introduction of the 
‘inducement’ criteria that effectively replicated the notorious email from 
Napster. 
 
It appears that any easy to use programme is also capable of fulfilling the 
requirement of ‘promoting infringement’ simply by being efficient and user-
friendly194.  As such, any potential developers risk being stuck between a 
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 Grokster, 933. 
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 See Lessig, L., ‘The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World’ 
(2002, Vintage Books), pp194-196. 
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 Ganley, P., ‘Surviving Grokster: innovation and the future of peer-to-peer’, (2006) EIPR 
28(1) 15-25, p22.  In contrast, a p2p programme is just a simple protocol that sits in top of 
the physical and logical architecture created by others.  The fact the p2p, for Ganley, is 
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164 
rock and a hard place; Napster concentrated power to engage in new (or 
potential) digital markets in the hands of the rightsholders, whilst both 
Napster and Grokster have the effect that anyone who wishes to design such 
a system risks being guilty of contributory infringement by doing what any 
entrepreneur would do: that is design a user-friendly system.  With the effect 
that risk being caught in a vicious symbiotic circle; the programme will not be 
successful unless it is well designed and if it well designed, then it risks being 
viewed as promoting infringement.  Whilst not being the victim of 
circumstance to the same degree as Napster, Grokster still fell victim to the 
p2p hangover and served to strengthening copyright’s armoury for 
rightsholders. 
 
The issue of ‘inducement’ was important in The Pirate Bay case as it was in 
Grokster, but was much more evident here due to the conduct of the 
defendants.  Again, personal circumstances may have played a crucial factor 
in the decision; the founders were actively involved in a political campaign to 
encourage copyright infringement195.   
 
It appears that ‘knowledge’ and ‘inducement’ are inextricably linked when it 
comes to p2p.  The introduction of the ‘inducement’ factor further pushes the 
issue of infringement onto the user.  Whereas the requirement of ‘knowledge’ 
places the onus on the defendant, the requirement of inducement would 
seem to involve the user (if they are effectively being ‘induced’ to infringe), 
but it rests with the defendant as well.  One may think it is a standard that 
can only be judged from the standpoint of those who may be ‘induced’, and 
perhaps a user standpoint would be advisable in cases such as these.  
However, it would be unlikely that anyone would say (or at least admit) that 
they were ‘induced’, as obviously this incriminates the user196.  However, 
users could hardly be judged to have been ‘induced’ to infringe copyright 
through their use of p2p technology; their conduct is a result of the sub-
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(2009) CTLR 15(6) 129-130, p129. 
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culture specific to the Internet (and which can be traced back to the 
development of the Internet197) that ‘sharing’ is perceived as a fruitful and 
worthwhile exercise.  As it is then, we are left in the curious position of the 
defendant being judged by a standard they may never have considered, nor 
had reason to consider. 
 
The concept of ‘specific knowledge’ implies that any sort of notion that 
copyright infringement is taking place appears to be sufficient.  Arguably, 
creating a p2p programme would alone imply the knowledge requirement, 
despite the fact that the technology would still have legitimate uses.  The 
requirement of knowledge thus necessarily implies inducement; however, 
whilst implying some sort of active conduct on the part of a defendant, this is 
also not the case.  The argument has already been made that simply trying 
to create and user-friendly programme could potentially be enough to satisfy 
inducement.  Nevertheless, it also becomes harder to reconcile with the 
increasingly ‘remote’ nature of p2p technology (from central server, through 
to torrent incarnations).  As such, the line between merely being a search 
engine and ‘inducer’ of copyright infringement threatens to become 
blurred198.  It is an unfortunate fact of modern life that such efficient 
mechanisms are used to disseminate illegal, rather than legal, copies, but by 
shutting down p2p networks to solve the problem of infringement forces us, 
in many cases, to rely on a less-efficient mechanism for disseminating digital 
content. 
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Digital Rights Management 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent controversies1 highlight that the issue of Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) has not gone away.  In the past, DRM has always been closely 
associated with content to which it has been attached2, but developments in 
digital technology and content distribution necessitate a reconsideration of 
the operation and potential impact of DRM on users in relation to evolving, 
streaming-based methods of content dissemination.  It can be argued that 
DRM is no longer as closely intertwined with the content it is designed to 
protect.  In the past, prior technological advances had facilitated and 
promoted the acquisition of physical copies of works; now, every act of 
perception or of materialisation of digital content can be controlled via DRM 
so as to condition both user experience and consumption.  Significantly, the 
current operation of DRM highlights the emerging possibility of ‘remote’ 
content management resulting from arbitrary negotiations and decisions 
made by the relevant rightsholder(s).  As such, DRM can be viewed as a 
separate mechanism, or a latent technology that can be effectively ‘switched-
on’ by rightsholders following the sale of content to users.  As a result, there 
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1
 Admittedly, these do not all involve music.  See, ‘Amazon Kindle users surprised by “Big 
Brother” move’, (2009) The Guardian, available from: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jul/17/amazon-kindle-1984, ‘Ofcom knocks back 
BBC DRM plans’, (2009) BBC News, available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/8352241.stm, and, ‘Microsoft cutting off up to 1m 
gamers with modified Xbox 360 controls’, (2009) The Guardian, available from:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/nov/11/xbox-modded-consoles-live-cut-microsoft 
It is worth noting that the modification of Xboxes may also serve the purpose of facilitating 
‘cheating’ in online gaming.  As such, the blocking of chipped consoles helps maintain the 
network by ensuring that the gaming environment is fair for all players.  However, this raises 
other issues such as whether the practice of cheating would cause complaints from other 
users and the ‘social etiquette’ associated with virtual gaming communities (as also 
mentioned in chapter 3, p102 and p122).  Although interesting, they are beyond the scope of 
this chapter. 
2
 For example, the aggressive ‘XCP’ and ‘MediaMax’ software released on albums by Sony-
BMG.  See generally, Fox, M.A., ‘Another nail in the coffin for copy-protection technologies?  
Sony BMG’s XCP and MediaMax debacle’, (2006) Ent LR 17(7) 214-218. 
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has been a key shift from protecting content itself to an application of DRM 
on distribution networks.  Such developments may result in expanding 
barriers to content consumption which will be (and is) increasingly 
channelled through digital networks3.  DRM measures have always carried 
the risk that they may be circumvented (despite the illegality of such 
practices); users could ‘crack’ the DRM protection on content and enjoy 
unrestricted use.  With the application of DRM now, greater control rests with 
the rightsholder who can permit unrestricted  use, but who also has the 
power to subsequently restrict it4.  This is especially important given the 
amount of content that is now streamed and/or which is dependent on a 
network (controlled by the rightsholder) for distribution and consumption. 
 
This chapter will proceed by outlining the legal basis and development of 
DRM, and seek to provide a definition that encompasses its necessary 
features.  The restriction of content to users, in particular, has raised 
important tensions and debate between the application of DRM and the 
exceptions under copyright law which enable users to make use of 
copyrighted content for certain purposes, and serve to facilitate the 
dissemination of information and ideas that arise from interacting with 
copyrighted works; the role of DRM in this context will thus be analysed.  It is 
not necessarily the case that DRM is prejudicial to creative practice; instead, 
it is the position of users (as would-be creators) which may be adversely 
affected in light of the emerging trend in streaming-based, and DRM-
supported content dissemination. 
 
2. Legal background 
The content industries have the power to insulate themselves against 
competitive pressures which may otherwise act to force change in their 
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3
 Correra, C.M., ‘Fair use in the Digital Era’, (2002) IIC 33(5) 561-678, p585. 
4
 This could presumably have the somewhat absurd effect of DRM circumvention now 
motivating users to protect their use privileges from DRM, as opposed breaking DRM 
measures; users would seek to ‘protect’ rather than ‘circumvent’.  The act of circumvention is 
useless if one has already been deprived of content. 
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strategies and business models5.  Although they have had the benefit of 
favourable court findings to help ‘insulate’ them to an extent6, they have also 
now come to rely on ‘self-help’ measures through DRM.  As soon as 
technology had been envisaged to enhance the effective exercise of 
copyright, it was feared that similar technology might be used to defeat such 
technological protection, and that legal protection was additionally required: 
“In other words, the fence had to be electrified: acts of disabling the technical 
barriers had to be punished.”7  The degree of control and power digital 
technology gives a user, especially a skilled user, should not be 
underestimated8, so although DRM systems are privately created, they have 
an important ‘subsidy’9 through their legal protection, or ‘paracopyright’10. 
 
The first attempt to conclude an international agreement in response to the 
perceived challenges of digital technology11 was made by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and led to the adoption of two 
treaties, which amongst other things12, established a common basis for DRM 
protection13: The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)14 and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)15.  The Treaties established, 
for the first time, that technological measures used by rightsholders to protect 
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5
 Kemp, B., ‘Copyright’s Digital Reformulation’, (2002-2003) 5 Yale J L & Tech 141-153, 
p142. 
6
 See the outcome of the cases against peer-to-peer networks discussed in chapter 4, 
pp131-165. 
7
 Dusollier, ‘Technology as an imperative for regulating copyright: from the public 
exploitation to the private use of the work’, (2005) EIPR 27(6) 201-204, p202. 
8
 Boone, M.S., ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Computing and its Impact on Digital Rights 
Management’, (2008) Mich St L Rev 413-434, p423. 
9
 Lessig, L., ‘Code (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p117. 
10
 See generally, Ballabh, A., ‘Paracopyright’, (2008) EIPR 30(4) 138-144. 
11
 See chapter 2, pp72-74. 
12
 Ibid, pp76-81. 
13
 Barczewski, M., ‘International framework for legal protection if digital rights management 
systems’, (2005) EIPR 27(5) 165-169, p165. 
14
 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996. 
15
 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), adopted in Geneva on December 
20, 1996. 
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their works enjoy an independent protection16.  They contain provisions 
concerning the protection of rights management information17 and 
importantly, provisions on the protection of technological measures18 
themselves; namely that: 
 
“Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological 
measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their 
rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in 
respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or 
permitted by law.”19 
 
This was implemented in the US through the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
1998 (DMCA)20.  The anti-circumvention measures therein render the 
circumvention of DRMcontrols an independent wrong, thus converting 
copyright into an absolute form of protection21.Similarly in Europe, through 
the Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society (InfoSoc Directive)22, the act of circumventing 
such a measure has become a legal wrong in itself, aside from actual 
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 Braun, N., ‘Interface between the protection of technological measures and the exercise of 
exceptions to copyright and related rights: comparing the situation in the United States and 
the European Community’, (2003) EIPR 25(11) 496-503, p496. 
17
 Arts.12 and 19 of the WCT and WPPT, respectively. 
18
 Specifically, arts.11-12 WCT and arts.18-19 WPPT.  See Barczewski, M., ‘International 
framework for legal protection if digital rights management systems’, (2005) EIPR (27)5 165-
169, p165. 
19
 Art.1 WCT, Obligations concerning Technological measures.  This is also dealt with in 
art.18, WPPT specifically in relation to phonograms. 
20
 s.1201, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, to amend title 17, United States Code, to 
implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty, and for other purposes, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
21
 Correra, C.M., ‘Fair use in the Digital Era’, (2002) IIC 33(5) 561-678, p582. 
22
 Art.6 Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 2002 on 
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society.  Henceforth, the InfoSoc Directive. 
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copyright infringement23.  Indeed, when the idea that ‘the answer to the 
machine is (in) the machine’ was proposed in 199524 by Charles Clark, legal 
advisor to the International Publishers Copyright Council, it is questionable if 
such  protections were envisaged.   
 
3. Definition 
Clarke’s vision involved some sort of ‘closed circuit’ system with the 
development of relevant architecture25 and as such, the origins of DRM 
implicate the architectural modality26 as a factor of user regulation.  In this 
sense, it can be seen as an evolution from the law trying to control digital 
architecture27, to architecture itself (albeit with a legal basis) as being 
deployed against architecture.  Such control comes from the code28 to 
ultimately create a system of identification, monitoring, control, and 
compensation29 which requires reinforcement by ‘controlling legislation’30.  
Clarke’s idea represented not so much computers’ abilities to block copying, 
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23
 Foged, T., ‘US v EU anti circumvention legislation: preserving the public’s privileges in the 
digital age?’, (2002) EIPR 24(11) 525-542, p525. 
24
 Charles Clarke, quoted in Goldstein, P., ‘Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the 
Celestial Jukebox (Revised Edition)’ (2003), pp165-170.  For a full version of Charles 
Clarke’s position, see Clarke, C., ‘The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine’, in 
Hugenholtz, P.B., (ed), ‘The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment: Proceedings of the 
Royal Academy Colloquium’, (1995, Kluwer Law International) 139-145.  This phrase has 
been shortened with the passage of time from ‘the answer to the machine is in the machine’, 
to ‘the answer to the machine is the machine’.  It is not apparent when this occurred, but the 
content of both versions of the message is the same. 
25
 Clarke, C., ‘The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine’, in Hugenholtz, P.B., (ed), ‘The 
Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment: Proceedings of the Royal Academy 
Colloquium’, (1995, Kluwer Law International), pp139-145, p139. 
26
 See chapter 3, pp119-126. 
27
 See chapter 3,  pp121-126.  This was the case in the actions against p2p networks as 
discussed in chapter 4, pp131-165. 
28
 Lessig, L., ‘Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity’, (2004, Penguin Books), 
p151. 
29
 Clarke, C., ‘The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine’, in Hugenholtz, P.B., (ed), ‘The 
Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment: Proceedings of the Royal Academy 
Colloquium’, (1995, Kluwer Law International), pp139-145, p140. 
30
 Ibid, p144. 
172
as their capacity to connect authors and users31.  From this somewhat 
humble and even noble beginning, the issue has grown and been clouded by 
the fear of rightsholders that they would ultimately pay the price for putting 
copyrighted works online.  The perceived lack of copyright’s enforceability32 
in the online world is probably the reason why rightsholders began to act in 
ways which suggest they do not trust copyright laws and as a result, have 
turned to such private ordering measures33 as a form of ‘front-end’ 
protection34. DRM was therefore a sign that the content industries were 
becoming adept at presenting the digital environment as a threat35.  
 
The origins of DRM may be traced back to 197636 and the Sony Betamax37 
case.  Here, it was argued that Sony should build in sensors in their video 
recorders that would detect special broadcast signals to prevent recording, 
and therefore, could be seen as an early DRM solution (although not ‘digital’ 
as such).  During the 1980s, software vendors also experimented with copy 
protection technologies, but eventually abandoned the idea38, and in the 
early 90s, the US Audio Home Recording Act of 199239 provided for a serial 
copy management system40 in all digital audio recording devices that allowed 
first generation copies only41. 
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 Goldstein, P., ‘Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox (Revised 
Edition)’ (2003), p184. 
32
 See chapter 2, pp70-75. 
33
 Foged, T., ‘US v EU anti circumvention legislation: preserving the public’s privileges in the 
digital age?’, (2002) EIPR 24(11) 525-542, p525. 
34
 Parchomovsky, G., and Weiser, P.J., ‘Beyond Fair Use’, (2011) 96 Cornell L Rev 91-138, 
p98. 
35
 Hesmondhalgh, D., ‘The Cultural Industries (Second Edition)’, (2007, SAGE Publications), 
p151. 
36
 Stromdale, C., ‘The problems with DRM’, (2006) Ent LR 17(1) 1-6, p1. 
37
 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 US 417 (1984). 
38
 Kretschmer, M., ‘Digital copyright: the end of an era’, (2003) EIPR 25(8) 333-341, p335. 
39
 US Audio Home Recording Act, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992), to amend title 17, United States 
Code, to implement a royalty payment system and a serial copy management system for 
digital audio recording, to prohibit certain copyright infringement actions, and for other 
purposes. 
40
 As the author and his supervisor both remember from the ‘era’ of the Minidisc. 
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DRM measures demand the technical ‘incapacitation’ of users who may (or 
wish to) infringe copyright through privately constructed42usage terms.    
However, the features and operation of a DRM system depend on the 
particular context in which it operates.  Although its specific components vary 
from system to system, it is broadly designed to provide a secure distribution 
platform for digital content.  There is a general consensus that DRM is a 
generic term referring to a number of different restrictive measures employed 
by rightsholders to restrict unauthorised use, or copying of, content43.  DRM 
involves the use of technology to control digital content, as Felten puts it: “All 
various types of DRM systems operate by restraining a work with some kind 
of technological lockbox…”44  The most commonly deployed measure is 
encryption45, but DRM may also include the use of metadata and 
watermarking or fingerprinting46.  These methods are bespoke and vary 
greatly between systems47.  DRM systems must also offer a means to 
identify and manage content in addition to providing a secure distribution 
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 Kretschmer, M., ‘Digital copyright: the end of an era’, (2003) EIPR 25(8) 333-341, p335.  
See also, Knopper, S., ‘Appetite for Self-Destruction: The Spectacular Crash of the Record 
Industry in the Digital Age’, (2009, Simon & Schuster), ‘Big Music’s Big Mistakes, Part 6: The 
Secure Digital Music Initiative’, pp150-157. 
42
 Kemp, B., ‘Copyright’s Digital Reformulation’, (2002-2003) 5 Yale J L & Tech 141-153, 
p146. 
43
 See for example, Angelopoulous, C.J., ‘Modern intellectual property legislation: warm for 
reform’, (2008) Ent LR 19(2) 35-40, p36 and Bechtold, S., ‘Digital Rights Management in the 
United States and Europe’, (2004) 52 American Journal of Comparative Law 323-382, p331 
44
 Felten, E. W., ‘A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use’, Communications of the ACM, April 
2003/Vol 46, No. 4, p57. 
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platform48.  Ultimately however, these elements can be distilled down to a set 
of trusted ‘rules’ attached to a digital file.  Crucial to any system is the ability 
to make the use of digital content dependent upon authorisation, and to 
express the terms of condition and use in a computer interpretable way49.   
 
DRM may also involve Technical Protection Measures (TPMs).  TPMs are 
the specific technological tools designed to serve the same purpose50 and 
have the advantage of being self-executing, or independently enforcing51.  
Operating through TPMs, DRM will mainly come into play at the last stage of 
the value chain i.e. before delivery to the commercial user or consumer52.  
Rights Management Information (RMI), which are forms of digital 
identification and description varying in complexity53, may also be involved.  
DRM is not necessarily synonymous with TPMs as it can also involve usage 
contracts, technology licence agreements and anti-circumvention 
legislation54.  It can, however, be seen as encompassing intertwining 
technologies, including TPMs, as well as a of mixture technical and legal 
mechanisms that control the use of digital content55.  DRM technologies may 
be a misnomer and may not really be about the management of digital 
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‘rights’ at all; rather they are about the management of certain 
‘permissions’56.  They may more aptly be described as ‘code as code’57, or 
‘digital restrictions management’ given their use by rightsholders to restrict 
user rights58.  Their primary purpose is that of control; mapping the physical 
property restrictions into the digital world.   
 
Some broad features can, however, be identified.  The restrictions are 
effected through ‘code’59.  To the author, DRM can be said to be a mixture of 
technical and legal measures; both of which constitute the code60.  It is 
applied to digital content, and it is applied for the purposes of controlling that 
content.  The legal code forms the basis for such an approach and also 
provides protection for the technical code.  This, in turn, protects and controls 
its designated content.  As a result, the author proposes the following 
definition: 
 
DRM is technical code, backed up by legal code, for the purposes of 
identifying, distributing and protecting digital content and that works by acting 
as a constraint against unauthorised uses of such content. 
 
The development of DRM and the additional scope of protection for DRM 
measures have engendered much debate.  Because DRM may operate to 
regulate  content usage and may not be circumvented, it has been argued 
that it may impact on copyright exceptions: 
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 “Armed with technological measures and anti-circumvention laws, the 
right holder is now entitled to prevent the users from making fair use of 
copyrighted works.”61 
 
Such exceptions, or defences, to copyright infringement will now be 
examined in light of DRM. 
 
4. Traditional fences, traditional problems 
Copyright law (both past and present) is founded on the fundamental 
principle that adverse economic incentives are created if unrestricted copying 
of intellectual products is permitted62.  If adverse incentives exist, society will 
not have as much creative innovation as it wishes to encourage63; copyright 
aims to solve this through the allocation of certain exclusive rights.  How 
broad one views the various exceptions and defences to infringement is 
typically related to how broad one believes the copyright monopoly has 
become with the expansion of copyrights over the years64.  For those who 
hold that the monopoly is too broad, it is important to have an even broader 
framework of defences and exceptions; while for those who believe that the 
copyright monopoly is not broad enough, it should be narrower.  
Nonetheless, both the exclusive rights and corresponding exceptions reflect 
the benefits to society of creative works.  As already established, the 
foundation of copyright is utilitarian (with a necessary user-focus)65; 
therefore, the emphasis of copyright law is (or should be) on the benefits 
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derived by the public from creative content, and reward to copyright owners 
is a secondary, although necessary, consideration66.   
 
 4.1 DRM and copyright exceptions 
Copyright exceptions should be viewed as a rational and integral part of 
copyright law which are necessary to realise the objectives of that law67 and 
minimise welfare losses that may arise from the strategic behaviour of 
rightsholders68.  They allow the use of copyrighted work for certain purposes, 
recognising that new works may be based on pre-existing works which may 
still be under copyright protection69.  It is a vital arbiter between two 
competing interests: potential uses deemed fair (but which may ultimately 
lead to fewer works being created through reducing incentives); and, 
enabling such users’ ability to use and transform existing content70.  The 
initial framework concerning exceptions to the right of reproduction can be 
found in article 9 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (1886)71.  This states that: 
 
 “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to 
permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that 
such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”72 
 
Thus all signatories to the Convention (the UK and US included) are bound 
to ensure that their respective exceptions or defences must adhere to this 
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obligation.  These ‘special cases’ were further extended by article 10 of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)73 and article 16 of the WIPO Performances 
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)74, and at the European level, were 
implemented through the European Directive on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (InfoSoc 
Directive) which provides a list of permissible ‘exceptions and limitations’ to 
copyright protection under article 5.  Despite these international treaties 
governing both DRM and copyright exceptions, it is important to understand 
the relative fluidity of the legal frameworks regarding copyright exceptions 
and why this may be problematic. 
 
The UK equivalent is known as the doctrine of Fair Dealing as set out in 
Chapter III of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988.  
Following the InfoSoc Directive, this contains a list of certain ‘permitted acts’ 
which may be done in relation to copyright works75.  Although the doctrine 
itself is not defined, factors the court may take into consideration when 
deciding whether a use (or ‘dealing’) is fair have been determined through 
case law.  These may include, inter alia, whether the (original) work has 
been made available to the public76; how the work was obtained77; the 
amount taken78; the use made of the work (for example, if it was 
transformative)79; the ‘motive’ behind80, and consequences of, the dealing81; 
and, whether the purpose of the dealing could have been achieved by 
alternative means82.  Furthermore, sufficient acknowledgement of the original 
work is also required in certain instances83.  In most cases, these factors will 
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be combined and weighed up together and like the situation in the US 
(discussed below), whether or not a particular act falls within the meaning of 
‘fair dealing’ depends very much on the circumstances of the case.   
 
In the context of this thesis, it is also questionable whether the UK framework 
(operating within the European system of specific exceptions) is suitable for 
the digital age84.  This has been subject to recent independent review85 in 
which it was noted that the ‘patchwork’ approach of specific permitted acts 
has been problematic’ particularly in terms of user-expectations: 
 
 “... we have in recent years witnessed a growing mismatch between 
what is allowed under copyright exceptions, and the reasonable expectations 
and behaviour of most people. Digital technology has enabled use and reuse 
of material by private individuals in ways that they do not feel are wrong.”86 
The US approach is different from its equivalent European counterpart.  The 
American Fair Use doctrine has played an important role in promoting the 
dissemination of creative content87 and its origins were developed from the 
UK law88.  It is codified in chapter 1, s107 of the Copyright Law89 which 
provides four factors to be considered in cases otherwise amounting to 
infringement: the ‘purpose and character’ of the use (including any 
commercial aspects); the ‘nature’ of the copyright work; the ‘portion used’ 
(concerning amount and substantiality); and, the ‘effect’ of such use on the 
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market or value of the copyrighted work90.  Despite this, its statutory 
formulation and relevant case law have not particularly defined its contours 
or objectives91.  The general guidelines provided in US law and the lack of a 
complete, precise list of exempted acts have, in the past, provided a flexible 
approach to adopting new solutions in response to the development of new 
technologies92.  According to Leval, It should be viewed as a rational and 
integral part of copyright law which is necessary to realise the objectives of 
that law93, again with an important user-element94: “The doctrine of fair use 
limits the scope of the copyright monopoly in furtherance of its utilitarian 
objective.”95   
 
It is important to note the conceptual differences between the UK position of 
fair dealing (and its European equivalents), and the US position of fair use.  
Fair dealing may be aptly described as permitted acts in relation to a 
copyrighted work where it is used in defined circumstances.  In contrast, fair 
use is capable of having a much more ‘blanket’ application and can 
potentially apply in any circumstance; as such, it can be viewed as either an 
exception or defence96.  In the context of this chapter, the terminology used 
will reflect the broader idea of copyright exceptions and the purpose they 
serve in facilitating the creation of new works (as opposed to any specific fair 
use, or fair dealing regime). 
 
 
90
 S.107(1)-(4), ibid.  These are also considered in chapter 4 on Napster and p2p technology 
as this was the central defence to their activities, pp130-135. 
91
 Leval, P.N., ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, (1989-1990) 103 Harv L Rev 1105-1136, 
p1105. 
92
 Correra, C.M., ‘Fair use in the Digital Era’, (2002) IIC 33(5) 561-678, p575. 
93
 Leval, P.N., ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, (1989-1990) 103 Harv L Rev 1105-1136, 
p1107. 
94
 See chapter 2, p42 and p45. 
95
 Leval, P.N., ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, (1989-1990) 103 Harv L Rev 1105-1136, 
p1110. 
96
 The difference in perspective depends upon whether it is understood as an affirmative 
right and therefore integral to copyright law, or not.  See Davis, M., ‘From pirates to patriots: 
fair use for digital media’, (2002) IEEE Multimedia 9(4) 4-7, pp5-6. 
181
The lack of a coherent framework of copyright exceptions poses problems for 
DRM of a technical nature.  Despite the fact that the doctrine has been 
realised in legislation, several aspects of it are problematic from a DRM-
perspective97.  The doctrine is very fluid and it is important to remember the 
potentially wide-range of activities that depend on fair use for legitimacy.  As 
such, it has often been described as a ‘safety valve’98 that serves a crucial 
role in limiting the reach of what would otherwise be an intolerably expansive 
grant of rights to copyright holders.  Its ambiguity is a major problem for code 
writers; in the US: “The legal definition of fair use is, by definition, 
maddeningly vague.”99  There were and are few, if any, rules as to what is 
‘allowed’100; thus the operation of DRM in relation to a deliberately101 fluid 
and vague area of copyright law may be problematic. 
 
In order to preserve copyright exceptions, DRM systems would need to 
accommodate for unauthorised uses of copyrighted works, but the fluidity of 
the doctrine means that these cannot be defined with precision.  As much as 
the exceptions themselves may be regarded as fluid, accommodating the 
potential variety of ‘uses’ may therefore be difficult.  In practical terms, an 
approximate algorithm would have to be used that operates with crude 
proxies, but, “Approximation is ... crucial to ‘streamline’ legal norms.”102  The 
difficulties in approximating DRM with uses, and thus potential copyright 
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exceptions, are represented a priori by the identification of such 
exceptions103.  It would make errors in both directions i.e. allowing some 
uses the law would forbid and forbidding some the law would allow104.  As 
such, difficulty lies in expressing the variables that may arise in each case in 
Rights Expression Language (REL, the computer code expressing the rights 
that exist over a piece of content used by DRM technologies).  This poses a 
challenge: 
 
 “Perhaps the most challenging issue yet to resolve in the field of policy 
expression languages is the tension that arises naturally when attempting to 
represent liability-based systems such as copyright law through explicit 
expressions of rights or permissions.”105 
 
From a technological perspective, there is no precise algorithm for deciding 
whether a use is fair or not: “To a computer scientist such imprecision is a 
bug; to lawyers, it is a feature since it allows judges to take into account the 
unique circumstances of each case.”106   
 
Despite this apparent issue, it is not necessarily the case that DRM will be 
detrimental to copyright exceptions.  DRM may actually be necessary in 
order to function as an important supplement to copyright exceptions by 
facilitating the availability of content  and consequent use, ‘options’.  A 
modern and pragmatic copyright regime needs to regulate access107and 
through the operation of DRM in this respect, the ability of content owners to 
offer and regulate a the distribution and consumption of their works may lead 
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to a greater number of specialised options and a wider range of consumer 
choices108.  Access has always been a barrier to consumption, but this is 
inherent in copyright itself.  As established in chapter 2, copyright operates to 
commodify content and allows a market to form for such content109, but in 
this sense, it is the market which operates to govern access110 through 
determining availability, price and ultimately, consumption.  DRM further 
implicates the importance of the market as a regulatory modality111 as 
opposed to an independent access right in itself112.   It is ideal because it 
allows the market to be ‘encapsulated’ as one single entity113 so as to be 
able to tailor, more closely, availability and demand114:   
“TPMs do not in themselves prevent the public from enjoying its rights.  
On the contrary, thanks to enhanced functionalities, if correctly fine tuned, 
they can produce multiple advantages.”115   
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In this sense, DRM may also operate as an adjunct to the operation of the 
market as a form of regulation in the digital environment116.  Copyright 
regulates access through permitting the commodification of content117, thus 
allowing a market to form and operate118.  It is this market which regulates 
consumption119 and in this sense, DRM may operate as an adjunct to the 
market.  DRM provides the ability to design different services and offers 
producers the ability to price discriminate with regard to buyer tastes and 
potentially enable greater revenue recovery120.  With DRM, the rightsholder 
may make a range of choices that directly affect the availability of their 
content; the more it appears available for use (without restrictions) the more 
reasonable the users’ belief that they may interact with it121.  This also 
contributed towards the development of users’ normative behaviour122 
towards unauthorised copyright infringement, engendered by digital 
technology123 and the freely124 available content through associated peer-to-
peer services125.  Any privileges rightsholders adopt should in theory 
compete with one another in the marketplace (such that the market will no 
longer be for content, but the ‘best’ form of DRM content), and that a new 
use ‘equilibrium’ will assert itself through a process of experimentation126, 
and presumably competition.  Conversely, any non-DRM alternative may 
 
116
 See chapter 3, p104-126. 
117
 See chapter 1, pp24-25 and chapter 2, p45. 
118
 See chapter 2, pp45-46. 
119
 See chapter 3, p104. 
120
 Einhorn, M.A., and Rosenblatt, B., ‘Peer-to-Peer Networking and Digital Rights 
Management – How Market Tools Can Solve Copyright Problems’, (2005), Cato Institute 
Policy Analysis No. 534, p3. 
121
 Grynberg, M., ‘Property is a Two-Way Street: Personal Copyright Use and Implied 
Authorization’, (2010) 79 Fordham L Rev 435-498, p481.  
122
 See chapter 3, p95-103. 
123
 See chapter 2, pp57-75 and chapter 3, p119-126. 
124
 See chapter 3, p105-110. 
125
 Discussed in chapter 2, pp66-70 and chapter 4, pp131-165. 
126
 Parchomovsky, G., and Weiser, P.J., ‘Beyond Fair Use’, (2010) 96 Cornell Law Review 
91-138, p127. 
185
have negative consequences.  Enforcing copyright in the digital environment 
without DRM requires unbearable transaction costs127. 
 
As such, it is far from clear-cut that DRM and copyright exceptions are 
incompatible.  DRM technologies can, in theory, operate to reduce 
transaction costs (for rightsholders) and hence ward-off market failure in this 
sense128, and which exceptions to copyright may otherwise be left to 
rectify129.  It represents an attempt by rightsholders to ‘internalise’ benefits 
resulting from market transactions involving digital content, as it allows for 
more effective fencing of content so as to address some of the market failure 
that results from creative digital works130.  However, even this approach is 
not without its issues.  The central problem with a market failure approach 
(from an economic perspective) is that it does not adequately account for the 
fact that copyrighted works are public and not private goods131.  Although 
copyright operates to commodify content132, digital technologies have largely 
removed any related reproduction and distribution costs133.  As such, the 
widespread availability of copyrighted content available online for free has 
led the creative industries to present the message that they ‘can’t compete 
with free’134.  However, even with DRM-free content, consumers still face 
social and technical transaction costs in exchanging content135.  A market-
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based analysis, including the role of copyright exceptions, is not necessarily 
easy as these potentially allow users to bypass the market136.  However, 
despite attempts to internalise as much benefit as possible from transactions, 
it is important to remember that benefits to users cannot be judged purely 
from looking at the market: 
 “The choice between more flexible access policies and digitally 
metered, fully-commodified usage rights is not a simple choice between 
market failure and (by implication) market success.”137 
 
Any approach that focuses exclusively on market failure overlooks the 
changing economics of creation and distribution resulting from digital 
technology138 and the low costs of digital content whose ‘value’ might be 
realised in other non-financial ways139.  Although it may be argued that DRM 
may be incapable of accommodating a nuanced approach to copyright 
exceptions, that does not mean that copyright exceptions themselves 
necessarily correspond to, and facilitate, creativity on the part of creators. 
 
5. Remix? 
Artists such as Louis Armstrong, Elvis Presley, the Beatles, the Rolling 
Stones, Led Zeppelin, and, er, Barry Manilow have all borrowed to some 
extent140.  There is an issue between ‘inspiration’ and infringement in the 
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creation of new content, and it is arguably in this pocket that copyright 
exceptions sit.  However, they cannot accommodate creative sampling and 
remixing practice141, and have been deemed not to apply142 to such new and 
emerging creative practice(s): 
 
 “Something has happened in human creativity which copyright law 
never foresaw and was never written to accommodate – the fragmentary 
reuse of others’ art to make new art.”143 
 
Creators rely on a certain degree of flexibility in the way in which they use 
pre-existing copyrighted works144, but borrowing and changing existing music 
(as an integral aspect to music production) are not necessarily seen as 
legitimate methods of creation145.   
 
“... defining sampling as theft or appropriation immediately indicates, 
prior to any discussion, that something illegal, illegitimate or at best, 
inappropriate has occurred.”146 
 
Musical ‘borrowing’ is a pervasive aspect of musical creation in all genres 
(and periods)147, but not every copy leads to the creation of a new work148.  
With the operation (and protection) of DRMs, and its intersection with 
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copyright exceptions, care must be taken to not mistake present (perceived) 
realities for permanent ones149.  The rightsholders’ control over copying and 
derivative works did not prevent the development of appropriation-based 
musical content150; the natural human approach to our own culture was to 
participate in it by consuming, participating, and adding to it151.  Creative 
forces are unpredictable and cannot be modelled ex ante152 so it is not 
necessarily the case that copyright (and its exceptions) have been, or ever 
will be, able to accommodate such practices in light of the opportunities 
afforded by digital technology153: “The ageing guidelines for determining fair 
use do not yet accommodate, or even acknowledge, the modern tendency to 
create new work out of old.”154  For example, in the context of hip-hop (as 
well as other musical genres such as ‘plunderphonics’155), the production 
practices of incorporating copyrighted recordings into new works by 
sampling156 essentially collide with copyright assumptions157; especially 
regarding derivative works which the rightsholder may control.  Furthermore, 
CD manufacturers had signed anti-piracy agreements with record labels in 
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return for their business158, thus rendering production and distribution of such 
content illegal, aside from the creation of such content in the first place.  Any 
exception-based defence may therefore only come into play once 
infringement has been ascertained, and may arguably not fit well with 
musical copyright159.  Decisions of infringement in such instances typically 
focus on melody, ignoring other issues (and creative decisions) such as 
rhythm, harmonics, linguistic word-play and the overall musical aesthetic160: 
“The creative process has lost all benefit of the doubt...”161  Nonetheless, the 
‘conflict’ between sampling music production and copyright ignores the 
actual history of interaction between law and ‘remixing’162 which suggests 
that both can accommodate each other163; and there is nothing to suggest 
that such creative practices will stop: “We’ve continued to work in this way 
because we like the sound of it.  We like the results.  We get inspired by 
what we find out there, it’s simply fun to do...”164.  In fact, the ‘illegal’ nature of 
it may even constitute a significant part of its appeal to users: “... there’s 
nothing the file-sharing community likes better than something illicit”165 
 
Views of musical composition as individualistic and autonomous fail to take 
adequate note of the centrality of borrowing in the creative processes of 
many composers throughout music history166 (although this in itself may be 
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regarded as a ‘compositional prerogative’167).  Such conceptions arguably 
stem from ‘Romantic’168 and natural rights theories169 of authorship170, which: 
“...fail to recognize the use of existing works for new creations can be an 
important source of innovation.”171  This also fails to appreciate the role 
technological advances play in changing the nature of authorship172.  
Content production, and creativity may now be seen as much more social 
and collaborative products173 (or at least have the potential to be as a result 
of digital technology).  DRM, however, encapsulates the values of the 
romantic author at the expense of newer ‘authorial’ conceptions based on, 
and resulting from, digital technology174.  As a result of this, content 
threatens to become completely unavailable to any succeeding artist’s use 
without payment and permission175 although payment and permission are 
established industry norms176.  However, that still does not mean that DRM 
may prejudice transformative use(s).  By their very nature, such uses often 
require prolonged exposure and rights of ‘extraction’, but which may be able 
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to accommodated through DRM-control and any associated payment177; 
such willingness has clearly been evident previously:  
“... the hip-hop community, from its earliest days, generally 
understood and respected the obligation to obtain and pay for permission to 
use samples in commercial recordings”178.   
 
Copyright exceptions initially developed in an analogue world179 and as 
technology frees content from physical restraints180, man-made constraints 
(i.e. ‘code’181) may help inspire artists to make new kinds of meanings 
through new techniques182 and forms of creativity.  As such, this represents a 
valuable addition to the ‘community’ aspect of the normative modality183: 
“Technical limits have historically presented obstacles for artists to 
overcome, resulting in innovations.”184  This change could arguably result 
from further, or higher, levels of transformative use such that DRM 
technology is capable of reflecting these new relationships and may 
consequently facilitate new business models185: “... DRM appears to be at 
the foundation of whatever business models will actually succeed in the 
digital age.”186  
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DRM is seen as an important mechanism for protecting copyrights in a free 
market187 and may even serve to uphold copyright exceptions in the digital 
environment188.  In such instances, this relationship would result from 
negotiations between owners and users, preliminary to any litigation189, 
therefore suggesting that any unauthorised uses that rely on an exception-
based defence are unlikely to succeed in such a context (as being an option 
of last resort, outside of pre-negotiated outcomes).  Although many modern 
personal uses are not the sort that was traditionally the concern of copyright 
law190, technology can change users’ relationship to content in ways that can 
make a profit191.  Similarly, the law is full of flexible, context-specific 
application192 and the same is arguably true of DRM: “Legal scholars’ 
insistence that law is determinative of cultural participation is an example of 
thinking like a lawyer, not like an artist.”193  As such, it may be concluded that 
copyright exceptions do not especially facilitate creative practice on behalf of 
creators.  However that does not necessarily mean that DRM does, can, or 
will, either; but equally that does not mean that it will not.  Nonetheless, the 
author believes that the most important aspect in any consideration of DRM 
comes from the user-perspective194; especially when one recalls that digital 
technology has enabled users to become creators195 and when one 
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appreciates more recent developments in content dissemination, which will 
now be analysed. 
 
 
 
 
6. Better business models? 
As stated, technology can, and has, altered users’ relationships with 
content196.  It has also been responsible for helping develop strong normative 
behaviour on the part of users towards their consumption of digital 
content197.  This is continuing; the author believes we are in the midst of a 
important shift in the provision and consumption of digital content.  Today’s 
Internet is arguably mostly concerned with connecting people with content198 
and in this respect, it is perhaps inevitable that DRM remains an integral 
component of content provision.  Users are now more ‘detached’ from 
content consumption; in the past, DRM has always been closely associated 
with copy-based content to which it has been attached199 and ultimately 
consumed.  It can now be argued that DRM is no longer as closely 
intertwined with the content it is designed to protect.  In the past, prior 
technological advances had facilitated and promoted the acquisition of 
physical copies of works200 and in digital form201, but this is changing with the 
move towards streaming-based distribution and consumption.  Now, every 
act of perception or of materialisation of a digital copy can be controlled by 
the rightsholder who can thus condition how a user apprehends and 
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consumes content202.  Although copyright mediates the relationship between 
the user and content203, DRM also operates in this way; such that it has 
shifted the primary metaphor from one of copy control, to control of the ability 
to distribute, and use content204.  This has been as a result in the evolution of 
digital content provision and DRM via a ‘streaming-based’ model: “Evolve or 
die.”205 
 
6.1 Streaming 
Such recent developments in DRM may be seen as being aimed at the 
architectural elements of the Internet that are concerned with the efficient 
transport of content206, but the Internet was (arguably) never designed as a 
commercially structured medium for selling digital data207.  As much as DRM 
may operate as a form of architectural regulation208, architectural distribution 
mechanisms are also developing beyond pre-existing per-to-peer 
architecture209.  It was stated in 1995 that the delivery on demand will be the 
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preferred communication pattern on the Internet210.  Such ‘transport’ of 
content now takes place via content streaming, and downloading has 
become less necessary211.  Perhaps the best-known musical streaming 
service is Spotify, launched in 2008, which although offering a priced 
download service212, operates primarily as an on-demand service: 
“...because the music plays live, there’s no need to wait for downloads and 
no big dent in your hard drive.”213 
 
Content is distributed using streaming technology in a way that does not 
permit downloading214.  In this scenario, content is (somewhat ironically) 
stored on a central server215 from where a transmission is initialled at the 
request of a user216.  This raises potential tensions between the conduit and 
hosting status of the ISP responsible for providing the streaming217.  Content 
streaming has the advantages of efficiency (through compression), leaving 
no trace of the compressed content (unless permitted by the rightsholder) 
and the ability of control (to access streamed content, the user will have to 
return to the rightsholder’s website)218.   
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Once the process of streaming has ‘begun’, it is a continuous process of 
transmission219, but which nonetheless involves a degree of copying (or 
‘buffering’220) to facilitate the smooth receipt and playing of the user’s chosen 
content.  Although this is essentially an act of temporary storage, it is not an 
act of ‘reproduction’ in legal terms; nowhere is a ‘copy’ of the content stored 
or any part of it retrievable by users221.  From a copyright perspective, this 
implicates the right of ‘communication’222 such that this right is infringed 
when a copyrighted piece of content is made available to the public ‘by any 
means’223.  For such a communication to take place, it is sufficient that the 
work is made available to the public (which is clearly satisfied in the case of 
the Internet and the variety of means in which this may occur224), and that it 
can be accessed at the user’s preference225.  However crucially, the InfoSoc 
Directive does not oblige rightsholders (or Member States) to take measures 
to safeguard copyright exceptions for such on-demand services as article 
6(4) states: 
 
 “The provisions ... shall not apply to works or other subject-matter 
made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that 
members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.”226 
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The requirement of ‘contractual terms’ may do nothing to overcome this, 
given the easiness of embedding a click-wrap licence in digital products227 
and by implication, services.  The wording of this article also closely parallels 
the definitional parameters of an ‘Information Society Service’ under the 
European Technical Standards Directive228 and by implication, an Internet 
Service Provider (as reference is made to this provision)229.  Offering content 
would operate as an incentive for potential users to subscribe to an ISP’s 
service230 and DRM (as a safeguard against unauthorised uses) theoretically 
makes it possible for ISPs to operate in this way.  This adds a potentially 
troublesome dimension to the changing nature of content distribution and 
consumption; the shift to streaming-based dissemination and development of 
ISPs as content providers (discussed more fully in the following chapter231) 
may result in the increasing redundancy of copyright exceptions with little or 
no chance (at least no duty) for them to be implemented.  Rightsholders 
retain absolute discretion in DRM design such that users may have to rely 
upon their (potential) benevolence to perform perfectly legal actions232.  The 
implications for users in this context will now be examined. 
 
 6.2 The position of users 
Content available in physical copies cannot communicate with its ‘originator’ 
(the rightsholder) after it has been distributed in the market; therefore, usage 
rules or policies are (or should be, in theory) governed by the outcome of 
negotiations between user(s) and rightsholder(s)233, although this is difficult: 
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“The sheer number of sovereigns and private parties holding stakes in 
the game means that at some point and in some way these stakeholders will 
attempt to influence ‘their part’ of the Internet.”234 
 
The application and consequent ‘influence’ of DRM on content networks may 
deprive users of the ability to  consume creative content, or alternatively, the 
opportunity to engage with it on their own terms.  Such measures threaten to 
amount to a ‘digital lockup’ of content and networks as a result of arbitrary 
decisions made by rightsholders and potentially, service providers.  There is 
no reason to think that giving rightsholders greater control over the 
dissemination and use of their works in the digital environment will result in 
greater benefit to the public235; users are interested in the content that gives 
them greater levels of freedom236 and digital technology has helped to create 
strong norms along these lines237.  In addition to providing opportunities to 
potentially use content in flexible ways, user privileges afforded by copyright 
exceptions (statutory, or negotiated) play an important role in potentially 
allowing  content to be creatively used by others238 in transformative ways.  
However, creativity and cultural participation can reach accommodation with 
copyright (and presumably DRM thereunder), and even benefit from it239: “... 
internet goods offer the possibility to interact with user and therefore they can 
diversify usage rules among consumers.”240  Again though, such usage rules 
should in theory result from a bargaining process in which users are 
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involved.  This has not been the case; with unilateral, or bilateral decisions 
(by, or between, rightsholders) made regarding content distribution.  This 
was the case in previous efforts of enacting DRM, such as the ‘Secure Digital 
Music Inititaive’ (SDMI) as a standard encryption format for music files.  
Although this ultimately ended without agreement due to the conflicting 
interests of those involved in 2002241, that did not mean that the issue faded: 
 
 “Meanwhile, unbeknownst to most of the panel members, another 
group of smart, hi-tech business people was watching the proceedings very, 
very carefully.  It was Apple Computer... (who) decided they could do a far 
better job.”242 
 
Apple has arguably become an important digital gatekeeper for the content 
industries243; through transforming itself from a technology-based company, 
to an entertainment-based one244.  Steve Jobs himself came to play a major 
role in shaping the strategy of rightsholders245, although ironically, he did not 
favour a subscription based distribution model, which is why there is no such 
model that works on an iPod246.  Apple’s proprietary ‘FairPlay’ DRM system 
benefitted them much more than the labels as it locked consumers into Apple 
products247.  This ‘lock-in’ creates an Apple ‘ecosystem’ that essentially ties 
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its product range together for commercial transactions248 (driven by the 
iPod249) such that that they could be said to be mutually reinforcing250 and 
help foster a ‘positive’ norm251 towards Apple products.  Nonetheless in 
2006, the record label EMI decided to drop DRM in stark contrast to the 
accepted belief among the rest of the music industry (although this led only 
to a minor upturn in sales)252. 
 
 “Then a weird thing happened, the rest of the major labels joined EMI 
in doing the same thing they swore they would never do.  Steve Jobs was 
responsible for their decision.”253  
 
However, DRM itself has evolved from this.  The interconnected nature of 
Apple’s products and services is an important part of their business 
strategy254, as well as the rigidity of their business practice: “Apple is a 
stalwart on its pricing scheme.”255  This interconnected nature between 
products and content (even if the content is DRM-free) therefore highlights 
the importance of rightsholder-controlled digital distribution networks256.  By 
maximising their return by internalising transaction costs through DRM, 
external costs are created for consumers; for example, potentially having to 
find alternative sources of output at the risk of legal, technical and financial 
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recriminations, should those sources be illegal257.  Ironically, this has already 
been proven to be the case following the introduction of DRM-free music 
available on the Apple iTunes service in 2007258.  Here, DRM-free music was 
introduced for download at a cost of 20 pence more per track than DRM-
protected music.  In addition, customers could upgrade their DRM-protected 
tracks for 20 pence each259.  Most recently, the iTunes ‘Match’ cloud music 
service offered to replicate all music stored on users’ computers (regardless 
of source and legality) with better quality alternatives so that it could be 
accessed and listened to on all devices260; at a subscription cost of £21.99 
GBP a year261.   
 
Furthermore, sites such as YouTube and Spotify have contributed to 
‘distracting’ users from downloading content; familiarising them with on-
demand streaming instead262 which has now become a major standard in the 
online distribution of digital works; allowing the user to consume the content 
in ‘real time’263.  As such, this suggests that the normative conduct of users is 
also being channelled into specific distribution and consumption channels. 
Despite an agreed compromise between the major record labels and iTunes 
regarding copy-protection and pricing in 2009, rightsholders were looking for 
other business opportunities264: “Better business models are the Holy Grail of 
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the digital age.”265  This was helped (or not helped) by the reluctance of 
artists to act independently; when the traditional music industry business 
model started to falter in the late nineties, even artists were reluctant to 
assume their own responsibilities for distributing and marketing their 
content266.   
 
As a result, this could ultimately have the effect that users are deprived of the 
ability to consume to content which requires proprietary hardware and/or a 
subscription fee.  Theoretically, they have the power and option to seek out 
those services and products (in this case, content) that best correspond to 
their own needs267, but as previously discussed, these ‘needs’ may not 
correspond with those of rightsholders268 and the market operates to limit 
and regulate this choice of ‘service’269: “... to be an active market player, the 
sovereign (user) must have choice.”270  This choice now appears to be 
exclusively between legal streaming services, withp2p services no longer 
being a viable, and legal, alternative choice271.  In this sense, DRM relieves 
users of the ability to choose between content and perhaps even content 
providers.  Therefore, it presents them with a stark choice of breaking the law 
(‘take it or leave it’272), pure unavailability of service/content, negotiating a 
complex and expensive licensing process, or lobbying the service provider 
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for a better (or improved) product273, which legally, it may be under no 
affirmative duty to provide. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Disputes over DRM are not necessarily determinative of creativity, but rather 
of the allocation of the proceeds from production274 and distribution, but both 
are not necessarily served by financial indicators275.  There is an interesting 
dichotomy that copyright over-enforcement may discourage creativity by 
increasing cost to the user, but this is, in effect, the same argument behind 
the traditional economic defence of strong copyright (that economic reward is 
necessary to incentivise and safeguard creativity)276.  ‘Profitability’ alone 
does not necessarily provide incentive for such innovation277, just as 
copyright (and its exceptions) may not facilitate it either.  DRM may operate 
on both sides of this argument; as being able to supplement copyright 
exceptions, or restricting them, just as it may serve to accommodate (or not) 
new forms of creativity.   
 
The crucial role of DRM now is in the emergence of new business models 
and related evolution of streaming-based content dissemination.  It can now 
be argued that content providers are also becoming service providers278 (and 
even hardware manufacturers as in the case of Apple).  It therefore appears 
that networks and associated content are converging279 such that 
rightsholders now have the ability, through DRM, to control the networks on 
which their content is available, or through which they provide it.  DRM 
affords rightsholders much greater control, especially given the increasing 
tendency for content to be streamed or delivered over a network which they 
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control280.  Copyright does not protect against the threat digital technology 
poses to the business model of the content industries281, but DRM, under the 
auspices of copyright, does appear to operate in this way: acting as an 
architectural support to the market; as a form of regulatory architecture in 
itself; and, facilitating a potential shift in the normative behaviour of users 
regarding content consumption.  
 
Broad interpretations of copyright law i.e. now including DRM, endanger 
interactions with content282.  Consumption of digital content involves the 
ability to perceive that content283 implicating some sort of performance or 
display of the content which in most instances, would not infringe 
copyright284.  DRM has in the past been criticised for limiting the usability of 
content, failing to be able to distinguish between fair and unfair copying, and 
for (potentially) being perpetual285.  Now however, it may also operate as an 
‘omnipresent connectivity’286 and is an inescapable necessity287.  Digital 
networks can therefore be designed to mirror the traditional industry market 
norms288 and re-establish the market practices and market regulation that 
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were threatened by digital technology289.  Such a content-centric network 
focuses on what a user wants with increasing concentration on the delivery 
of content290.  A successful network may increase the available choices to 
the user, but conversely, restrict interoperability291, such that user choices 
are limited amongst network providers and their proffered content.  Such 
choices may interfere with the ‘value’ of a piece of content292 as the value 
attached to it arises as a result of its utility through consumption293: “People 
want to be engaged with their content ... They want to engage in an ongoing 
relationship...”294  The permission to use copyrighted content comes from the 
user’s ownership of the tool they use for the interaction295 as well as the fact 
that they may be in possession of the necessary tools for ‘breaking’ DRM 
protection296.  However, the development of streaming-based and DRM-
supported content distribution changes this power-balance; DRM may 
operate against this by affecting users’ perceptions of their rights297, 
changing their normative behaviour, as well as, and in relation to, the 
underlying architecture of digital content consumption: “Nowhere is this 
transformation more apparent than among young people who have grown up 
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in a digital world and, in some cases, cannot relate to the physical objects of 
the past.”298 
 
Arguably, the user should be the central focus299; as they are now have 
central importance in the digital copyright landscape and are reflected in the 
utilitarian foundation of copyright300.  However: 
 
 “From the exploitation of the work, its diffusion to the public as a 
whole, the copyright has shifted to the control of a business model, aided by 
technology, of the distribution of copyrighted works to individuals.”301 
 
There has been a failing of copyright policy regarding DRM in this respect by 
focussing on the producer-side of the market, to ensure the full appropriation 
of market value302.  This ignores the users and their resulting creative 
potential303 (facilitated by digital technology304).  Evaluation of such content 
markets (and content itself) should therefore not be governed by the 
expectations of rightsholders, but the legitimate expectation of users305.  
Such expectations (or norms306) may not entirely be legitimate, as resulting 
previously from an ultimately illegal service307.  On the other hand, they may 
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be legitimate in the sense of deriving from the beneficial architectural 
features of digital technology308 for both the consumption and creation of 
content.   
 
The expectations of users may, however, be subject to change.  DRM makes 
it possible for Information Society Service Providers (ISSPs)309, those who 
broadly provide Internet access and services, to also act as content 
providers310.  The development of such DRM-centric networks threatens to 
alter the Internet’s architecture into an ‘element’, “... that can be used as a 
counter to the ends that it connects.”311  Policy should be based on 
maximising user benefits broadly312, in line with copyright’s utilitarian 
foundation313, but channelling production and ultimately, output, through such 
prescribed, DRM-enhanced, and ISP-centred distribution channels runs 
counter to this:  
 
“Rather than harnessing the structural significance of network 
technology, the law attempts to reinstate analogue-world barriers and instead 
of pushing the interests of creators and users, intermediaries tighten their 
grip.”314 
 
However, internalising benefits to rightsholders can have the effect of 
creating negative externalities (the harm to others caused by the activities of 
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another315) for users; thus failing the market.  These costs may also affect 
the ability of creators and users to extract ancillary value from the distribution 
and use of their work316 if it is tied to a specific distribution network.  
Arguably, the trend could be described as being an internalisation of 
networks which could be seen as having no further benefits to rightsholders; 
as use of networks is dependent on having (or wanting) content in the first 
place.  Copyright commodifies this content and subsequently operates to link 
the user with the content317 (which architecture facilitates318).  However, 
there is no economic justification for going beyond such internalisation since 
revenue has already been gleaned from consumers who have purchased the 
relevant subscription, content and associated hardware.  There is no further 
economic or creative benefit to be had from using DRM to either exclude 
users from, or tie them into, a network service that they are dependent on in 
order to  engage with, consume, and/or create new content.   
 
 
315
 Harrison, J.L., ‘A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and 
Application’, (2005) Journal of Intellectual Property Law 13(1) 1-60, p5. 
316
 Bates, B.J., ‘Commentary: Value and Digital Rights Management – A Social Economics 
Approach’, (2008) Journal of Media Economics 21(1) 53-77, p66. 
317
 See the axis presented in chapter 3, p90. 
318
 Ibid, p84 and pp117-118. 
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ISP Liability 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite legal action against peer-to-peer (p2p) networks1 and the application 
of Digital Rights Management (DRM)2, further developments are underway to 
maintain rightsholders’ privileges in the digital environment.  Latterly, this has 
developed through initiatives requiring Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
assume a more active role in ensuring that infringing content is not 
transmitted across their networks, and to adopt counter-measures against 
users where this is the case.  However, the existing legal framework in most 
jurisdictions is not completely adequate to deal with new and evolving file 
sharing methods3 and the question remains as to how far copyright liability 
should extend beyond direct infringers4.  The legal response to digital 
copyright infringement in the context of ISPs is perhaps less coherent than 
the approaches taken in response to p2p software in the sense that various 
legal responses in this context are rooted in individual jurisdictions.  
Nonetheless, the argument in favour of such an approach claims that the risk 
of copyright infringement is a natural by-product of Internet service5 and as 
such, ISPs should be involved in tackling the problem of unauthorised 
copyright infringement.  European case law and legislation have not yielded 
a consistent approach to the problem; ISPs face as many legal regimes as 
there are Member States6.   
 
 
1
 See chapter 4, pp131-165. 
2
 See chapter 5, pp166-209. 
3
 Nwogugu, M., ‘Economics of digital content: new digital content control and P2P control 
systems/methods’, (2008) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 14(6) 140-149, 
p149. 
4
 Lichtman, D., and Landes, W., ‘Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic 
Perspective‘, (2003) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 16(2) 395-410, p396. 
5
 Yen, A.C., ‘Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, 
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment’, (2000) The Georgetown Law Journal 88 1-15, 
pp3-4. 
6
 Julia-Barcelo, R., ‘On-line intermediary liability issues: comparing EU and US legal 
frameworks’, (2000) EIPR 22(3) 105-119, p106. 
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However, the signs are that pre-existing ISP ‘immunity’ is unlikely to survive 
for much longer7; specifically with the development of both a ‘graduated 
response’ mechanism to deal with digital copyright infringement and 
developments in content provision.  ‘Graduated response’ refers to a means 
of copyright enforcement that relies on a form of co-operation with Internet 
access providers that goes beyond the traditional ‘notice and take-down’ and, 
“... implies an educational notification mechanism for alleged online infringers 
before more stringent measures can be imposed.”8  It marks a change from 
the previous methods of copyright enforcement whereby action has been 
taken unilaterally by rightsholders and as Strowel notes: “... is another word 
for improved ISP co-operation.”9  Such a response implies and necessitates 
the involvement of an extra entity; online intermediaries. 
 
“The contours of the ‘graduated response’ system are not yet clear, in 
part because of its varying versions, but this institutional system is clearly 
different from the existing law enforcement mechanisms.”10 
 
From a legislative perspective in Europe, the main issue seems to be 
between national legislation, forcing ISPs to be responsible for enforcement, 
and various principles of EU law, including Fundamental Rights.  These 
intersections are troubling, as they largely depend on the facts (and 
European Court of Justice terms of reference) of the various cases; such that 
there is little uniform approach to the issue.  In this chapter, the broad legal 
framework will be explained before the relevant decisions in Belgium, Spain, 
Ireland, France, and the UK will be critiqued.  It will be suggested that recent 
developments here potentially pose the biggest threat to both users and the 
ISPs themselves.  This is as result of the loosening of the ‘knowledge’ 
 
7
 See generally, Clark, B., ‘Illegal downloads: sharing out online liability: sharing files, 
sharing risks’, (2007) JIPLP 2(6) 402-418. 
8
 Strowel, A., ‘Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for Copyright Law Makers – Is the 
“Graduated Response” a Good Reply?’, (2009) The WIPO Journal 1 75-86, p77. 
9
 Ibid, p77. 
10
 Ibid, p79. 
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requirement for infringement and a counter-intuitive interpretation of the 
prohibition on traffic monitoring by ISPs.   
 
2. Legal principles 
The position of ISPs is governed by a variety of laws and the international 
and national levels, and is the product of legal instruments across the 
Intellectual Property and Information Technology law spectrum.  Article 8 of 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), provides the basis restricting the 
unauthorised communication of copyright works11.   
 
At the European level, the ISPs are subject to three main Directives (which 
have also featured in the relevant case law).  Directive 2001/29/EC on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society12 (the InfoSoc Directive) provides that Member States 
shall provide the exclusive right of authorisation to rightsholders in terms of 
reproduction13, communication14 and distribution15.  It also provides for 
sanctions and effective remedies to be available to rightsholders which are to 
be: “... effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”16  It also notes the role of 
intermediaries in the digital environment, and their potential role in acting 
against infringement: “... the services of intermediaries may increasingly be 
used by third parties for infringing activities.  In many cases such 
intermediaries are best placed to bring such infringing activities to an end.”17  
As such, Member States are obliged to ensure that rightsholders may be 
 
11
 Art.8 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT),1996.  As replicated in arts.10 and 14 of the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), 1996, which provides protection for 
performers and producers respectively. 
12
 Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 2002 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.  
Henceforth, the InfoSoc Directive. 
13
 Art. 2, InfoSoc Directive. 
14
 Art. 3, ibid. 
15
 Art. 4, ibid. 
16
 Art. 8, ibid. 
17
 Recital 59, ibid. 
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able to apply for an injunction against intermediaries where this is the case18.  
Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights19 (the 
Enforcement Directive) further concerns the measures, procedure and 
remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of IP rights20.  Such 
measures must also be effective, proportionate and dissuasive21, but in 
addition, they must be fair, equitable, and not unnecessarily complicated or 
costly22.  Importantly, it provides that a judicial authority may, on request, 
issue an interlocutory injunction to prevent infringement by a third party using 
the services of an intermediary23.  Specifically in relation to ISPs, measures 
were enacted to govern the liability for infringing activity through Directive 
2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (the E-commerce 
Directive) which was proposed in 1998 and was adopted by the Council of 
Ministers, becoming law in May 200024.  The European Union decided to pre-
empt the possibility of diverse national approaches through the adoption of 
the E-commerce Directive, as recital 59 states: 
 
 “Despite the global nature of electronic communications, coordination 
of national regulatory measures at European Union level is necessary in 
order to avoid fragmentation of the internal market, and for the establishment 
of an appropriate European regulatory framework; such coordination should 
also contribute to the establishment of a common and strong negotiating 
position in international forums.” 
 
 
18
 Art. 8(3), InfoSoc Directive. 
19
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights.  Henceforth, the Enforcement Directive. 
20
 Art. 1, Enforcement Directive. 
21
 Art. 3(2), ibid. 
22
 Art. 3(1), ibid. 
23
 Art. 9(1)(a), ibid. 
24
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce in the 
Internal Market.  Henceforth, the E-commerce Directive. 
215
The motivation behind the E-commerce Directive is to develop information 
society services, and to ensure legal certainty and consumer confidence25.  
The European definition of an ISP is rather nebulous, requiring reference to 
two distinct concepts; a ‘service provider/established service provider’ and an 
‘information service’.  The former is defined under article 2 of the E-
commerce Directive as: “... any natural or legal person providing an 
information society service...”  And furthermore as: 
 
“... a service provider who effectively pursues an economic 
activity using a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. The 
presence and use of the technical means and technologies required 
to provide the service do not, in themselves, constitute an 
establishment of the provider...” 
 
Consequently, an ‘information service’ is defined as: “any service normally 
provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the 
individual request of a recipient of services.”26   
 
In light of the foregoing, a distinction needs to be made between those who 
offer ‘information services’ and those who operate as conduits.  Therefore, 
the author will use the term ‘Information Society Service Provider’ (ISSP) for 
those undertakings who broadly provide Internet access and services, and 
‘ISP’ specifically where they are acting conduits through whom information 
 
25
 Baistrocchi, P.A., ‘Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive on 
Electronic Commerce’, (2002) 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 110-130, p112. 
26
 Directive 98/34/EC on laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field 
of technical standards and regulation and of rules on Information Society Services (the 
Technical Standards Directive), art.1(2).  Further definition is provided thereunder: ‘at a 
distance’ means that the service is provided without the parties being simultaneously 
Present; ‘by electronic means’ means that the service is sent initially and received at its 
destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital 
compression) and storage of data, and entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, 
by radio, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means; and ‘at the individual request 
of a recipient of Services’ means that the service is provided through the transmission of 
data on individual request.   
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(or content) is transmitted or communicated.  For example, BT27 may be 
regarded as an ISSP, and services such as ‘Blogger’28 may be described as 
an ISP.  The E-commerce Directive does not establish a general liability 
regime applicable to ISPs, but a system of specific liability exceptions29.  The 
defences for ISPs are outlined in articles 12 to 15 of the Directive.  Article 
12(1) provides a “Mere conduit” defence which states that:  
 
“Where an information society service is provided that consists 
of the transmission in a communication network of information 
provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of 
access to a communication network, Member States shall 
ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information 
transmitted, on condition that the provider: 
 
(a) does not initiate the transmission; 
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the 
transmission.” 
 
Article 13 provides for a “Caching” defence, under 13(1): 
 
“... Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not 
liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of 
that information, performed for the sole purpose of making 
more efficient the information's onward transmission to other 
recipients of the service upon their request, on condition that: 
 
(a) the provider does not modify the information; 
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the 
information; 
 
27
 http://www.bt.com/ 
28
 http://www.blogger.com 
29
 Baistrocchi, P.A., ‘Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive on 
Electronic Commerce’, (2002) 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 110-130, p117. 
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(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of 
the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and 
used by industry; 
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of 
technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain 
data on the use of the information; and 
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 
access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual 
knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source 
of the transmission has been removed from the network, or 
access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an 
administrative authority has ordered such removal or 
disablement.” 
 
Article 14 then provides for a “Hosting” defence as 14(1) states: 
 
“... Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not 
liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of 
the service, on condition that: 
 
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is 
not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent; or 
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access 
to the information.” 
 
These can be summarised thus: 
• The ‘mere conduit defence’ where there is no liability where an ISP 
does not initiate the transmission, select the recipient or select or 
modify the information; 
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• The ‘caching defence’’ where is no liability for the automatic, 
intermediate and temporary storage of information for the sole 
purpose of more efficient onward transmission; and 
• The ‘hosting defence’ where there is no liability for storing information 
at the request of another if an ISP does not have actual knowledge 
that the activity is unlawful, and if it has knowledge, acts to remove or 
disable access to the information. 
 
The liability exclusions and limitations will apply no matter what theory of 
infringement is used by the plaintiff30.  This is further complemented by the 
fact that ISPs are prevented from any general obligation to monitor the traffic 
flowing across their networks under article 15(1): 
 
“Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, 
when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the 
information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to 
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.” 
 
This has enabled ISPs in Europe to enjoy a relatively comfortable existence 
through assumed immunity under the E-commerce Directive and a 
widespread belief that broadly, they have little or no control or knowledge31 
over the materials accessed through their service: 
 
“Until recently, the position of ISPs in Europe has been relatively 
comfortable, enjoying a degree of immunity from liability due to the Electronic 
Commerce Directive and a widespread belief that ISPs have little or no 
knowledge or control over materials hosted or accessed by users of their 
services.”32 
 
 
30
 Julia-Barcelo, R., ‘On-line intermediary liability issues: comparing EU and US legal 
frameworks’, (2000) EIPR 22(3) 105-119, p109. 
31
 In contrast to the Napster p2p file-sharing network, see chapter 4, p134-138. 
32
 Clark, B., ‘Illegal downloads: sharing out online liability: sharing files, sharing risks’, (2007) 
JIPLP 2(6) 402-418, p415. 
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Both the definition of an ISP and the defences available to them may also be 
analogous to the end-to-end (e2e) principle lying at the heart of the Internet’s 
architecture by premising the role of the user (i.e. the ‘end’-point on the 
network); their control over the flow of information; and, the passivity of the 
network on which the user operates33.  However, there has been an 
emerging and consistent trend across Europe suggesting that ISPs will be 
required to actively engage in tackling digital copyright infringement.  Whilst 
such a trend may be evident, the preciseness and consistency of such an 
approach is variable.  These will now be explored across the jurisdictions of 
Belgium, Ireland, Spain and France as well as recent European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) rulings in the area, as the most developed (but my no means 
consistent) approaches to the relevant issues. 
 
This is a complex area as the cases that will be analysed involve a variety of 
legislation as well as Human Rights issues.  These may be presented in the 
following table (overleaf): 
 
  
 
33
 See chapter 2, p81 and chapter 3, p122. 
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Country Issue(s) E-
commerce 
Directive  
Other 
directives 
Human 
Rights 
issues 
ECJ 
Belgium Filtering Arts.12 
and 15 
InfoSoc 
Directive 
(2001/29) 
Enforcement 
Directive 
(2004/48) 
Convention, 
arts.8 and 10 
 
Charter, 
arts.8, 11, 
and 16  
Yes 
Ireland Graduated 
response 
and 
blocking 
(injunctive 
relief) 
Art.12 InfoSoc 
Directive 
(2001/29) 
 
N/A No 
Spain Disclosure 
of personal 
data 
Art.15 InfoSoc 
Directive 
(2001/29) 
Enforcement 
Directive 
(2004/48)  
Personal Data 
Directive 
(95/46) 
Privacy and e-
communication
s Directive 
(2002/58) 
Charter, 
arts.17 and 
47  
Yes 
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France  Graduated 
response 
N/A N/A Constitutional 
rights of 
property, 
communicatio
n, 
expression, 
presumption 
of innocence 
and 
procedure 
No 
UK Graduated 
response, 
filtering, 
blocking 
(injunctive 
relief) 
Arts.3(2), 
12, and 15 
Technical 
Standards 
Directive 
(98/34) 
Privacy and e-
communication
s Directive 
(2002/58) 
Authorisation 
Directive 
(2002/20) 
Charter, arts. 
7, 8, 11 and 
52 
No 
 
3. European approaches 
 
 3.1 Belgium 
The case of Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) 
v. Scarlet34 is interesting to note for two reasons; firstly, it necessitated 
 
34
 Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (SABAM) v. SA Tiscali (Scarlet) 
District Court of Brussels, No. 04/8975/A, Decision of 29 June 2007.  A translation of the 
judgement (which the author has used) is available by Mady, F., Bourrouilhou, J., and 
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consideration of the relevant sections of the E-commerce Directive 
(mentioned above), and secondly, it concerned the applicability of technical 
measures to restrict digital copyright infringement.  As such, it may be 
differentiated as the only completed case involving such measures.  The 
appropriateness of technical solutions was not discussed in great detail, and 
the fact that other initiatives across Europe (notably in France and Ireland, 
discussed below) do not involve such measures arguably amounts to tacit 
acceptance that they would be ineffective. 
 
SABAM commenced proceedings for injunctive relief against Scarlet 
(formerly Tiscali) to prevent the unlawful file sharing of content to which they 
held the rights35.  Specifically, it sought the applicability of filtering software 
(specifically ‘Audible Magic’) to Scarlet’s network in order to prevent such 
occurrences36.  Aside from issues of effectiveness and cost of such 
measures, the case also considered how any imposition would affect 
Scarlet’s position in relation to the ‘safe-harbour’ provisions of the E-
commerce Directive.  Specifically: that the imposition of technical measures 
would impose a general monitoring obligation; that it would (consequently) 
lead to a loss of ‘mere conduit’ status; and, that it would violate the 
fundamental rights to privacy, confidentiality of correspondence and freedom 
of expression37. 
 
The Court held that article 15 of the E-commerce Directive was of no 
relevance for the present purposes and did not concern matters relating to 
injunctive relief38.  As a result, it was ruled that the prohibition on monitoring 
should not preclude the development and operation of technical measures to 
monitor network traffic39.  Such technical measures were also held to be 
    
Hughes, J., in 25 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal CAELJ Translation Series #001 
(2008) 1279-1292.  All subsequent references will refer to this source, henceforth, SABAM. 
35
 SABAM, p1282. 
36
 Ibid, p1284. 
37
 Ibid, p1287. 
38
 Ibid, p1288. 
39
 Ibid, p1288. 
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purely ‘technical instruments’ that would require no monitoring by Scarlet 
because they operated automatically without the need for any active conduct 
on Scarlet’s part40.  The Court also seemed to adopt a negative interpretation 
of these provisions in stating that if it was the case that Scarlet would lose its 
exemption, it would not necessarily follow that it would be found liable; which 
would then necessarily involve a different trial41.  Put differently, the Court 
decided that immunity under the Directive only protects ISPs from the 
content of transmissions and not from findings of copyright infringement or 
an order aimed at ending them42.  It appears that the Court skilfully avoided 
the crux of the issue by divesting itself of responsibility through interpreting 
the provisions so as to focus on liability and the characteristics of the 
technologies in question.  It could be suggested that the District Court was  
simply avoiding any more detailed or nuanced analysis, but as with the 
decisions in Ireland (discussed below), it seems that the Court is bound by 
the terms of its reference; potential liability issues were not at stake here. 
 
The Belgian ruling seems to go against the no monitoring obligation in article 
15 of the E-commerce Directive.  However, the court appeared to circumvent 
this through viewing the technology in question as purely an automatic 
measure; thus that the ISP would not play an active role in filtering.  It 
appears that the issue revolved around the interpretation of the word 
‘monitor’.  Quite a narrow definition appears to have been adopted in SABAM 
where it seems to be taken to mean that the ISP must actively be involved in 
policing traffic on its network.  However, it could be argued that any measure 
imposed on a network to filter traffic amounts to ‘monitoring’ as it implies a 
presence on the network and an analysis of the transmissions that pass 
through it.  Furthermore, the Court seemed to accept that any ‘automatic’ 
technical response negates any arguments over the E-commerce Directive, 
but no measure can ever be purely and entirely automated.  Further 
 
40
 SABAM, pp1288-1289. 
41
 Ibid, p1289. 
42
 Couneson, G., ‘Belgium: intellectual property – copyright (Case Comment)’, CTLR 2008, 
14(3), N62-62. 
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proposed legislation has since been tabled in Belgium43, demonstrating the 
increasing tendency to more formally govern this area. 
 
3.2 Ireland 
Ireland has also seen cases brought concerning the issue of ISP liability.  
Arguably, these cases are of much more jurisdictional significance to the UK 
as Copyright law in Ireland (currently governed by the Copyright and Related 
Rights Act, 200044) is largely similar to that in the UK as the Irish Intellectual 
Property system developed from that of the UK following independence in 
192145.  Both are also subject to the duties imposed by membership of the 
European Union and are bound by the same law considered above. 
 
In July 2009, the Irish High Court delivered its verdict in the case of EMI 
Records (Ireland) v. Eircom46 concerning the application by EMI to require 
Eircom to block access to The Pirate Bay website47.  The judgement is 
curious in the first place as it relates to the private settlement between the 
parties regarding this application, and it was agreed that Eircom would not 
oppose EMI’s application.  The precise details of the settlement have 
remained private and therefore, there is only a limited opportunity to examine 
the merits of the action.  Eircom may have been influenced into the 
settlement by the SABAM decision48, but the ‘judgement’ was based 
exclusively on EMI’s argument49, and as such bears a distinct one-sidedness.  
Nevertheless, there is acceptance of the innocent, or perhaps ‘conduit’ status 
of Eircom in the matter under s.40(4) of the Copyright and related Rights Act, 
 
43
 Szafran, E., and Klaeser, T., ‘Belgium: legislation – copyright – proposed bills – internet 
regulation’, (2010) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 16(5) N111-N113. 
44
 Available from: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0028/index.html 
45
 See generally, http://www.patentsoffice.ie/en/student_copyright.aspx 
46
 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v. Eircom PLC (2009) IEHC 411.  Henceforth Eircom I. 
47
 Discussed in relation to p2p liability in chapter 4, pp152-155. 
48
 Nagle, E., ‘”To every cow its calf, to every book its copy” – copyright and illegal 
downloading after EMI (Ireland) Ltd and Others v Eircom Ltd’, (2010) Entertainment Law 
Review 21(6) 209-214, p213. 
49
 Eircom I, as Charleton J. admitted in his opening. 
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200050.  However, Charleton J. interpreted this provision as providing a wider 
entitlement to the copyright holder; allowing the provider of ‘facilities’ 
enabling copyright infringement to be guilty of infringement where they failed 
to remove the infringing material upon notification of it51: 
 
 “I interpret that, at the moment, as saying that the pipe or channel (i.e. 
the electronic pipe or channel in this case) down which the copyright 
infringing material is going can be the subject of injunctive relief under s. 
40(4)”52 
 
Another notable feature of the ruling is the rhetoric that Carleton J. employed 
in his delivery which confirms the high regard afforded to creator’s rights (at 
least in Ireland) and the emphasis on the ‘protective’ function of copyright (as 
opposed to the ‘incentivisation’ of innovation53).  Also interesting is the 
emphasis placed by the Judge in relation to the conduct of the proprietors of 
The Pirate Bay torrent service54; aside from the fact that this case took place 
in a different jurisdiction, the ‘technology’ is also different and operates in an 
entirely dissimilar context.  Comparing the conduct of legitimate business 
enterprise with that of a more cynical nature (at least as far as the individuals 
involved were concerned55) underscores a lack of balanced analysis, 
differentiating between organisations/undertakings and users.  It also reflects 
court opinion (at least as far as Charleton J. is concerned) supporting the 
views regularly expressed by rightsholders which is both one-sided and not 
necessarily truly accurate56.   
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Another judgement was issued in April 201057 as a result of the agreement 
by Eircom to adopt a graduated ‘three-strikes’ policy, and was again 
delivered by Charleton J.  The primary operation of this seems to involve 
third party operators who are engaged with identifying illegal downloaders 
and who are hired by the rightsholders to identify specific infringements58.  
Such information is then passed on to Eircom who are obliged to write to the 
subscriber (allegedly) involved, warning them that their Internet connection 
will be cut-off unless they cease such behaviour59.  In addition, to prevent the 
burden from resting exclusively with Eircom, EMI agreed to initiate similar 
proceedings against other ISPs in the country60. 
 
One of these was taken by EMI against UPC Communications61, and again, 
was heard in the High Court before Charleton J.  The issues raised were in 
relation to the various ‘technical solutions’ for an injunction62.  In contrast to 
the two Eircom judgements, the decision here is much longer and more lucid; 
because UPC contested.  As a matter of evidence, it was established that 
copyright was being infringed on UPC’s network and UPC’s evidence as to 
its unawareness in the matter was not accepted63.  Ironically, a similar 
evidential matter (or more aptly in this case a lack thereof) arose here as it 
did in the Napster case; specifically in relation to the infamous email referring 
to ‘pirated’ music64.  Charleton J. stated:  
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“It is clear that they have an economic and moral obligation to address 
the problem ... Relevant correspondence from within UPC is profoundly 
disturbing as to the reality of their approach.”65 
 
The specific role of third parties in detecting online infringement was 
considered66 and their operation judged to be legitimate, highly accurate and 
not subject to any degree of substantial error67.  In addition, technological 
responses to such activity by the user (use of proxy IP addresses and 
encryption) were not considered to be widespread or significant enough at 
the time to negate the operations of these data collectors.  Therefore 
detection operations were regarded as appropriate68.  Worryingly, notification 
and termination were also considered appropriate without any specific 
consideration as to why.  Detection, notification and termination are separate 
processes, each having (or at least which should have) its own procedures.  
This seems especially at odds with the preceding paragraphs which talk 
about the reluctance to impose such termination measures. 
 
However, the case turned on the legislative measures in force regarding the 
applicability of the granting of an injunction69.  On the basis of (thankfully) 
stated and (reasonably) considered evidence, it was rightly concluded that 
cutting off access to computers holding copyrighted material does not 
remove the actual infringing material itself; it merely stops the ‘transit’ of such 
content70.  In addition, the technological measures considered above do not 
operate to remove such material71.  It was concluded that the national 
legislative provisions insist upon removal of infringing content, and not 
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blocking, which is: “... simply not possible in the context of a transient 
communication.”72  It was found that there was an absence of provisions 
enabling the blocking or interrupting of Internet access in Irish law73.  The 
prime reason for this was that in other jurisdictions, legislative provisions 
expressly require a Court order in relation to (potential) disconnection and 
there is no comparable measure in Irish law74.  Through this, the critical 
importance of Internet access was also implicitly recognised.  As such, the 
blocking of Internet access/communications can, and was, distinguished 
from removal (of infringing content) mechanisms75. 
 
EMI’s application against UPC was defeated on legal (or more aptly, the lack 
of legal) grounds, but that is not to say the Court was being sympathetic to 
UPC, or any other ISP for that matter.  This was based partly on the less 
than satisfactory conduct by UPC and the fact that Charleton J. explicitly 
stated that he would have granted injunctive relief had it been available76.  
Tellingly though, the judge was mindful of the ruling he gave in the first 
Eircom decision stating that: “I regret that my previous judgment in the matter 
was wrong.”77  This could be seen as a rather hollow victory for UPC and (at 
least) Irish ISPs in general; they were not obliged to impose measures not 
because they had won their case on a point of law (or favourable 
interpretation of such law), but because there was no provision in the 
national law to permit it in the first place.  Unsurprisingly, this was not to last; 
although there was acceptance by Charleton J. that Irish law on the matter 
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lags behind the rest of Europe, this was not going to last forever78.  As it was, 
we were left in the position that in Ireland at least, there was no legislative 
scope for rendering ISPs liable for copyright infringement.  This was 
seemingly a surprise to the legislature who believed they had fulfilled their 
obligations under the Copyright Directive to ensure the availability of 
injunctive relief for rightsholders.79.  Rumours persisted that the Irish 
government planned to bring in a statutory instrument to fill the gap 
perceived by Charleton J. in this case80.  According to the Minister of State 
for Research and Innovation, Sean Sherlock (TD), this was on the advice of 
the Attorney-General’s Office to ensure compliance with the European 
Copyright Directive in allowing for such an injunction81.  The Sstatutory 
Instrument was signed in March 201282 after a short period of media scrutiny 
and an emergency debate in Dáil83 (the lower house of the Irish Parliament); 
it allows a copyright owner to apply to the High Court for an injunction 
against an intermediary.  The statutory instrument mentions an ‘intermediary’ 
against whom an injunction may be made, as one to whom article 8(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive applies84, but provides no guidance beyond this.  It also 
states that the Court should have due regard to users who may be affected 
by such a measure.  However, the emphasis on the goal of such a response 
(to reduce digital copyright infringement) threatens to overshadow the other 
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equally legitimate interests of the user; little attention was paid to the interest 
of those who might have their Internet connection terminated85. 
 
 3.3 Spain 
In Spain, the issue came before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
regarding the applicable European Directives86 and Human Rights 
obligations in the case of Productores de Música de España SAU 
(Promusicae) v. Telefónica de Esapaña SAU (Telefónica)87.  The issue was 
whether an ISP could be forced to pass on confidential information about 
illegal file-sharers on its network to an industry body.  This case differed 
slightly in nature as the main issue at stake was the disclosure of personal 
data of those engaged in illegal file-sharing in the context of data protection, 
and was brought under civil as opposed to criminal law.  The case concerned 
the balancing between the European fundamental rights to ‘property’88 and 
an ‘effective remedy’89 (as enshrined in the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights90), with that of data protection contained in a number of 
directives broadly relating to the ‘information society’ and intellectual property 
rights.  Interestingly, the right to intellectual property is slightly ambiguously 
worded in the Charter, as it states simply, “Intellectual property shall be 
protected.”91  In contrast, more ‘physical’ property (‘possessions’) seem to be 
more concretely protected92.  Nonetheless, the need to analyse how these 
competing goals of the law in this area warrant consideration as to how the 
policy objectives of data protection and copyright protection (across the 
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relevant directives) sit within this framework of copyright as a fundamental 
right93. 
 
In sum, the European Court deemed the reference to ask if (then) 
Community law must be interpreted as requiring Member States to lay down 
an obligation to communicate personal data (in the context of civil 
proceedings) in order to ensure the effective protection of copyright94.  
Despite accepting that the purposes of the directives mentioned were to 
ensure, in particular, the protection of copyright95, other provisions of the 
directives at issue96 led to the conclusion that such protection cannot affect 
the requirements of the protection of personal data.  In short, there were no 
legislative provisions within the Directives that, in the Court’s opinion, 
provided for an obligation on Member States to lay down an obligation to 
provide personal information97.   
 
With regard to the issue of Fundamental Rights under articles 17 and 47 of 
the Charter (the right to property, including Intellectual Property, and, the 
right to an effective remedy, respectively), the Court proceeded to consider 
whether such a lack of obligation would amount to an infringement of these 
rights98.  As a result, there is a conflict between the fundamental rights of 
rightsholders, and the fundamental rights of users thus raising the question 
of the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of different 
fundamental rights99.  Advocate General Kokott100 further recognised the 
conflict thus: 
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“The communication of personal data to a third party, whatever the 
subsequent use of the information thus communicated, therefore constitutes 
an infringement of the right of the person concerned to respect for private life 
and consequently an interference within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
ECHR.”101 
 
The protection of the rights and freedoms of others cannot justify the 
communication of personal traffic data102.  This also relates to the European 
Court of Human Rights case law on the issue; where such data may be 
implicated under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on 
the right to respect for private and family life103.  Any wider interpretation than 
that currently contained through the applicable Directives would render the 
protection of personal data meaningless with regard to unauthorised use of 
communications systems104.  If this was the case, then it would be necessary 
to store and intensively process all network communication with regard to 
content:  “The citizen ‘under the eye of Big Brother’ would thus be a 
reality.”105  As a result, unauthorised use of an electronic communications 
system does not include its use broadly for unauthorised purposes, only use 
contrary to the system itself106 .  Whilst this approach focuses on the 
applicability of personal data disclosure in civil cases, it is unclear that the 
situation would be the same in criminal proceedings which by their very 
nature are more serious.  This question, however, was left for another time, 
since the data protection Directives do not apply to criminal offences107.  The 
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ECJ recognises data privacy and copyright as fundamental rights and 
requires a balance to be struck between them108.  Member States must 
themselves strike an appropriate balance between the obligation to disclose 
or withhold such information.  In effect, by recognising that personal data 
may be available for rights holders for civil suits of copyright infringement, the 
balance may have tipped more in favour of rightsholders than perhaps the 
EU had intended.  The ECJ thus, in this instance, seemed quite content to 
keep out of the argument and leave it to the national legislatures to decide, 
so long as the various fundamental rights are balanced in accordance with 
EU law. 
 
Despite recognising the importance of copyright as a matter of public 
interest109, Advocate General Kokott (tellingly) stated that:  
 
“...(it is) not certain that private file sharing, in particular when it takes 
place without any intention to make a profit, threatens the protection of 
copyright sufficiently seriously to justify recourse to this exception.”110 
 
The Court recognised that Member States must be careful to rely on an 
interpretation of the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck 
between various fundamental rights111.  In conclusion, the Court came to the 
decision that none of the directives required the Member States to lay down 
any obligation to communicate personal data in order to ensure the 
protection of copyright in civil proceedings112.  Nevertheless, they did state a 
proviso whereby Member States should interpret them so as to allow a fair 
balance to be struck between competing fundamental rights in a way 
consistent with the general principles of Community (Union) law113.  The 
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ruling can be welcomed in terms of the ECJ confirming that no obligation to 
disclose personal data exists, although this has been tempered by the more 
recent decision in the case of Bonnier Audio114.  Here, it was held that the 
disclosure of personal data of infringers is not precluded where such an 
order of disclosure is based on evidence, and is proportionate and 
necessary115.  However, this does not mean that data retention for enforcing 
IP rights is now required; it is only possible in certain limited circumstances116. 
However, Promusicae has ultimately brought little clarification117.  There 
does not appear to be a ‘blanket’ exemption as it requires national courts to 
resolve any issue on this matter before them in the context of balancing 
fundamental rights which could require such disclosure (depending on the 
facts of a given case).  In such instances, the flip-side of the Court’s ruling 
that no obligation exists may come to be relevant; that such an obligation is 
not necessarily precluded118.  ISPs may not be forced to reveal the identities 
of subscribers unless the infringement is on a scale that constitutes a 
criminal offence119.  The ECJ decided that it cannot be derived from 
European legislation that Member States are obliged to install a duty to 
disclose personal data in civil cases, but did not provide guidelines as to how 
a balance should be struck: “In sum, the ‘hot potato’ was passed on to the 
Member States.” 120 
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 3.4 France 
The situation is markedly different in France where it was announced in 2007 
that a (then) new independent anti-piracy body was to be established 
following a deal between the music and movie industries, and Internet firms.  
Under this arrangement, ISPs monitor the activities of their users and pass 
on information about infringers to the new organisation.  President Sarkozy 
described the initiative as the ‘future for a civilised Internet’121.  The adoption 
of this system was not without its problems.  The French Constitutional Court 
(Conseil Constitutionel) struck down122 the original Hadopi Act as being in 
violation of two French Constitutional principles: that an individual is innocent 
until proven guilty (as the user would be presumed responsible for any 
breaches without the opportunity to prove otherwise); and, the freedom of 
communication which must be limited in accordance with the French right of 
entitlement to Intellectual Property.  As such, an administrative body, i.e. 
Hadopi could not be vested with the right to cut-off an individual’s Internet 
access (and violate the freedom of communication). 
 
The French Constitutional Court issued its ruling in June 2009 on the 
‘constitutionality’ of the proposed Hadopi law.  The main reason for the 
referral was the allegedly improper manner in which the Parliament passed 
the Act123.  In addition, it was argued that by affording an administrative body 
(even an independent one) the power to impose disconnection penalties, 
Parliament infringed the (French) fundamental right of freedom of expression 
and communication124 as well as imposing disproportionate penalties and an 
unfair presumption of guilt125.  Weighted against this, was the similar 
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recognition of the fundamental right to property which was deemed to include 
Intellectual Property126 as well as recognition that an administrative body 
acting within the competencies of the law is not precluded in exercising its 
penal powers127.   
 
The Court placed upmost importance on the rights of freedom of expression, 
but recognised Parliament’s freedom to lay down rules to reconcile this with 
the right to property128.  However, the Court appeared to afford more 
importance to the rights of communication and expression as being the 
cornerstones of a democratic society (described as being “precious”)129; the 
potential breadth of the initial measures were deemed to infringe these rights.  
The Court invoked a principle that has been integral to French jurisprudence; 
that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty such that it applies 
even if a punishment is sanctioned by a non-judicial body130.  This131 also 
proved decisive in this case; the relevant provisions of the Act were adjudged 
to have reversed the burden of proof in this instance and were deemed 
unconstitutional132. 
 
Contrasts may be drawn with the UPC judgement in Ireland mentioned 
above.  That case demonstrated the willingness of the Court to impose 
measures to limit Internet access, but not so here where such a response 
was ruled unconstitutional.  It was further argued that such measures were 
disproportionate, unduly wide and may potentially lead to pre-emptive action 
with regard the right of users to receive information133.  The Court disagreed, 
finding that the legislative measures concerning such responses involved 
right and proper judicial procedures and that any decision to terminate 
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Internet access was a matter solely for the judiciary (in accordance with 
Hadopi provisions on the matter)134.  It would not be unconstitutional where 
the proper judicial procedure was followed135.  Therefore, the disconnection 
of Internet users was implicitly deemed an acceptable response, although in 
this instance, purely due to the legislative grounds which accommodate it.  
There also appears to be a distinction between ‘active’ communication and 
‘passive’ reception of information; it seems the first is a constitutional right, 
whilst the latter is not, despite the fact that one cannot function without the 
other.  This is also expressly recognised in the European Convention on 
Human Rights under article 10(1) which explicitly mentions the right to 
receive ideas136.  Nonetheless, in contrast with Ireland, there was no 
discussion as to the necessary copyright provisions in French law which 
allow (or may have disallowed) such a course of action; the ruling was 
confined to the constitutionality of the Hadopi Law. 
 
 3.5 The ECJ 
The issue on the legality of filtering measures was pending before the 
European Court of Justice in the form of a preliminary reference137 following 
the SABAM case in Belgium where the Brussels Court of Appeal sought a 
ruling on whether the relevant directives, interpreted  in light of articles 8 and 
10 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (the rights to respect for private and family life, and 
of freedom of expression), permit imposing an obligation on ISPs to force 
them to implement filtering measures to block traffic infringing copyright 
law138. 
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Advocate General Cruz Villalon issued his Opinion on the matter139, stating 
that in order to be permissible, such a measure must comply with the 
conditions laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (the Charter) to govern the restriction on the exercise of rights and 
must be done in accordance with an appropriate legal basis.  The Advocate 
General considered that the court order imposed by the District Court 
constituted a ‘general obligation’ which may be intended to be extended, on 
a permanent basis, to all other ISPs and which may have a consequent 
lasting effect on a wide range of individuals and organisations, irrespective of 
whether or not they have a contractual relationship with Scarlet.  Such an 
order was also deemed to apply as a preventative measure; therefore, a 
finding of actual infringement would not first be made.  Importantly, Advocate 
General Cruz Villalon stated that the order at issue was a ‘new obligation’ 
through which the legal and economic responsibility for dealing with online 
copyright infringement would largely be delegated to the ISPs.  As such, he 
considered that the installation of a filtering and blocking system (in principle) 
would be a restriction on the right to respect for the privacy of communication, 
the right to protection of personal data, and, freedom of information under the 
Charter.  However, he accepted that such rights may be restricted, provided 
they are done so in accordance with the law (‘quality of the law’) and would 
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be permissible if they were adopted on a national legal basis which was 
accessible, clear, and predictable; this was not the case in Belgium and there 
were no adequate safeguards in place.  As a result: 
 
 “... the Advocate General proposes that the Court of Justice should 
declare that EU law precludes a national court from making an order, on the 
basis of the Belgian statutory provision, requiring an internet service provider 
to install, in respect of all its customers, in abstracto and as a preventive 
measure, entirely at the expense of the internet service provider and for an 
unlimited period, a system for filtering all electronic communications passing 
via its services (in particular, those involving the use of peer-to-peer software) 
in order to identify on its network the sharing of electronic files containing a 
musical, cinematographic or audio-visual work in respect of which a third 
party claims rights, and subsequently to block the transfer of such files, either 
at the point at which they are requested or at the point at which they are 
sent.”140 
 
The ECJ subsequently ruled141 that that a contested filtering system (as it 
was in this case) should not be adopted as it would be in violation of EU 
law142.  Installing such a preventative system, at the ISP’s expense, and 
which would filter all electronic communications indiscriminately, and apply 
indefinitely143 would be in violation of the general monitoring prohibition 
under article 15 of the E-commerce Directive144.  It would also appear to be 
in countenance to the e2e design principle by applying technical 
mechanisms to a network that may otherwise be neutral with the potential 
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effect that the network itself may become less efficient145.  However, this 
ruling was specific to the framing of the question; which itself was quite 
precise in these terms.  Although the right to Intellectual Property was 
acknowledged as a Fundamental Right, it was acknowledged that this was 
not an absolute right146 and must be balanced against the protection of other 
fundamental rights as in Promusicae147.  In this instance, this right needed to 
be balanced against the right to conduct a business under article 16 of the 
Charter (of Fundamental Rights).  The nature of the filtering in this case was 
deemed to infringe this right as well as being complicated and costly to 
implement148.  Aside from the nature and implementation of the system, it 
was also held that the effects of such a measure would adversely affect the 
rights of users; specifically the right of personal data protection and their 
freedom to receive and impart information (under articles 8 and 11 of the 
Charter, respectively)149 as well as harming freedom of information150.  In 
conclusion, it was held that: 
 
 “Consequently, it must be held that, in adopting the injunction 
requiring the ISP to install the contested filtering system, the national court 
concerned would not be respecting the requirement that a fair balance be 
struck between the right to intellectual property, on the one hand, and the 
freedom to conduct business, the right to protection of personal data and the 
freedom to receive or impart information on the other.”151 
 
This is initially encouraging in terms of providing a more definite answer on 
the issue, but the judgement is still bound by the facts of the original case 
and the reference in that it specifically concerned the imposition of 
blocking/filtering measures as opposed to a graduated response scheme.  It 
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may be questioned as to whether this opinion and subsequent ECJ ruling 
may really be of relevance anymore.  The case began in 2004 and was 
heard by the District Court in 2007; the state of technology moves so quickly 
that any evidential matters concerning the effectiveness of such measures 
may now be out of date (as we are now six years later at the time of writing).  
Filtering measures have since been an issue in relation to the article 14 
hosting defence under the E-commerce Directive.  Although it was held by 
the ECJ that this would violate the no monitoring obligation under article 
15152, it remains to be seen if and how the application of filtering measures 
may develop beyond its application on a network.  Nonetheless, ISPs now 
possess the necessary traffic management capabilities which may be 
employed in this scenario (as opposed to relying on third-parties to 
implement solutions).  This is also evident from the prevalence of graduated 
response mechanisms evident in France, Ireland, and (most likely) in the UK.  
The fact that ISPs now possess and operate traffic management techniques 
is arguably of central importance in terms of website filtering or blocking.  
This will be considered below in the UK context. 
 
4. The UK 
The approach in the UK has been a rather long-winded and tortuous affair 
that began in 2006 and has been subject to a number of consultations and 
reports, which finally culminated in the Digital Economy Act (DEA) passed in 
2010.  However, even the passing and content of this act was the subject of 
much controversy153 and was arguably prey to the lobbying interests154 of the 
affected parties, as Lord Puttnam stated during the debating stage: 
 
“Many of us in this House have come in having just had our ears 
bashed-either by the record industry or some other aspect of special 
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pleading ... The lobbying process that has gone into this Bill has been quite 
destructive and has done none of us very much help at all.”155 
Before it was even passed as an Act of Parliament, the Digital Economy Act 
(DEA) engendered a lot of controversy in its incarnation as a Bill.  The origins 
of the Act can be traced back to the Digital Britain Report156, and before then, 
The Gower’s Review on Intellectual Property157 (as marking the first in a 
series of reports on Intellectual Property Law in the UK).  One of the central 
features of the Act was to implement strict measures to combat digital 
copyright infringement; specifically (again), a ‘graduated response’ to the 
problem.  In contrast to the approach in France, but similar to Ireland, the 
‘response’ involves ISPs being informed of infringing activity.  They would 
also be required to send out notices to their subscribers who have committed 
infringements.  Rightsholders would then be able to obtain a court order and 
potentially sue158 those infringers.  Notably, this only involves the ISPs and 
rightsholders, as opposed to an independent body (Hadopi in France), and 
ultimately carries a less severe sanction (with a limited right of appeal), as 
opposed to Internet suspension (France) or termination (Ireland). 
 
In addition to proposing a graduated response, the DEA affords the 
Secretary of State wide-ranging powers in this area; notably in relation to 
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website blocking159.  The Bill received Royal Assent on the 12th April 2010 
and entered into force on June 12th that year.  However, it engendered 
resentment amongst ISPs, and following a legal challenge by BT and 
TalkTalk, a judicial review of the Act was granted pending a full review to be 
undertaken160. 
 
 4.1 Judicial Review 
On the 20th April 2011, the High Court issued its decision on the judicial 
review161 brought by the ISPs BT and TalkTalk.  The Court concluded that 
the initial obligations contained in the DEA are not legally enforceable 
against any individual (or ISP) and thus do not have the necessary ‘legal 
effect’ required from settled European case law162.  This is because the 
obligations are expressly dependent on the regulatory Code to be developed 
and without this, they are not yet sufficiently clarified to be enforceable; the 
actual content of the obligations is to be defined in the Code163: “Without the 
Code, the initial obligations simply beat the air in legal terms.”164  Moreover, 
the Court insinuated what any such Code must contain infringement reports, 
infringement lists etc., and may presumably open the door for lobbying by the 
content industry upon whom ISPs appear increasingly reliant (discussed 
further below), and as alluded to in the judgement165.  The author is 
reminded of the work of Lawrence Lessig in ‘Code’166 (referred to elsewhere 
 
159
 S.17, Digital Economy Act (DEA), 2010.  
160
 ‘Net providers get Digital Economy Act judicial review’, (2010) BBC News, available from: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11724760 
161
 The Queen on the Application of British Telecommunications PLC and TalkTalk Telecom 
Group PLC v. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 
(henceforth, BT). 
162
 BT, para. 84. 
163
 Ibid, para. 84. 
164
 Ibid, para. 84. 
165
 Ibid, para. 252, quoting the evidence filed by the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS): “However, those ISPs with significant content interests have not demurred 
at the estimates provided in their responses to Government consultations.” 
166
 Lessig, L., ‘Code  (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books), p81.   
244
in this thesis167).  Specifically, ‘code as code’; law can be ‘code’ and ‘code’ 
can be law.  This is perhaps further confirmed in a statement in the 
judgement:  “It is the Code that in strict legal terms will constitute the 
technical regulation.”168 
 
The High Court169 stated that: “For the present purposes, the role of the ISP 
under the DEA is essentially passive.”170  However, this largely leaves a void 
at the centre of the entire operation of the DEA.  One may take heart from 
the fact that ISPs are not obliged to monitor under the DEA, but this still 
leaves the question as to who will?  As a consequence of this statement, 
there must be some undertaking that will be active.  As there may not be an 
independent body involved (such as Hadopi) this suggests that perhaps 
rightsholders may engage themselves (or through another agency).  
Alternatively, the ISP themselves may be involved through the (presumably) 
passive accumulation of data.  Similarly, everything else is presumably to be 
governed by the aforementioned Code; the lack of which effectively enabled 
the Court to assert the validity of the Act as the grounds for opposition were 
unfounded, essentially because the real ‘flesh’ of the Act has still to be 
formulated.  This begs the ancillary question of how and why Parliament 
chose to pass an Act that essentially left the substantive provisions to be 
filled in by ISPs themselves.  There also seemed to be deference to the 
‘insight’ afforded to Parliament by the lengthy consultation process171 as well 
as the practical deference relating to the sheer volume of evidence on this 
issue172.  However, this fails to take into account neither the lobbying power 
of the content industries (including the controversial circumstances of the 
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DEA’s birth nor the lack of Parliamentary scrutiny resulting from the ‘wash up’ 
phase.   
 
In contrast to much of the rest of Europe, the UK has no formal Constitution 
which grants and protects individual rights (unlike France and those 
considered in Promusicae).  As such, there is potentially little opportunity to 
balance competing interests here (individual rights v. copyright): 
 
“In the digital age, there is a need for progressive judicial perspectives 
which give adequate consideration to the increasing importance of the 
Internet.  The plight of copyright owners, although real, cannot continue to 
eclipse the rights of Internet users...”173 
 
This is something which the High Court paid only limited attention to, stating 
that this case was not one which involved a human right or fundamental 
freedom174; instead, this was something Parliament had a wide margin of 
discretion over175.  Furthermore, there was a notable reluctance to accept 
any European aspect to the decision; it was concluded that the questions of 
EU law raised by the case resulted in clear answers and the Court did “... not 
believe that any useful purpose would be served by my making a 
(preliminary) reference.”176  The author would argue that in fact, a preliminary 
reference should have been made, not least because similar matters have 
been with regard to the situations in Spain and Belgium.  Furthermore, the 
decision by the High Court runs contrary to the opinion of the Advocate 
General in the SABAM case who proposed that the ECJ should declare that 
EU law precludes a national court from requiring ISPs to implement filtering 
measures.  As such, a reference to the ECJ may be seen as necessary as 
there are matters of EU law requiring interpretation in order for the UK Court 
to pass judgement.  These would seemingly not be covered under the ‘Acte 
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Clair’ Doctrine177; despite what the Court concluded, the author would assert 
that the answer is not obvious on the basis of the foregoing European 
decisions on the matter.   
 
Nonetheless, it does demonstrate that ‘technical measures’ have moved 
beyond mere filtering and now stand for traffic management techniques, 
bandwidth throttling etc.. Whilst these measures may not necessarily affect 
the user control residing at the end-points in the network under e2e, their 
existence and operation arguably affords the possibility for more intrusive 
measures to be introduced which may undermine these elements of the 
Internet’s architecture under the auspices of combating unauthorised 
copyright infringement.  Specifically, its open architecture and associated 
independence from software programmes and hardware platforms178 
threaten to be undermined by necessary technical measures in operation 
and such monitoring systems as may be introduced in this area.  As 
mentioned above, the e2e network architecture and central place of the 
user179 may also be overridden.   
 
In truth, the legal basis for rendering ISPs liable for copyright infringement 
and for a graduated response mechanism remains unclear; in part due to the 
relatively recent nature of this initiative (and associated lack of coherent case 
law), and also due to the complexities of the various legal measures that may 
be involved.  At the very least, it must rest on some form of national 
legislation, which it now does in France, Ireland, and to a lesser extent, in the 
UK (the details of which still need to be fleshed out in terms of the regulatory 
code).  It may however, be hoped that the drafting of the Code will be 
influenced by the ruling of the ECJ against filtering measures.   
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4.2 Beyond graduated response?  Newzbin(z) 
As much as the operation of ISPs regarding unauthorised copyright 
infringement has yet to be worked out under the DEA, this has not stopped 
the content industries from pursuing individual actions through the courts in 
the UK.  This has been most apparent in the Newzbin cases180  and has 
potentially much more serious ramifications.  These cases involved the 
operation of websites operating via ‘Usenet’ (a distributed early Internet 
message board system181) which was alleged to contain infringing content.  
Although Newzbin I shut down, a similar version (Newzbin 2) re-surfaced 
shortly thereafter and was subject to similar proceedings; ultimately an 
injunction was sought under section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act182.  This section was implemented by the Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations (2003) and states that a Court has the power to grant an 
injunction against a service provider where the service provider has actual 
knowledge that their service is being used to infringe copyright. 
 
Interestingly, the judge in the second case made reference to Charleton J’s 
‘eloquent description’ in the UPC case (above) about the scale and nature of 
the problem of unauthorised copyright infringement183.  The nature and tone 
of these judgements has already been questioned, and it is unfortunate that 
they re-surfaced in this instance.  Despite referencing the Hargreaves 
Report184 where it was noted that the statistical evidence of such activity is 
open to question, it was still accepted that there was ‘’fairly good’ evidence of 
wrongdoing185.    Despite the claim that the service was ‘content agnostic’186, 
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it was found that ‘binary’ content (that is, content beyond mere text) was 
treated differently in that the user interface was primarily directed towards 
such (infringing) content187.  Furthermore, the defendant, on cross-
examination, revealed enough to evidence knowledge of infringement188.  
Evidence was rejected in both cases that only minimal content on both sites 
was non-infringing189, and that shutting down the service would only have a 
minor effect on lawful uses190.  In fact, the available content was deemed to 
be ‘commercial’191; a term which had not surfaced at any time previously in 
the judgement, and a term which was not defined in the present context192.   
 
In the Newzbin I case, it had to be decided if the system, and its operation, 
amounted to ‘authorisation’ for the purposes of infringement.  Reference was 
made to the seminal Amstrad193 case which determined this very issue194 
(and may be seen as analogous to the US Betamax case, discussed earlier 
in this thesis195).  Specifically, Newzbin was charged with authorising 
infringement by its members, procuring, encouraging and entering into a 
common design with its members to infringe, and, communicating the 
claimants’ copyrighted works to the public196.   
 
In Amstrad, it was held that the production and distribution of high-speed 
audio cassette recording equipment did not amount to a grant of 
authorisation to infringe copyright as the user could not reasonably deduce 
that Amstrad purported to possess the authority to grant permission to 
copy197.  However, in the present context, the facts of the case were 
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interpreted to mean that the relationship between operators and users, the 
functionality of the site, and the nature of the available content amounted to a 
grant of authorisation198.  Despite the somewhat archaic nature of the 
underlying arhictecture, the operation of Newzbin was considered to be 
‘sophisticated’199 and extended beyond mere indexing or ctaegorisation of 
content200.  Furthermore, the operation of the service led to an infringing 
copy of commercial content being made201; there was an absence of filtering 
measures in place and the ‘terms and conditions’ of their service were 
deemed to be no more than ‘window-dressing’202.  These findings also led 
the Court to determine that the defendants were liable for participating in a 
common design so as to procure infringement203.  The operation of the 
service was also held to be active, with the defendants deemed to have 
intervened in a material and sophisticated way to make copyrighted content 
available204. 
 
As a result, the pre-existing Amstrad authority205 on the matter has now been 
overridden; such that Newzbin I: “... purports to possess the authority to 
grant any required permission...”206  These factors are comparable to similar 
issues argued regarding p2p networks207; such that now, creating an easy to 
use system may count as ‘authorising’ copyright infringement, beyond merely 
‘encouraging’ it.  Indeed, the term ‘inducement’ also appeared in this 
judgement208 in a similar context to the Grokster decision discussed in 
chapter 4209.   Furthermore, the operation of the Newzbin services could 
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hardly be said to be as ‘user-friendly’ as the p2p networks discussed earlier 
in this thesis210.  Ultimately, because specific instances of infringement had 
not been recorded211 and ‘Premium’ members of the service paid a weekly 
subscription fee212  it was deemed sufficient to overrule Amstrad213.  
However, this reflects the very nature of the Internet and digital technology; it 
would be practicably prohibitive (for example, because of financial reasons 
and scale) to be able to identify each and every act of copyright infringement 
committed by an individual user.  The mere fact that users may simply be 
connected, in general terms, to the Internet i.e. they are online, and have 
some sort of loose ‘relationship’ with the services (likewise, the ‘service’ may 
be said to have a relationship with the user) they choose, seems to operate 
as a minimal evidential hurdle needed to suggest ‘authorisation’ by the 
service provider for the purposes of copyright infringement.  Similarly, any 
‘relationship’ may be ongoing by virtue of an Internet connection and access. 
 
The Newzbin II case centred more on the liability (and therefore 
responsibility) of BT (as an ISSP) to implement measures to block access to 
the site through an injunction under s.97A of the CDPA214.  Again it was 
found that they majority of content on Newzbin II was protected by 
copyright215 and that the defendants in this instance had made plans to avoid 
enforcement undertaken by rightsholders216.   
 
The ECJ judgement in the Scarlet case was differentiated as in the present 
instance, the relevant blocking technology was already operated by BT for 
other (arguably more legitimate) purposes and was therefore eminently more 
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feasible217.  This is important, as it was this distinction which may 
differentiate this case in light of the ECJ’s judgement in Scarlet discussed 
above.   
 
It seemed to be decided that because BT is the UK’s biggest Internet 
provider218, most of Newzbin I’s users were probably BT subscribers and are 
now members of Newzbin II219.  Crucially, it was decided that although 
Newzbin II was used for infringing purposes, BT, as an ISSP, was also 
implicated as a service used for such infringement; and therefore, both were 
used to infringe220, however the Court’s wording on this point is unclear 
stating that: “… it does not necessarily follow that the subscriber is not using 
BT’s service to infringe.”221.  Again, questionable reference was made to 
Charleton J on this issue in that this decision is consistent with the approach 
in UPC regarding p2p users222.  Although the logic in involving ISPs to act 
against copyright infringement is understandable (such infringements being a 
by-product of Internet service), it is quite another thing to implicate them as 
operating within the same arena as undertakings dedicated to copyright 
infringement223.  Nonetheless, the nature of the infringing act and its 
relationship to the service were found to be the same as in Newzbin I such 
that as well as users using BT’s services to infringe, the operators of 
Newzbin II were too224. 
 
‘Actual knowledge’ of infringing activity was also found to be evident225 (on 
the part of Newzbin II), without actually being able to point to any specific 
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acts of infringement226.  It was decided that this term should not be 
interpreted too strictly227: “One can know that someone is infringing copyright 
without knowing who that person is or even being able to find out who that 
person is.”228  The absurdity of this statement is obvious; knowledge appears 
to have been extrapolated to a blanket application which exists online.  This 
could perhaps have been as a result of the operators of its previous 
incarnation failing to keep adequate records, or as a culmination of this, the 
cross-examination of the defendant and treatment of content from the 
Newzbin I case.  Ultimately, ‘actual knowledge’ followed from the fact that BT 
knew that the operators of Newzbin II infringed copyright on a large scale 
and that the users of Newzbin II included BT subscribers229. 
 
The extension of this concept may be based as much on personal, or 
contextual, factors than on anything else which was evident here in light of 
the steps the operators had put in place to protect themselves from action by 
rightsholders230.  A similar argument was made in relation to the Napster and 
Pirate Bay cases231, but in those instances, there was perhaps more 
justification for doing so; on the part of the email referring to ‘pirated music’232 
in Napster, and the anti-copyright campaign and politics that served as the 
background to the Pirate Bay233. 
 
BT contended that the order sought by the rightsholders was contrary to 
article 15 of the E-commerce Directive, which prohibits any such general 
obligation to monitor Internet traffic234.  Although it was accepted that the 
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order sought required BT to monitor traffic, it was submitted that this would 
not involve monitoring the specific information transmitted and that it did not 
involve a general obligtation, but rather a specific (and limited) one235.  The 
Court made this distinction between acts of ‘general’ monitoring and acts of 
‘specific’ monitoring, but in an arguably counter-intuitive way.  BT was not 
being ordered to monitor the specific information being transmitted across its 
network in an ‘active’ way (such that may be precluded under article 15)236; 
instead, it was being asked to perform a more general and automated 
monitoring, not anything more ‘active’237.  Confusingly, it was stated: “To the 
extent that this amounts to monitoring, it is specific rather than general.”238  
Presumably it was deemed ‘specific’ in light of the purpose it was designed 
to achieve (i.e. disrupting traffic to Newzbin II239) rather than ‘targeted’ 
towards any particular user(s) or organisations.  The reasoning of the Court 
suggests that they interpreted article 15 to preclude only active and specific 
(or detailed) monitoring of traffic such that the article reads: ‘No general 
obligation to monitor specifically’.  The author asserts that this is wrong and 
that the article should be interpreted as precluding any monitoring 
whatsoever, at any level.  In fact, it could be argued that the Court 
interpreted this the wrong way around.  From the wording of the article itself, 
it could be suggested that it is intended that general monitoring is precluded 
apart from in specific (and presumably more justified) instances.  Regardless, 
it appears that there are now different ‘shades’ of monitoring that have been 
read into the E-commerce Directive.  Assuming there to be different shades 
of monitoring, there may thus also be different shades of interference that 
may occur in light of the e2e principle. 
 
At the time of writing, the impact of these judgements in light of the ECJ’s 
ruling in SABAM remains to be seen.  In the Newzbin II case, the Court 
suggested that rightsholders would not undertake future actions in the same 
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vein ‘lightly’240; however, the outcome of these cases would presumably 
make it much easier for rightsholders to pursue such a course of action.  In 
addition, whilst the ECJ judgement precludes website filtering and blocking, 
there may be enough to separate it from the current situation in the Newzbin 
judgements.  It was perhaps not so much that blocking/filtering is unlawful 
per se; but, that the specific mechanism in the SABAM case was unlawful.  
BT operates a different system which already works to filter certain other 
types of material. 
 
Simply put, the outcome of these cases is twofold: there can be ‘knowledge’ 
without knowledge, and, there can be ‘monitoring’ without monitoring.  The 
point was made in a previous chapter that the line between being an 
enterprise dedicated to copyright infringement and mere search engine 
threatens to become blurred241; so it is now with ISPs.   
 
When one considers the legislative definition of an ISP (mentioned above) as 
providing a service at the request of a user; the extension, or loosening, of 
actual knowledge suggests that an ISP must now be responsible for the 
requests of its own users or subscribers regardless of the ultimate source 
they choose to access content.  This is also in contrast to the Internet’s user 
element which has been central in its origin, development, and culture242.  
Whilst this ‘responsibility’  is theoretically possible from the technical 
standpoint of being able to identify those requests transmitted across the 
network (despite the arguments under e2e, mentioned above), it also 
suggests that they need to, or should, know what the user wants to request 
on the basis that BT was implicated in servicing unauthorised infringement.  
Again, this presents the user, and therefore their ISP, with a stark choice of 
utilising legitimate content channels or simply infringing copyright and 
accruing liability243. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 ISPs and the law 
Traditionally, ISPs have been under very little affirmative duty to monitor 
transmissions on their networks and a balance can be seen here in 
protecting the rights of their users in terms of privacy etc. from the European 
cases discussed above.  This has now changed, and as such, the position of 
ISPs is now unclear as evidenced by varying stances on the issue across 
Europe.  The courts do not appear to understand the importance of 
intermediaries to a vibrant Internet244: “Internet intermediaries need safe 
harbours.”245  They provide socially desirable services furthered by the 
network effects created by its function246: 
 
“If an obligation is to be imposed in ISPs to actively seek copyright 
infringements or to use filtering techniques, it not only brings into question 
their exoneration from liability, but it also endangers the free circulation of 
services, the freedom of expression and information, and users’ right to 
privacy.”247 
 
It is interesting to note that the definitions of an ISP above, whilst effectively 
sharing the same features (‘service’, ‘communication’ and ‘at individual 
request’), do not include any reference to digital content; merely a 
‘communication service’.  Although the issue of unauthorised copyright 
infringement is clear in the wider regulatory framework outlined in this 
chapter, it is less-so regarding ‘conduits’; instead, the focus here is on the 
‘connection’.  As such, these judgements in relation to article 12 of the E-
commerce Directive should be made with reference to the article’s substance 
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i.e. initiating, selecting and modifying, as opposed to the ‘contents’ of what is 
actually transmitted in the ‘communication’. 
 
As shown above, in Belgium, Spain and the UK there has been resistance to 
any form of control over their networks or attempts to obtain the details of 
users engaged in illegal file-sharing activity.  The focus was more so on 
copyright law in Belgium and although the court ruled that imposing filtering 
software did not amount to ‘monitoring’, the decision still seems to conflict 
with article 12 which grants immunity to ISPs as ‘mere conduits’.  Surely one 
would think that if they are not under a duty to monitor, they classify as 
conduits because it would suggest that they are merely passive actors 
allowing traffic to stream over their network.  This has forced ISPs into 
defining their role, but the Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) 
stated that Net firms could not be classified as anything other that ‘mere 
conduits’ under the E-commerce Directive and thus are not responsible for 
the contents of the traffic being transmitted across their network248.  In 
addition, they stated that ISPs were explicitly prohibited from inspecting the 
contents of data packets unless forced to do so by a warrant249.  The Internet 
Service Providers Association of Ireland (ISPAI) has also spoken out 
vehemently against such policies250. 
 
Furthermore, it seems as though ISPs are defined such that they play no 
active role in the provision of the service and the emphasis is, in fact, on the 
user who engages in activity: “... at the individual request of a recipient...” 
(the Technical Standards Directive).  Therefore, legal responsibility rests with 
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the subscriber251 which is further, and perhaps more indirectly, supported by 
the architecture of Internet and its design principles252.  Regardless of the 
capacity in which ISPs now seem to be conducting themselves, it could be 
argued that their very definition(s) imply that any infringing material is the 
sole responsibility of the users; it is they who have the ‘control’, not the ISP.  
However, the outcome of the Newzbin cases appears to have cast this 
assertion into doubt.  The dichotomy appears to lie with the fact that once 
users upload content, liability implicates the hosting (under article 14 of the 
E-commerce Directive), and not the user himself (regardless of what the 
relevant ISP Acceptable Use Policy may state).  However, when it comes to 
the downloading of content, responsibility appears to lie exclusively with the 
user, but an ISP may now theoretically be involved as the service provider 
through which the user accesses infringing material as a ‘conduit’ under 
article 12.  Furthermore, an ISSP may be ultimately responsible for the 
activites of both the user and another ISP which stands in sharp contrast to 
the ideologies and origins of the Internet itself.  However the reality of ISSPs 
themselves in relation to content provision warrants consideration in order to 
further understand this. 
 
 5.2 ISSPs and content 
As it is then, ISSPs appear to be an obvious253 target in tackling 
unauthorised copyright infringement as they form the preceding link in the 
chain (between content and user): “Many in the music industry cannot see 
why ISPs cannot simply ... take the first step of notifying the individual behind 
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that account that their activities are unlawful.”254  To an extent, this may 
seem logical; if ISSPs are actively promoting the virtues of their own service 
(mainly connection speed and data allowance), then they should 
concurrently engage in a more active role to prevent the ‘benefits’ of their 
service being used to infringe copyright.  This then differentiates them from 
other organisations such as Sony and Apple255, who although arguably 
promoting the infringing virtues of their devices256, have no further control 
over any content which the technology is used to ‘appropriate’.  In contrast, 
ISPs have enormous powers of control257 and some form of ‘monitoring’ is 
not necessarily anything new: 
 
“Reactive monitoring is a reality in the ISP industry.  ISPs respond to 
content-based complaints as a matter of good business practice for the 
purpose of maintaining customer goodwill and satisfaction.”258 
 
However, this must now also include the goodwill of the content industries; 
directing private complaints to ISSPs may theoretically provide an 
expeditious way to protect their rights259.  This is because it is clear that the 
Internet does not necessarily provide a particularly secure environment for 
 
254
 Massey, R., ‘Independent service providers or industry’s secret police? The role of ISPs 
in relation to users infringing copyright’, (2008) Entertainment Law Review 19(7) 160-162, 
p161. 
255
 In the context of personal computing technology and a one-time product sale, not in 
relation to the provision of content itself. Similar arguments were discussed in chapter 4, 
p147 in relation to the Sony Betamax, and chapter  in relation to Apple’s iPod (although their 
products are now much more interconnected), see chapter 5, pp200-201. 
256
 See chapter 4, pp136-137. 
257
 Coudert, F., and Werkers, E., ‘In the aftermath of the Promusicae case: how to strike the 
balance?’, (2010) International Journal of Law & Information Technology 18(1) 50-71, p71. 
258
 Schrurers, M., ‘The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party Content’, (2002) 
Virginia Law Review, 88(1) 205-264, p261. 
259
 Julia-Barcelo, R., and Koelman K.J., ‘Intermediary Liability in the E-commerce Directive: 
So Far So Good, but it’s Not Enough’, (2000) Computer Law & Security report 16(4) 231-239, 
p233. 
259
copyrighted works260, but in this respect, content industries should 
presumably endeavour to provide content within secure channels261 i.e. 
through the ISPs themselves as Internet distribution of content can now form 
a significant proportion of sales262: 
 
“The Internet ... offers content providers commercial opportunities that 
depend in close control over the access, duplication, and distribution of their 
works in the Internet.”263 
 
There has appeared to be at least a degree of co-operation between ISSPs 
and the industry as evidenced by the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’; 
agreed by the ISSPs and the British Phonographic Industry in 2008264.  A 
similar memorandum has also now also in effect in the US265.  Despite the 
Judicial Review brought by BT and TalkTalk, this is indicative of how closely 
ISSPs and the entertainment industry have become aligned.  ISSPs have 
become dependent on the industry in order to be able to offer exclusive 
content to their customers.  For the author, the term and definition ‘Internet 
Service Provider’ now seems outmoded; and the issues addressed in this 
chapter correspond more to liability for ISSPs regarding the activities of 
users and other ISPs.  ISSPs are now increasingly content providers266 
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rather than just merely access providers and there is nothing in the definition 
of such ‘information services’ that precludes these developments.  For 
example, Amazon now offers streaming movie rental through acquiring 
‘LoveFilm’267 as well as its standalone MP3 music download service268.  
Whilst this may be of benefit in terms of offering users legitimate content, it 
nonetheless calls into question the pre-existing safe harbour provisions in 
that ISPs and ISSPs are now much more active in the content market.  As 
such, it may be said that they are losing immunity as a result of this shift and 
also as a result of the legal measures covered above, but at the same time, 
taking on more responsibility in providing content.  There is little in the E-
commerce Directive to apply to such a shift in roles and the responsibilities 
that go with it; it offers, but does not particularly elucidate on either 
notification or private codes of conduct solutions269.   
 
Beyond this, things get complicated270.  “... signs of structural change are 
appearing in the way in which issues of online liability and immunity are 
addressed...”271  European regimes have been evolving272, and continue to 
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do so.  Through the pre-existing European legislation, there appears to be a 
balance that been struck between providing ISPs with a predictable legal 
framework in which to conduct their business whilst still ensuring copyright 
protection for rightsholders.  The author believes that the legislation is not in 
itself problematic, although given the variety of law implicated in this area 
and the variation in factual scenarios, it is difficult to identify a coherent 
approach.  Currently, the problems arise more from this variation, and 
consequent variation in judicial opinions on the matter.  This could perhaps 
be overcome by introducing a more exact, or precise, definition and 
distinction between an ISP and an ISSP.  This would overcome the problem 
suggested at the end of chapter 4 (that the distinction between an ‘inducer’ of 
infringement, and a search engine threatens to become blurred273) as 
applied in the current context.  That is, the line between a ‘mere conduit’ and 
an ISP involved in copyright infringement, and an ISSP providing Internet 
access, is becoming indistinct.  This is a real potential threat in the UK 
following the Newzbin cases.  Alternatively, this could be done through more 
nuanced judicial analysis of the operation of the ISP, or ISSP itself.  This is 
crucial because without judicial guidance, an ISP only has such information 
as is put before it:  
 
“In short, even though the host service provider’s servers might 
contain patently infringing material, the provider is not likely to have any 
knowledge of such material.”274 
 
This is a good example of where it may be prohibitively expensive to 
distinguish legal from illegal activity275 due to the practical problems such as 
use of encryption, firewalls, and taking out new subscriptions with alternative 
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providers276 which may hamper the implementation of systems that would 
monitor traffic flows277: “The feasibility of disconnecting a person from the 
internet, and any attempt to police and enforce such a ban, smacks of the 
futile.”278  Because monitoring carries cost, it is possible that ISPs may 
perform this task at sub-optimal levels279 and may prove a prohibitive 
financial burden on ISPs; European providers are mainly small or medium-
sized enterprises280.  Furthermore, there ares a large number of operators 
who would be forced to implement such measures evidenced by the 
membership list of the Internet Service Provider Association (ISPA) which 
lists 135 ISP ‘organisations’ as members281.  These range from ‘Corporate’ 
entities, to ‘Large’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Small’ operators.  As such, any potential 
liability would undoubtedly have an effect on the business operations of most 
(if not all) these ISPs; either forcing them to comply (which raises cost issues, 
especially for smaller enterprises) or in a way that would adversely affect 
their business since they do not all possess their own independent 
communications network (i.e. physical infrastructure).  It is also worth noting 
that such membership (and potential liability) is not purely restricted to 
subscription services; members of the UK ISPA also include UK subsidiaries 
of companies such as Google, Microsoft and eBay.  This would suggest that 
the definition of an ISP is all-encompassing and any-blanket regulation on 
liability could have far-reaching consequences for operators who do not fall 
within such a ‘traditional’ category.  As such, liability regimes undermine the 
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positive attributes of the Internet by producing a reductive effect of online 
freedoms and diminishing network effects282:  
 
“If they were to be obliged to screen, monitor, filter or in any other way 
interfere with content passing through their systems, the consequences 
would be considerable.”283 
 
In the UK, users are potentially left isolated; there is no legislative 
mechanism in the UK preventing their actions from being watched, and their 
traditional allies in terms of Net censorship are now the very organisations 
that threaten their online freedom through potentially becoming the enforcers 
of online copyright infringement.  Although the public may not specifically be 
involved in the issue, they may still result in bearing the costs284 .  The main 
actors affected by any such measures will be Internet users, and the 
‘community’ itself285.  Any measure threatening access control and 
disconnection (even if only temporary) threatens to close off outlets for 
individual creativity and reflects a disproportionate balance between these 
two avenues; legitimate uses in relation to access to content must be clearly 
separated from consumption286.  A legal system that permits (and may thus 
encourage) ISPs to indiscriminately eliminate potentially infringing material 
upon notification will unduly threaten the virtues of the digital environment287.   
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As much as users may be left isolated, it is also likely that ISPs are left to 
operate within a very narrow margin of error.  As much as users may face a 
stark choice between infringing copyright or operating through legitimate 
content outlets288, ISPs in the UK may find themselves in a similar position 
with regard to providing users with access to infringing sites, thus facing 
liability as infringement can now involve use of their own service. 
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Creative Commons 
 
1. Introduction 
The actions chronicled in this thesis thus far have largely been undertaken at 
the behest of rightsholders in order to safeguard their rights in the digital 
age1.  From a creator and user perspective, the loss of faith in copyright law, 
and its enforcement has led to a significant reappraisal of the role of private 
law in the digital environment2.  One initiative which warrants consideration in 
this case, is ‘Creative Commons’ (CC) which stands as a positive3 
counterpoint, to the preceding expansionist nature of copyright law.  Its 
premise is to relocate power from rightsholders to creators, who are afforded 
options to govern how their works may be used and re-used.  In this sense, it 
may serve to facilitate the creation and maintenance of through utilising the 
positive possibilities afforded by digital technology.  Like copyright law itself, 
it contains an important user-element as it allows users the opportunity to 
engage with and use content (although with conditions attached).  This is 
important; as was stated at the beginning of this thesis, creative practice is 
generated by and through exposure to other content, and the availability of 
content is crucial in maintaining a healthy creative environment4.  This 
chapter will examine whether CC can benefit the availability of creative 
content in relation to its ‘compatibility’ with copyright law and its suitability to 
the content it purports to govern.  Crucially, in order to undertake such an 
examination, it is necessary to look beyond purely ‘legal’ sources on the 
issue and consider wider aspects relating to musical genres, the music 
industry and artist-led initiatives in promoting their work. 
 
It appears unlikely that CC will ultimately prove to be successful.  Crucially, 
the concept of a commons may not be appropriate in the digital environment.; 
ascribing the ‘commons’ title to what in reality is an assorted, diverse and 
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Community: Is there a Fatal Disconnect?’, (2011) MLR 74(4) 503-531, p515. 
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disparate collection of content implicates the necessity of control which the 
CC licences build upon through its basis on copyright law and author-centric 
focus.  The author believes that this puts it into competition with copyright 
law in that it may serve to undermine copyright’s utilitarian vision.  The fact 
that it is based on the successful free software model and that it has a 
notable following does not ensure that it will have a beneficial effect on 
creativity in the digital environment due to the differences between software 
and sound recordings, as well as the difference in normative behaviour 
amongst their respective users.  The difference between Open Source 
Software (OSS) and the existing content governed by CC licences do not 
necessarily lend themselves to being applicable inputs to all types of creative 
works.  Crucially, the author believes that the ‘amateur’ context in which the 
movement primarily operates suggests that a market-based revenue model 
is impossible to develop and therefore, any resulting market-based regulation 
will also be negligible.  This is because although CC-licensed works are 
available from a number of intermediary outlets, there does not appear to be 
any guarantee that CC licensed content is capable of having a greater role 
as creative inputs, is sufficiently ‘protected’, or is even recognised.   
 
2. The Creative Commons movement 
The movement was inspired by what was perceived as a threat to culture as 
a result of the influence of copyright law on creativity5.  The movement is 
two-pronged; it consists of the organisation itself and the licences it offers.  
Both broadly operate in tandem to promote the message of the movement, 
and the use of CC licence tools in furtherance of this message.  The CC 
organisation is a non-profit, US-based establishment which operates as a 
licensing platform to promote the free use of creative works; both in terms of 
cost and freedom of use (to a degree)6.  It was founded in 2001 by James 
Boyle, Michael Carroll, Lawrence Lessig, Hal Abeson, Eric Saltzman and 
Eric Eldred7 who sought an alternative to the traditional copyright system.  To 
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Community: Is there a Fatal Disconnect?’, (2011) MLR 74(4) 503-531, p507. 
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an extent, the CC movement is to be admired as being a positive response 
to digital copyright infringement by removing restrictions on reproduction and 
distribution at the source, thus appreciating the normative expectations of 
users in relation to digital technology8.  In contrast, copyright policy has 
largely been negative (or restrictive) in its response9 and its practice.  As a 
counter-point to this, the Creative Commons: “... develops, supports, and 
stewards legal and technical infrastructure that maximises digital creativity, 
sharing, and innovation.”10 
 
Hostility to copyright has a long and ‘honourable’ history11, but the CC 
strategy does not aim to create a public domain12 in the legal sense of a 
regime free of any exclusive property rights; crucially, its normative 
framework still relies on an existing property regime.   Rather, it assumes it is 
possible to replace existing content production and distribution practices13 
with the ultimate objective of placing creative works into resources that will 
make them available to the public14: “Underlying the project is also a desire 
to promote alternatives to a one-way, passive consumption of 
commercialized culture.”15  As such, it arguably aims to create and promote 
an alternative market for the production and consumption digital content16 in 
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line with norms and the possibilities afforded by digital architecture17.  
Although it began in the US, it is now a global movement18.  CC perceives 
the current copyright regime as a major obstacle for creative activity, and that 
copyright regulation perhaps applies ‘too well’19: “For years, copyright has 
been a nagging restraint on all forms of popular reuse concepts.”20 
 
The origins and inspirations of the CC movement can be seen in the 
development of the GNU operating system and associated General Public 
Licence (GPL), and the later Open Source Software (OSS) initiatives21.  The 
idea was that there should be a public commons of computer software and 
that it should be ‘free’ in terms of access (as opposed to cost22) such that the 
resulting language of the CC licences thus share important characteristics 
with the GPL and other open source licences23.  Importantly, the issue of 
‘free’ does not bear its financial meaning here: “Free in this context usually 
means that users are free to use, modify and continue to share the 
software.”24  CC stands against broad copyright regulation and enforcement 
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by offering specific licensing tools applicable to all fields of creative works 
and freely accessible and available for anyone to use25: 
 
 “The main purpose of Creative Commons parallels that of the free 
software movement which seeks to use copyright to authorise, rather than 
inhibit, copying, distribution, modification and re-use of software and other 
copyrighted works.”26 
 
The OSS Movement and GPLs are widely considered successful by 
proponents of a Creative Commons-style system27.  Open Source is 
governed by the GPL and it is this licence that forms the basis for any 
resulting innovation, development and uptake.  Such a basis has theoretical 
promise; the free software movement perhaps best reflects a peer-
production and commons-based aspect to creation, and its functional 
success forces observers to take seriously such an approach as a form of 
production28. 
 
2.1 Operation 
The overall strategy of the movement can be described as twin-track: a legal 
component consisting of the licensing model; and, a symbolic component 
promoting the philosophies of sharing and contribution29.  The CC movement 
has popularised copyright scepticism by developing alternative licences for 
creators30.  In any field of endeavour some acts may be privileged, some 
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forbidden, and some required31.  In this case, a CC licence applies in 
addition to, and on top of an existing copyright, and gives the author the 
ability to dictate how others may exercise the author’s copyright rights32: “The 
licenses facilitate innovation, speech, and the distribution of rights to make, 
access, and remake culture.”33  When using the CC systems, the 
rightsholder has two decisions to make; the first is whether to allow 
commercial as well as non-commercial uses, and second, whether to allow 
derivative works to be created based on the original work.  Once this 
decision is made and a licence chosen, the work and the licence attached to 
it are inseparable34. 
 
These decisions can be combined in various ways (along with the necessary 
and non-optional attribution component) so as to result in the availability of 
six different CC licences35.  The licences are expressed in three different 
‘layers36: the ‘legal code’; a deed; and, the Rights Expression Language 
(REL)37.  The legal code is the full legal text of the rights that exist regarding 
the work (lawyer-readable code), the deed explains the licence in terms of 
information the public needs to know (human-readable code), and the REL 
describes the key licence elements that apply to a work to enable discovery 
through CC-enabled search engines (machine readable code)38.  Though it is 
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essentially ‘private’39 in nature (as opposed to the public rationale of 
copyright): “It promises to allow the individuals and communities to figure out, 
on their own, a way to bypass the increasingly protectionist global intellectual 
property regime.”40  Furthermore, it endeavours to lower the costs associated 
with copyright in terms of producing new works; the ‘permissions process’ 
can be cumbersome and expensive41; therefore, these private actors have 
attempted to create a type of ‘modularised’ contract that rightsholders can 
use to pre-authorise use(s) of their content42.  The ‘fulcrum’ of this position is 
the creator’s control over content use through the CC licensing structure, 
conveying a formal expression of legal identity43 which allows them to extract 
agreements on reproduction44.  Broadly speaking, the key elements of the 
CC licences are Attribution (contained in all licences), NonCommercial, 
ShareAlike, and NoDerivatives.  It is important to note that all the non-
commercial licences contain a special provision for file-sharing (as this is 
deemed a commercial activity45), which is permitted, provided this is no 
monetary compensation46.  All the licences also terminate automatically if a 
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work is used contrary to the specified licence terms47.  They also do not 
prejudice any limitations to copyright law, and can also operate for ‘analogue’ 
(or offline) works48.  The six available licences are: 
 
 
Attribution 
 
 
Lets others distribute, modify, and build upon the 
work (including commercially) as long as they 
credit the author for the original creation. 
 
Attribution Share 
Alike 
As above, as long as they credit the original author 
and licence their new creations under identical 
terms. 
 
Attribution No 
Derivatives 
 
Allows for commercial and non-commercial re-
distribution of a work provided it is credited to the 
author and not modified. 
 
Attribution Non-
Commercial 
 
Lets other distribute, modify and build upon the 
work although only for non-commercial purposes.  
Any new works created must also acknowledge 
the author and be non-commercial, although they 
do not need to be licensed on the same terms. 
 
Attribution Non-
Commercial Share 
Alike 
Also allows other to modify and build upon the 
work non-commercially as long as the author is 
credited and new works licensed under identical 
terms. 
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Attribution Non-
Commercial No 
Derivatives 
 
This is the most restrictive licence only allowing re-
distribution with credit to the original author. 
 
The aim of these licences is (broadly) to authorise the use of copyrighted 
works for purposes that would constitute infringement under traditional 
copyright law49.  By authorising through a CC licence, use of such a work 
succeeds where the operation of copyright may fail50: “It is already quite clear 
that copyright law prevents the unauthorized transmission of copyrighted 
material over the Internet; the problem is that it does so in a haphazard 
way.”51  Furthermore, it has the added advantage of being drafted with the 
digital medium (of distribution) in mind52 which may, in theory, assist with the 
development of positive normative behaviour as such digital architecture has 
been instrumental in shaping user norms in the past53.  
 
3. Incompatibility 
The fact that CC operates with copyright law is perhaps its most workable 
aspect, as it does not require any restructuring of copyright law itself and is 
unlikely to prejudice the interests served by the existing regime54.  As such, 
its foundation on copyright is arguably necessary55.  However, there is a 
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legal incompatibility between a conceptual view of a ‘commons’ and the 
digital environment.  As well as this, there is incompatibility between CC and 
copyright itself, and also incompatibility between CC licensed content and 
that governed by similar licence mechanisms. 
 
As a system, it is widely held that a ‘commons’ is by definition tragic (such 
that it will be depleted and not maintained) and therefore: “Private property 
saves lives.”56  Private property is efficiency’s answer to the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ and two macro-level perspectives are generally identifiable: one 
focusing on private ownership of information in models drawn from property 
theory (as may be paralleled with Locke’s Labour Theory57, which in the 
current context is inappropriate58); and, the other focussing on common 
ownership59.  These debates are based on the notion that common and 
private uses of information are inherently and primarily conflicting60.  
However, with the rise of digital technology, the debates about property have 
moved from land to information61.  The introduction of the CC system reflects 
the changes in the concentration and subsequent decentralisation of 
information (and content) production62 that digital technology facilitates63.  
Nonetheless, the production and distribution of music in digital form still 
functions in accordance with the operation of rightsholders64 who have 
utilised copyright to preserve their pre-existing market operation65  CC could 
also be seen as a response, not just to digital technology, but also to the 
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effect it has had on copyright law66 which has been expansively applied by 
rightsholders to secure their rights in the digital environment67.  It also 
reflects the creative reality that all creative content is based (to varying 
extents) on pre-existing content: “It is impossible to divest oneself of that to 
which one has been exposed.”68  However, digital technology has raised the 
stakes: 
 
 “With the power to create and distribute creative works on a large 
scale, and the impetus to use copyrighted building blocks that are at hand, 
comes the spectre of copyright infringement.”69 
 
This implicates content inputs which can be used without being subject to 
control70: “The most evident conflict created ... is the copyright problem 
inherent in creating ‘new’ works.”71  Although there is ambiguity when it 
comes to instances of potential infringing re-use, it is not always the case 
that copyright poses a problem in creating new works72.  CC and copyright 
systems are therefore co-existent insofar as CC is entirely dependent on 
copyright73, but the licensing component of CC could also be seen to be in 
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competition with copyright itself as both are concerned with the prohibition or 
exclusion of specified uses74.  Such conflict is undesirable75.  However, it is 
difficult to separate CC (or any notion of a ‘commons’) from its natural and 
cultural background because cultural activity is always related to (in this case) 
the digital environment76, and is therefore grounded in the Lessigan 
framework established in chapter three77, where norms, the market and 
architecture all have subjective and varying roles to play in regulating user 
behaviour.  As such, it is questionable whether the idea of a ‘commons’ is 
necessary.  This incompatibility will therefore be explored; first in light of the 
conception of a ‘commons’, then in terms of copyright itself, and finally in 
relation to content. 
 
 3.1 Commons incompatibility 
Most CC licences seek to place works in a ‘commons’78; a term that has 
come to be used increasingly over the last number of years to refer to 
wellsprings of creation that are outside of, or different from the world of 
intellectual property79.  In essence, the idea of a ‘commons’ refers to a 
situation where access to, and use of, a given resource is organised on a 
non-exclusionary basis.  In contrast to public and private property, and 
reduced to its conceptual minimum, it entails a situation where no specific 
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individual or entity is recognised under the law as having a right to exclude 
others from access to and use of a given resource80.  Society’s move to the 
information economy and a low cost communications environment has 
allowed this non-market production to play an increasingly important role in 
cultural production81.  As such, this reflects the ‘natural intellectual (or 
creative) environment’ that the basic idea of a ‘commons’ suggests:  
 
“... the natural intellectual environment consists of a vast pool of open 
intellectual resources within which and with which we experience life and 
engage in a wide variety of activities and practices.”82 
 
CC necessarily involves an assertion of control by the author (through a 
chosen licence), but the legal device by which a commons is created is 
analytically different from how property rights are created83.  Regarding the 
former; the legal construct is a declaration of abstention, whilst the latter 
requires a declaration of intervention84.  Some ‘control’ of the commons85 (in 
line with copyright’s proprietary nature) also contrasts with an ‘abstentionist’ 
vision86 necessary for a commons to operate.  CC gets around this in a 
rather clumsy (although perhaps necessary) way: “... Creative Commons first 
asserts the copyright in the work that the licence then aims to regulate.”87  As 
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such, it is important that CC is based on copyright, as behind every privilege 
is a right which enables the privilege to be granted88; control is necessary, 
because without it, you cannot surrender parts of it.  This leads to a paradox 
whereby any commons can expand even as proprietary content is created89.  
Nonetheless, framing the movement in terms of a ‘commons’ therefore 
presupposes some form of control, which is realised through licensing, and in 
the case of CC; six licensing variations on control. 
 
Relating a ‘commons’ to the sphere of landed property is unhelpful; any 
‘tragedy of the commons’ is negated by the realities of digital reproduction: 
“An information commons is possible because information is nonrival, and is 
an input and an output of its own production process.”90   Therefore, such a 
‘commons’ could theoretically exist in the form of any available digital content, 
whether copyrighted or not91.  This may arguably be negated by recent 
developments in Digital Rights Management as exclusionary technologies 
and a consequent evolution  of streaming-based content distribution and 
consumption92.  However, whilst this can affect the individual users, it does 
not affect the non-rivalrous nature of digital content itself.  A great deal of 
infringement occurs every day93 which suggests that even digital copyrighted 
content can form part of the aforementioned ‘natural environment’ where it 
can be seen as ‘natural practice’:  
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“The human environment ... is a media-saturated realm of copyright-
protected information in the form of texts, images and sounds, which 
invariably become part of our cultural vocabulary.”94 
 
Because of this, the author maintains that any reference to commons theory 
as grounded in the area of landed property is both unnecessary and 
irrelevant; it does not reflect the nature of the digital environment and 
copyright’s utilitarian justification95.   
 
It is in this ‘commons’ reality that the traditional economics of copyright fades 
away in that the scarcity of cultural goods is not actually as scarce as may be 
perceived.  The author asserts that it is possible to regard the commons as 
any digital content that is available to the user (from a variety of sources on 
the Internet).  As such, the issue in the digital environment is one of 
distribution96 and not authorisation; which is the focus of CC97.  Whether or 
not the content is under copyright protection is irrelevant so long as it is 
available.  Because CC applies only to self-prescribed works (as opposed to 
copyright’s automatic protection), this suggests that CC-licensed content can 
only operate in competition to non-CC licensed content that is protected ‘only’ 
by copyright.  Therefore, CC may arguably be trying to re-establish such 
scarcity through establishing a specific body of CC-licensed content which 
presents a choice between CC-licensed content with relevant permissions, 
and purely copyrighted content where such permissions are not necessarily 
expressly granted.  This is similar to the arguments regarding market choice 
discussed in light of the market modality98 and those made in light of DRM99; 
that users are being forced to choose between different (legitimate) sources 
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and providers of content  In this case however, the choice is between 
available digital copyrighted content (regardless of legality) or CC-licensed 
content. 
 
As such, CC ‘aggregators’ are especially important in providing access to 
such content.  If it is accessible, then it can add to the pool of resources 
(including the public domain and ‘ideas’) that users can engage with and use 
as the genesis for new works.  It could even be argued that because content 
is so easily available online, the boundaries between the commons and 
protected content have blurred to the point of indivisibility: “All popular 
music ... essentially, if not legally, exists in a public domain.”100  CC operates 
to de-lineate and re-establish these boundaries. 
 
 3.2 Copyright incompatibility 
The CC movement supposes a close relationship between creators and 
users (to the point of indistinction101).  By placing creators and users in closer 
ideological proximity, this should foster a positive norm of take-up and 
adherence to the licence agreement; the fact that the licence comes 
‘attached’ with the content it governs (and by implication, the creator) should 
provide more appreciability and closer (social) proximity is likely to make 
reciprocity more likely to influence behaviour102.  Therefore, it could 
potentially operate to develop normative user behaviour in a way that 
copyright, and its enforcement, does not103.  However, the impact of digital 
architecture on user norms related to content itself, rather than the 
relationship between creator and user.  Therefore, the utilisation of digital 
architecture by CC, and consequent operation of the licences directed 
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towards this relationship, was arguably never a feature in users’ normative 
behaviour in the first place. 
 
The situation is also much more complicated than that perceived by CC104.  
Copyright offers its own perplexities105 so the fact that CC as an alternative 
‘endeavour’ has emerged is not surprising106.  However, CC does nothing to 
necessarily remove these ‘perplexities’, and may add to them through 
extending the creator’s control.  Despite the structures inherent in copyright 
law, copying often happens without attribution107.  Therefore, because CC 
also advocates the use of content108 with attribution, this adds a further 
complexity, and the necessity of attribution represents a further extension of 
control impacting on users’ liberty109.  Copyright’s requirements for attribution 
are much more limited110.  This CC complexity may also affect third parties 
who did not take part in the initial bargain111: “virtually all entitlements 
necessarily involve a lack of consent on the part of some persons 
affected.”112  As a result, such licences can often fail to take into account the 
public interests that in the case of copyright (should) go beyond the interests 
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of the immediate contracting parties113: “Rarely can we be sure that our 
perception of a particular interest is more like an approximation of someone 
else’s perception of the same interest.”114  As established in chapter 3, 
normative behaviour of users is complicated; involving and depending on 
many other factors, all of which are subjective to the user115.  Therefore, 
focussing on users’ normative behaviour in light of architecture may be 
beneficial, but only up to a point as users’ normative behaviour is also 
determined by other factors. 
 
There appears to be a dichotomy between the ideology and practice of the 
movement; it is based on the premise of relocating power in the hands of the 
creators, but at the same time aims to be grounded in the expectations of 
users116 (in terms of allowing the re-use of content); it both purports to 
reduce control by actually extending it.  This can be seen through the 
operation of their licensing system, which although built upon copyright 
subverts its use in such a way as to change its meaning117.  The CC 
licensing arrangements very much focus on the creator (i.e. re-establishing 
the primacy of the ‘author’118) of the work as also being the owner of the work 
as is the case with copyright law itself; the author of a work is treated as 
being its first owner119.  However, CC’s emphasis on authorship may have a 
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similar effect to what rightsholders have previously endeavoured to do 
through utilising arguments on authorship to improve their position120; the 
operation of the CC licensing system extends control over content in much 
the same fashion.  In order to ‘live up’ to copyright’s utilitarian basis, the 
solution should be to provide more choice, instead of more burdens121 for the 
user.  In such circumstances, CC may be seen as an extension of power into 
the digital realm where once this may have been seen as ‘free’122 from 
control, as engendered by digital technology.  Therefore, CC labours under a 
misunderstanding of copyright’s utilitarian foundations, and effectively 
contradicts them:   
 
 “It could be argued that the Creative Commons story, whilst told in 
anticipation of causing real social effect, is also the public performance of a 
different tune to legislators and courts alike – raising the profile of a different 
legal story about copyright creators and users.”123 
 
This may then have a subsequent impact on copyright’s utilitarian goal.  
However, despite the attribution referring to ‘authorship’ (as distinct from 
ownership), through historical copyright practice, ownership has been 
dominant, to the extent that it is necessary to benefit copyright’s utilitarian 
premise124.  The focus on authorship also negates what has been made 
possible by digital technology; aside from the ‘author’: “... the Internet itself is 
a technology of production.”125  Creative production can nonetheless involve 
high initial costs126 which have traditionally been mediated through capital127; 
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implicating a broader economic structure at an ‘industrial’ level, but also at an 
individual level128.  As such, CC presents a very narrow view of authorship as 
being someone who will always (and always has to under CC) permit the 
use/re-use of their work without remuneration: “This ethos of sharing 
suggests that the economic model put in place by the Creative Commons 
licenses is one of gratuity.”129  As a result, it is questionable whether creators 
would then have sufficient incentives to produce new works in a system that 
mandates non-commercial use130.  It is crucial to note that ‘profit’ (in the 
financial sense) is not something that is important in this context as users are 
not always financially motivated or interested in paying for information that 
others create131 (in which case, CC may be more closely aligned with 
copyright’s moral rights132).  Likewise, CC is not a mechanism to facilitate 
such profit, other than the ‘value’ that comes from attribution.  This may be 
the most important thing above all else133 for creators; in which case CC may 
be of benefit: “Copyright’s processes are relevant primarily to centralized 
copyright industries ... For amateurs, however, it isn’t clear that copyright law 
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is very important at all.”134  But this is not necessarily true from the users’ 
perspective where ‘value may take a different form135.   
 
A transition from recognition to commercial exploitation would be problematic: 
“Once an audience for an individual’s work develops, the question of 
compensation becomes more fraught.”136  Such an ‘amateur’ context may be 
to the movement’s detriment as creators would be unlikely to devote 
themselves fully to ‘authorship’ if they cannot profit from the value that others 
place in their work137.  On the premise that CC is developed from copyright, 
the author does not believe it will do anything to further creativity beyond 
copyright.  CC does not prohibit reuse and therefore, potentially prevents a 
market developing for that work because copying is not a right that the 
author can to exclude others from doing.  Copyright brings greater 
entitlement and as a result, it is questionable whether authors would have 
sufficient incentives to produce new works in a system that provides licences 
for non-commercial use138 in a way that would inhibit the utilitarian goal of 
copyright.  CC is therefore not a mechanism to facilitate the necessary 
market for copyrighted content139.  As such, this lack of a viable market 
alternative suggests that this modality of regulation could not operate to 
regulate user behaviour positively towards CC.  Instead, users may still 
operate in accordance with the market modality presented in chapter 3140 
which may override any CC market and resultant norms it may create. 
 
This brings the argument full-circle; although there are mechanisms to 
facilitate audience-building; the only mechanism by which to receive 
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‘compensation’ is the pre-existing copyright structure.  As CC lacks a 
commercial dimension, copyright may be preferable141 as it can allow for 
increased exploitation which can subsequently increase value142. 
 
 3.3 Content incompatibility 
The CC licence platform is based on experience from the Open Source 
movement which offers a range of software licences as well as licences for 
other types of content under the control143 of the GPL.  This stipulates that 
any copies, even if modified, must carry the same licence (or ‘viral’).  
Although both movements necessitate control144, CC offers a choice of 
different licence options considered suitable instruments for promoting 
sharing and reuse145: “It is exactly this diversity of licensing options that 
makes Creative Common’s licensing scheme less effective.”146  Furthermore, 
the political nature of the movement and the variety of licensing options, may 
lead to diverse motivations (and consequent normative behaviours) among 
those who utilise them147, thereby providing less cohesion to CC in 
comparison to that of the GPL.  The GPL demonstrates an egalitarian 
ideology: “Because the GPL regulates derivations ... the inevitable 
improvements on Linux must also be shared according to the free access 
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principle of the original.”148  However, the nature of this type of content is 
different and the normative behaviour of its users is different; acting to 
contribute and develop in the case of software, as opposed to a more 
passive consumption of digital music content149.  There is nothing to suggest 
that such a model of production would work elsewhere: “As powerful as peer 
production can be, it is unlikely to be the best model for the music 
industry.”150  This may be because of issues surrounding revenue 
development and revenue sharing; currently, this environment is still 
‘professionally’ focussed (this is discussed further below). 
 
CC seeks to address the needs of a wide and diverse group of authors and 
producers; in comparison with the free software movement: “The GPL’s 
provisions reflect a shared definition of free software that was intensively 
negotiated by the community.  Creative Commons still lacks such 
consensus.”151  The ‘consensus’ in this context appears to be that of authors 
which may be paralleled to the ‘consensus’ on the part of rightsholders, with 
the normative behaviour of users seemingly unappreciated.  As such, the 
consensus of users appears to be ‘assumed’, with most CC users having 
played no part in the development of the licences152.  Software is also its own 
medium153 with its own social ‘protocols’.  Although no-one ‘owns’ a free 
software project154, the same cannot be said of CC-licensed content due to 
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the common feature of ‘attribution’ in all the available licences155 through its 
emphasis on authorship (and control).  As such, there are also important 
differences between the end-user communities of both projects156. 
Whilst on the face of it the number of ‘famous’157 CC endorsements may 
seem promising, on closer inspection it is not necessarily the artists/groups 
that use such licences, but what is actually CC licensed which is important; 
the stimulative response of content to creative practice is as a result of the 
information or the content itself158.  This is important because despite its 
development from the free software movement (which could also be seen to 
be niche), it is important to differentiate between the production methods and 
outcomes of the two movements.  In the case of free software:  
 
“... where content is created by one or two individual creators, it is 
evident that decentralization of all content functions leads to a much greater 
proliferation of expressive content.”159 
 
Flickr and Wikipedia are two large undertakings who employ CC licences, 
with over 100 million licensed images on Flickr160 and Wikipedia having over 
four million articles in English161.  However, when one looks more closely at 
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the materials that are available on these (and other) sites, they function as a 
pool of content or perhaps more accurately ‘resources’162 i.e. reference 
materials/information163 that can be accessed and used.  This may explain 
why the sciences, libraries and academia are most interested the licensing 
scheme164, as opposed to the content industries discussed in this thesis.  
This may be because the model of ‘freeware’ (embodying ambition, freedom, 
and mobilisation) is well known in terms of software, and is the same as the 
model of production in science and academic work165. 
 
Theoretically, the only content without restrictive re-productive control would 
be those works which are already CC licensed, or are works that are in the 
public domain.  As such, this represents either a narrow or out-dated body of 
content which can serve as ‘inputs’ as part of the creative process.  The 
developments in digital technology which were discussed in chapter two166 
have opened up a vast array of inputs i.e. all content available in digital 
form167, and on the basis of this argument, such content cannot therefore 
serve as inputs.  Despite premising copyright as a ‘hurdle’ to creativity, this is 
also not necessarily the case; there is nothing to suggest that creators will 
not create purely because of copyright, for example the practice of 
‘Plunderphonics’: “... an umbrella term for any music made completely out of 
existing audio recordings, including copyrighted material, and then altered in 
some way to create a new composition.”168  Furthermore, mechanisms do 
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exist under copyright law that allow pre-exisiting copyrighted content to be 
utilised in the creation of new music169. 
 
4. Intermediaries 
Copyrights and CC rights do not just operate as incentives, they may also 
operate to organise the way already-produced works are rationed and co-
ordinated170 through the regulatory modality of the market171: 
 
“Instead of a unitary system called copyright governing our information 
practices, we are witnessing the emergence of a distributed, messy 
agglomeration of opportunities in content creation, production, distribution, 
and so on.”172 
 
This may then facilitate potential market competition173; between 
content which may be substitutable: “... the addition of intellectual goods into 
the marketplace will increase the potential for meaningful competition 
between near substitutes.”174  Nonetheless, in the ‘amateur’ context in which 
CC appears to operate, such users are not acting in accord with the 
economic component of copyright law as an incentive for production175 and 
this again highlights the ideological inconsistency that CC depends on 
copyright, but not the fundamental utilitarian justification for it:  
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“... copyright encourages productive behaviour by giving creators a 
share in the benefits they generate ... The more revenues the author can 
expect, the more she is likely to invest time, effort, or money in creating new 
works.”176 
 
It should not be assumed that pre-digital copyright law was ‘wrong’, but 
perhaps that it was ill-equipped177 to deal with digital distribution:  
 
“Copyright would address such issues badly, because they are for the 
most part alien to copyright’s rationale.  The copyright system leaves most 
distributional issues to the marketplace.”178   
 
At a more practical level, any perceived ineffectiveness resulting from the 
variety of CC licences suggests that this has not necessarily been an 
impediment, and the uptake in use of the format (although it is still niche) 
suggests that such arguments are limited: 
 
 “The rapid adoption of Creative Commons licences by individual 
copyright owners and by a variety of new intermediaries demonstrates the 
utility of standardized (sic) understandings ... this utility has been derived 
primarily from the simplicity of the human-readable Commons Deeds and 
associated icons...”179 
 
Although there are problems faced by CC, that does not mean that it cannot 
be of benefit.  As a result of offering different possibilities from copyright, the 
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licence options can act as a ‘disintermediating’ force because they enable 
end-to-end transactions of content180, but also as a ‘reintermediating’ force 
by allowing new services and communities to form around such content181.  
CC licences may have the possibility of acting as intermediaries themselves 
or enabling new intermediaries182.  One such intermediary is the ‘Free Music 
Archive’183 (FMA).  A search on the FMA music website first and foremost 
reveals a massive array of musical genres184, many of which would arguably 
not be classed as ‘mainstream’.  Instead, these can be seen as ‘niche’ 
genres which although they may not have universal appeal in themselves, 
may combine to form a sizeable portion a music market when taken together.  
However, related to this is the problem of ‘choice’.  It has been argued that 
the process of creation involves an element of choice185 on the part of the 
author which is an investment decision186.  Digital technology has ‘de-
centralised’ the influence of the content industries in ‘taste-making’187; 
decisions of choice must then fall to the user (with or without other 
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guidance188).  This presents the practical problem of decision when one is 
presented with a variety of options.  Although this may be considered a good 
thing, it forces the user into a degree of introspection which does not always 
come naturally189.  Furthermore, information about that choice is now 
necessary190 to help the user, but it does not exist in this context. 
 
 4.1 Revenue  
Obviously, the fact that works are CC licensed demonstrates that the 
creators concerned are not (at least initially) concerned with earning revenue 
from their endeavours.  However, it could be argued that CC has no 
business model and is currently dependent on expanding its user-base, 
which may be, at least for the time-being, more important191; build up an 
audience and then figure out how to make them pay.  Nevertheless, the 
problem remains that the audience may not even be aware of the licensing 
scheme192 or even concerned with a ‘business model’. 
 
“... that the vision of authors ‘finding’ their audience without the 
intervention of outside tastemakers to vet their work is a romantic ideal that 
even the Internet cannot realise.”193 
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To overcome this problem, more ‘refined’ and centralised intermediaries may 
be advisable (for example, Internet Service Providers or Information Society 
Service Providers194), and which are already in existence online, for example, 
Google and Amazon who perform algorithmic filtering measures providing a 
much more reliable predictor of preferences195: “These technologies and 
services sift through a vast array of choices to present you with the ones that 
are most right for you.”196  Such aggregators are not necessarily the owners 
of the content, but through their market power197 they have been rendered ‘in 
charge’ of it.  As such, they may be regarded as ‘stewards’ who provide 
access to, and streaming of198, content to end-users.  Perhaps absurdly199, it 
is then these actors which are responsible for gleaning revenue for their 
aggregation services.  As well as this, there are more de-centralised, niche 
and user-based intermediaries who can also have influence beyond the 
purely ‘technical’200: “The new tastemakers are simply people whose 
opinions are respected.”201  These may also be defined (to an extent) as 
‘professional’ and ‘amateur’ (or recreational)202 services respectively, despite 
the fact that they can theoretically have the same effect. 
 
At this juncture, revenue and popularity of content diverge to a certain extent, 
as do the centralised and de-centralised filtering measures regarding the 
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issue of choice.  The former may be said to be technical and revenue-
focussed, and the latter based more on social aspects of popularity.  How 
popular a work is will not necessarily involve a corresponding revenue gain 
as the content may be freely accessible.  Revenue may accrue more 
remotely through associated advertising income, but not always from a direct 
‘pay to play’ basis (although there are several subscription music streaming 
services in operation203).  Nonetheless, revenue is not always directly earned 
from consuming  and engaging with the content itself.  Taking this as an 
example, the challenge is to formulate some sort of revenue model which 
could be applied to the digital landscape: “... the relative lack of financial 
resources of open source projects is likely to place them at a significant 
practical disadvantage vis- à-vis large commercial operators.”204  Such 
disparity is further evidenced by what may be called ‘taste monitors’ who 
provide a reflection of popularity of various forms of content.  These operate 
in a more ‘official’ context as aggregators and measurers of commerciality 
through the charts system205.  However, this supports a much more revenue-
orientated model of ‘taste’ with chart eligibility requiring a minimum pricing 
threshold; for example, digital tracks must have a minimum price of £0.40 
GBP as ‘singles’ in order to be eligible206.  This therefore excludes a 
significant amount of CC-licensed music, and totally excludes CC non-
commercially licensed music.  Yet the place of ‘hits’ still remains important; 
both as works in their own right, and also as the inspiration for new works: 
 
 “The hit parade promenades the aural floats of pop on public display, 
and as curious tourists, should we not be able to take our own snapshots 
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through the crowd ... rather than be restricted to the official souvenir 
postcards and programmes?”207 
 
CC has fostered a response (of sorts) in terms of production and distribution 
through the intermediaries it has fostered, although there is no guarantee 
that CC-licensed content may be treated with any more (or less?) reverence 
than copyrighted content.  In respective contexts of professional and amateur 
content provision, this can be seen in the ‘Freesound’208 project; a 
collaborative database of CC licensed sounds209 with approximately fifty 
thousand files.  This evidences the (worthwhile) ideological mindset of CC 
users in the music industry210 in terms of creating content for use and re-use 
by others.  These do not consist of musical works in their entirety, but merely 
various kinds of samples, drum loops, and other electronically produced 
sounds that are licensed for others to use211.  One user, Nic Stage, uploaded 
a sample that came to be used by seminal dance group the Prodigy on their 
latest album ‘Invaders Must Die’ (a UK number one which sold over 1 million 
units worldwide) and which was featured on their single ‘Omen’212.  However, 
problematically for the band (and arguably more so for Creative Commons) 
Stage was not credited as the original source.  This is despite the fact the CC 
licences provide the public with generous rights and (should in theory) be 
likely to be perceived as fair and reasonable by the public that matters213, or 
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even commercial businesses214.  On this basis, the ‘public that matters’ do 
not seem to include professional artists; it is debatable whether there will 
ever be any section of the public that ‘matters’.  CC’s use currently appears 
to be extremely niche to the extent that its content may have such a limited 
exposure that it can only form a minimal basis for future works, or is more 
applicable to amateur-to-amateur users215.   
 
This has consequences for the regulation of user behaviour through the 
market modality.  The potential difficulties for a CC-based market to develop 
render the impact this modality may have as minor; due to the lack of its 
commercial dimension, the ‘niche’ value of CC content and the self-imposed 
scarcity generated by the licences.  Therefore, users may still operate with 
regard to the market and its regulatory effect already established in chapter 
3216 as this is arguably more widespread and dominant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The argument may thus be made that CC proceeds from a faulty ideological 
base.  It provides users with the option to “... opt out of copyright 
altogether...”217, when in fact it is necessarily dependent on the underlying 
copyright regime; a fact they themselves acknowledge218.  Furthermore, it 
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seeks to ‘maximise digital creativity’219 by using the very methods (control) 
that it criticises when used under copyright law.  It also premises that 
copyright may be a handicap to creativity, but this is not necessarily the case: 
“Intellectually, by emphasizing the effects of control, these critics can support 
intellectual property generally, yet condemn it specifically...”220  Such 
criticism of copyright is not itself necessary; as was stated in chapter two, 
copyright has a utilitarian justification, but also includes a certain economic 
element221 which CC does not accommodate.  CC is not a mechanism to 
facilitate such incentive, other than the ‘value’ that comes from attribution: 
“Once an audience for an individual’s work develops, the question of 
compensation becomes more fraught.”222  Although there are mechanisms to 
facilitate audience-building, the only mechanism by which to receive 
‘compensation’ is the pre-existing copyright market structure.  As CC lacks a 
commercial dimension, it is unable to be supported by this, leaving it 
vulnerable to misuse (including misuse by professionals) and makes it 
difficult to emerge from its niche status despite the availability of CC-
focussed intermediaries. 
 
The CC strategy is not as revolutionary at it may perhaps first sound.  This is 
because it still effectively operates on the basis of copyright law, but this 
does not mean that the movement has no value.  It is based on the 
successful operation of the GPL in the free software movement and as such, 
cannot be ignored.  It also has the benefit of being designed with the realities 
of digital production and distribution in mind.  As such, it can be considered a 
more proactive response to the problems of digital copyright law than the 
mere updating of copyright law223.  Whilst CC achieves this through a variety 
 
219
 See: http://creativecommons.org/about 
220
 Polk Wagner, R., ‘Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control’, (2003) Columbia Law review 103(4) 995-1034, p996. 
221
 See chapter 2, p46. 
222
 Zimmermanm D.L., ‘Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in a Digital 
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of licensing options, they do not necessarily remove the burdens the 
movement associates with copyright law, and potentially creates its own.   
 
Although CC may have benefit in addressing user-norms that may be related 
to digital architecture, that is not to say that this will provide a viable solution 
on its own.  By artificially aiming to create ‘scarcity’ through its licensing 
system, CC limits users (and itself) to a relatively narrow and niche body of 
content.  Furthermore, it is questionable whether a viable market structure 
can develop in light of this because of the stipulated non-commercial and 
predominantly amateur context in which it operates. 
 
The idea of a ‘commons’ is unrealistic in the digital age.  Instead, any such 
idea must correspond to an accurate depiction of the environment in which it 
operates.  The conception of a commons environment in this context cannot 
be limited by rhetoric based on notions of physical property.  As such, 
copyrighted digital content which has been infringed must be a part of ‘the 
commons’ thus suggesting that a commons environment is, to a certain 
extent, redundant.  Furthermore, the ‘commons’ CC implicates control as a 
necessity.  Control is a fundamental aspect of the CC movement, as that 
control over rights is essential for them to be derogated from.  However, this 
is not necessarily beneficial: “In any case, the spread of intellectual property 
rights globally is not intrinsically a good thing, even where the license 
purports to be on the side of angels.”224  By changing the underlying rationale 
of copyright, it subverts it and can thus be seen as a competitor to copyright 
law.  On the basis that CC resources and copyrighted resources are 
indistinct in their practical availability such that the prescribed non-
commercial aspect to CC may result in upsetting the necessary economic 
stimulus to creativity under copyright’s utilitarian justifications to the point of 
underproduction.  This is perhaps a fundamental problem for the CC strategy; 
the fact that it operates exclusively on a non-commercial basis suggests that 
a market could not develop for such content.  However, it does provide 
valuable recognition of the value of ‘free’ and the non-financial value that 
 
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corresponds with this225.  The CC movement recognises the opportunities 
afforded by digital technology for creation/production, and dissemination of 
content.  It has also afforded the development of CC-themed digital 
intermediaries to facilitate the dissemination of content.   
 
The non-commercial aspect of CC suggests that it is only of limited use.  
Theoretically, CC-licensed content is only available to serve as inputs for 
creative works.  As such, the self-imposed architecture of CC artificially 
narrows the available creative resources to other CC-licensed works.  As 
such, it also ignores that copyright does not necessarily stop the production 
and dissemination of ‘new’ works even though they are infringing226.  It is 
important to also note the differences between the areas of software and 
other creative content; just because a similar scheme appears successful in 
the former, it does not mean it will operate in the same way with regard to the 
latter.  Software is fundamentally different to the other types of content to 
which CC licenses can apply due to the CC focus on authorship; it is not 
necessarily ‘collective’ in the sense that it could be said to be so for software.  
Furthermore, regarding the content itself; software is its own input and output 
whereas other content may be one of several different inputs and result in a 
completely different output.  As such, relying on a narrow conception of what 
users ‘want’ fails to appreciate the distinction between computer software 
and sound recordings, as well as the subjectivity of users’ normative 
behaviour in relation to recorded music in digital form227. 
 
225
 See chapter 2, p76-77 and chapter 3, pp107-108. 
226
 See the examples of DJ Dangermouse’s Grey Album and GirlTalk in Kot, G., ‘Ripped: 
How the Wired Generation Revolutionised Music’, (Scribner, 2009), chapters 11 and 12.  
However, it is questionable whether such works would infringe copyright in the first place: 
“Integrated works represent novel uses of digital technology that do not involve incursions 
into copyright owners’ legally cognizable markets...”  See Loren, L.P., ‘The Changing Nature 
of Derivative Works in the Face of New Technologies’, (2000) 4 The Journal of Small & 
Emerging Business Law 57-94, pp75-76, p93. 
227
 See chapter 3, p87 and pp95-103. 
302
One must also take a practical approach when looking at the markets228 for 
CC-licensed work.  Those organisations that utilise the licensing system are 
not necessarily content distribution services, but ‘reference’ services.  As 
such, there is little (if any) distribution market for such content.  It may be 
suggested that artists adopting such an approach, whilst making a noble 
statement against the constraints of copyright law, are missing the point.  
The pure existence of such an enterprise demonstrates the potential scale 
and niche value the Internet is able to provide.  The Internet is able to sustain 
a virtually infinite demand curve and while this may plateau towards the 
bottom of the arc, it may extend as far as there is content to support it229.  
The commons in this environment (it being a mixture of public domain 
content and available copyrighted material) can be harnessed by the 
powerful aggregators in the current digital marketplace (e.g. Google, 
YouTube, Apple etc.) provided legislation is in place to facilitate, and not 
hinder, the capture of this content.  Whilst copyright owners may be willing to 
offer content to such a commons, either openly or tacitly, legal issues and 
technological measures230 should not act to hinder this content231.  Perhaps 
more importantly now, similar CC measures should also not operate to 
constrain user access and use of such content.   
 
CC may facilitate the growth of intermediaries providing licensed content as 
(financial) copyright licensing costs would not be incurred.  However this 
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again raises the spectre of competition between copyright and CC through 
intermediary outlets: “The destruction of copyright industries would be a 
terrible thing if and only if, they represented the sole means that creative 
content could be generated.”232  Whilst CC intermediaries may be seen as 
aggregators of content, the lack of market-based dissemination suggests that 
copyright still has primacy in this respect.  That is not to say that 
dissemination of content under CC licences may be ineffective: “Distributing 
works for free might provide artists with new opportunities, such as funding, 
production contracts or paid contracts to work on other projects.”233  At the 
same time, care should be exercised: “... there is concern that Creative 
Commons and other copyleft models will promote a ‘gift culture’, further 
devaluing creative works both in society at large and in the minds of creators 
themselves.”234  Nonetheless, there is precedent in the music industry for the 
assumption that ‘giving something away’ can be beneficial, at least in terms 
of building a reputation for the artist235.  However, the author asserts that it is 
not the CC licences that make this possible, it is the nature of digital 
technology itself.  In this context, the controlling legalities of copyright can be 
forgone (and in some instances, actively discarded by the artist); and in such 
circumstances, a CC licence is unlikely to make much of a difference.  
Furthermore, ‘attribution’ is a necessary component in terms of building an 
audience, and this would still be the case without an attached CC licence.   
 
However, attribution does not have to be done exclusively through CC and 
can be done just as easily through copyright: “... both copyright compliance 
and the future health of the music industry depend on building mutually 
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beneficial relationships between musicians and their fans.”236  This does not 
necessarily have to happen through the CC movement; although it supposes 
a close relationship between creators and users237, this can also occur on 
the part of initiatives by the artists/creators themselves through innovative 
practices238 in presenting content to users239 and without such a formalised 
mechanism as CC licensing.  It is this which may operate to provide success 
over the failings of CC, but in furtherance of CC’s broad ‘political’240 objective, 
based on the centrality of authorship: “Copyright law is increasingly 
politicized because many understand the production of even innocuous 
cultural texts as a direct expression of power.”241  Therefore current copyright 
law and practice is not ‘apolitical’; it has been (and still is) subject to the 
lobbying interests of the content industries: “Law ... is a site for political 
struggle and disagreement.”242  As such, the ‘political’ nature of the CC 
movement may be its strongest virtue; serving as an important counter-point 
to the strategies employed by the content industries. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to address and clarify the changing interface between 
copyright and regulation in the digital environment in the context of recorded 
music, in order to explain the problems that copyright law has had in tackling 
the issue of unauthorised copyright infringements facilitated by digital 
technologies.  The problem is that the reliance on copyright law in the digital 
environment ignores the other regulatory influences in operation and which 
may affect the behaviour and consumption practices of users.  It sought to 
develop a regulatory framework so as to identify and understand these 
competing regulatory influences, and to analyse the effect such reliance on 
copyright law may have on these regulatory influences and the creative 
potential of the digital environment1. 
 
This concluding chapter is designed to cement the analyses and arguments 
made in the preceding chapters, bringing them together in order to assess 
the regulation of the digital environment, and the role of copyright within it. 
 
The work of Lawrence Lessig has provided the foundation for the theoretical 
aspect of the thesis.  The author has analysed the variety of regulatory 
influences in the digital environment2 and combined them into a bespoke 
‘Lessigan’ framework.  It is clear that the work of Lessig, although important, 
is not on its own sufficient to understand the full spectrum and impact of 
regulation in the digital environment.  As such, it was necessary to 
complement his initial work with that of other scholars in the field in order 
build a more complete and detailed regulatory picture3.  It is apparent that 
these regulatory modalities in the framework can broadly accommodate a 
variety of diverse factors which may influence user behaviour (regarding 
unauthorised copyright infringement), as well as a method through which to 
understand the actions of rightsholders and the subsequent effects.  
 
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However, the applicability of the framework depends on one of its own 
modalities; that of the market.  In the context of this thesis, the market is 
essentially that for recorded music4.  As a result, the ‘content’5 and variability 
of the other modalities may depend upon the type of content (and thus the 
market) that is being considered.   
 
1. Research value 
The author has sought to build a comprehensive picture of digital copyright 
law and its potential impact on the digital environment and thus, potentially, 
creative practice.  By providing a reasoned critique of foregoing policy and 
practice in this area, this thesis can stand as an authoritative body of work for 
future developments in the area.  There have been a number of Intellectual 
Property policy reviews conducted by the British Government during the 
researching and writing of the thesis6, and although proposals have had 
limited implementation, there still remains the potential for copyright law to 
change.  It is hoped that should this be the case, the content of this thesis 
will form a valuable resource from which to evaluate any policy and 
regulatory changes in this area. 
 
In terms of understanding mechanisms of ‘regulation’ this thesis also forms a 
coherent body of research that has gone beyond the purely legal in order to 
identify and analyse not only other regulatory factors in the digital 
environment, but also their substance and potential effect.  Much of the back-
story behind the thesis has taken place outside of the legal world, but its 
permutations have been felt through legal manifestations.  As such, this 
thesis has necessitated, and benefitted from, historical, technological, 
sociological law and economics-based research that have helped provide 
context, depth, and, it is hoped, a real-world and applicable critique. 
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2. Research findings 
The following issues were highlighted as necessary to address7: 
• An appropriate purpose and justification of copyright in light of digital 
technologies; 
• The issues that digital technology has presented for rightsholders and 
which they have attempted to regulate through copyright. 
• The complexity of the digital environment: the additional forms of 
regulation in the digital environment that influence user-behaviour. 
• The impact that the emphasis on copyright regulation has had in 
relation to these other regulatory factors in the digital environment; 
and, 
• The effect has this had on digital technology itself, the behaviour of 
users, and the market for digital content. 
 
In order to provide a background context to this thesis, it was first necessary 
to define what has been referred to as the ‘content industries’8; references to 
rightsholders made necessarily refer to the rightsholders of such ‘content’9.  
The practice of creativity is central to the cultural, or creative industries; 
specifically, those industries which produce ‘content’, which is closely related 
to copyright.  Copyright’s requirement of fixation may be said to ‘embody’ the 
content of the work in question10.  As demonstrated in chapter one, because 
such works can be said to ‘embody’, or consist of, different elements, they 
have content i.e. contain content.  As such, the industries which produce 
such works can therefore be said to be the ‘content industries’11.   
 
The focus of this thesis was specifically on recorded music (although other 
forms of content were considered where appropriate); therefore in chapter 
one, the issue of ‘creativity’ was examined as an activity copyright law serves 
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to promote12.  Again, this is closely intertwined with copyright as its 
requirements for ‘originality’ and ‘fixation’13 require some exercise of 
creativity; in this context, the fixation of sound recordings can be said to 
embody the creativity of the artist, producer, and/or remixer14.  It was also 
demonstrated that the practice of creativity involves the use of creative inputs 
that can inspire and generate the creation of new content15.  However, that is 
not to say that copyright law necessarily acts as a hindrance to such 
creation, and it is far from clear that every reuse of content will be 
infringing16.  Creativity does not, however, occur in isolation; it involves pre-
existing content (to varying degrees) and takes its process from the 
consumption and distribution in the wider environment:  
 
 “All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the 
spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deciphering its 
inner qualification and this adds his contribution to the creative act.”17 
 
This is facilitated by digital technology which serves to lower the costs of 
consumption and production by unifying the medium in which both activities 
can occur.  This signifies a close relationship between the two in which the 
user plays an important role18; digital technologies have enabled users to 
become creators in their own right19. 
 
In light of this context, the research proceeded through chapter 2 to establish 
an appropriate philosophical justification for copyright law in the digital age.  
Although there are a number of philosophical justifications for copyright, 
 
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based on ‘natural rights’20 and ‘personality’21 theories, it was established that 
the most appropriate basis for copyright law in the digital era is that of 
utilitarianism.  This is because the author-centric approaches of natural rights 
and personality theories do not adequately accommodate the evolution of 
content formats and creative content production; which have been 
recognised in the evolution of copyright22.  As demonstrated, a utilitarian 
conception of copyright helps overcome these difficulties; also, it contains an 
important user-element by focussing on the benefit to society as a whole23, 
from the production, distribution and consumption of creative content.  It is 
important to note that utilitarianism contains necessary incentives in order to 
induce or encourage creative practice in the first place; which is achieved 
through grant of copyright protection24.   
 
The impact of specific digital technologies (the Internet, MP3, and peer-to-
peer) was analysed in chapter two25 in order to examine the issues that 
digital technology has presented for rightsholders, and which they 
subsequently attempted to regulate through copyright.  The emergence of 
digital technologies resulted in perceived challenges to rightsholders’ 
exclusive rights; as convergence of content into a single digital form26 
marked the digital revolution as being different from any preceding it.  
Specifically, this was seen as a threat to rightsholders’ exclusive rights of 
reproduction and distribution which engendered concern and a realisation 
that copyright law would need to be changed in order to deal with these 
threats27.  As such, it was demonstrated that copyright law itself may be said 
to have converged around the digital environment28 as an important 
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regulatory mechanism so as to overcome the perceived difficulties of 
enforcement in the digital age. 
 
It is clear that the digital revolution was seen to warrant increased regulation 
and that regulation should theoretically apply in the digital world as it does in 
the physical.  Nonetheless, regulation cannot be solely applied to technology, 
it must also be applied to society, and users29 who have their own specific 
set of values and whose behaviour may be guided by different factors.  
Therefore, it was necessary to appreciate and inderstand complexity of the 
digital environment and the additional forms of regulation in the digital 
environment that influence user-behaviour.  Chapter three sought to address 
these issues by outlining a framework in order to understand the variety of 
regulatory influences that may influence users online30.  At this point, the 
work of Lawrence Lessig assumes importance in this thesis as he deals with 
Internet regulation and its consequences31.  His work on ‘modalities’32 can be 
combined with others in the field33 to provide the author’s original and 
expanded regulatory ‘Lessigan’ framework as applied to sound recordings in 
digital form34.  Assuming that copyright, as the legal modality, operates to link 
the user and content35 (because copyright governs what the user can and 
cannot do with that content), the other regulatory modalities of ‘norms’36, the 
‘market’37 and ‘architecture’38 were applied to in order to understand their 
regulatory influence and potential impact on the user.  Although not providing 
a single explanation for digital copyright infringement, it does provide 
valuable information regarding the factors which regulate (or not) user 
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29
 Chapter 2, p83. 
30
 Chapter 3, pp84-130. 
31
 Ibid, p85. 
32
 See generally, Lessig, L., ‘Code (Version 2.0)’, (2006, Basic Books). 
33
 For example, Anderson, Bowery, Castells, and Murray. 
34
 Chapter 3, p126. 
35
 Ibid, p90. 
36
 Ibid, pp95-103. 
37
 Ibid, pp104-119. 
38
 Ibid, pp119-126. 
312
behaviour39.  Crucially, it also demonstrates that far from having a 
necessarily restrictive effect in regulating behaviour, these modalities can 
have a positive effect of encouraging behaviour40.  It also provides a 
framework through which the actions by rightsholders to enforce their 
copyrights online may be analysed.  In light if this, it may be concluded that 
the architectural modality has been the focus of regulation by the law as it 
was the perceived cause of the law’s diminished regulatory effect41.  
Architecture has also fostered user expectations and norms42, but which the 
market (again being subject to legal regulation) has not been allowed to 
accommodate.  From this, it was then possible to address the impact that the 
emphasis on copyright regulation has had in relation to these other 
regulatory factors in the digital environment. 
 
The first important instance of regulation by copyright was dealt with in 
chapter four which analysed the legal action against Napster and successive 
peer-to-peer (p2p) networks43.  As a result of further architectural 
developments, latter-day manifestations of p2p networks are now able to 
cope with a much wider variety of digital content.  However, these 
developments have been shrouded by Napster’s legacy.  Despite 
architectural improvements which moved p2p beyond the reach of liability 
from Napster, the court in Grokster formulated the doctrine of ‘inducement’ to 
overcome the architectural immunity, replacing it with broader liability based 
on evidential matters44.  In addition to The Pirate Bay case, it was 
demonstrated that personal and circumstantial factors may also have had an 
impact in this area45.  It was shown that the effect of legal action here was to 
effectively deem p2p (as a distribution architecture) illegal by imposing more 
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and more stringent legal obstacles to escaping liability46.  Legal action 
against p2p networks had an important effect on the market (or potential) 
market for content available through such mechanisms.  Crucially, it 
cemented the power of rightsholders to engage in new areas of commerce, 
related to their content, at the expense of private entrepreneurial actors47 and 
was indicative of the emphasis rightsholders placed on the right of 
distribution; which had previously generated high revenue48. 
 
Digital Rights Management (DRM), although developing before the actions 
against p2p networks49, warranted consideration in chapter five as an 
architectural, as opposed to legal, development deployed by rightsholders to 
secure the distribution of content.  Arguably, DRM is ‘pure’ architecture (or 
‘code as code’50) designed to operate in relation to digital content by 
controlling consumption51.  It also marks an evolution of the market modality, 
as although it represents the continued emphasis on distribution, DRM also 
lies behind changing and evolving methods of distribution52.  Importantly, the 
development of streaming-based content distribution53, which relies on DRM, 
suggests that the nature of DRM is changing from a control mechanism 
attached to content, to a control mechanism that applies and operates 
arbitrarily54 on networks55.  Current models of content-streaming appear to 
be inextricably linked to DRM, and the market appears to be developing in 
this way i.e. moving away from ‘permanent’ copy-based distribution system56.  
This may also have the effect of changing pre-existing normative behaviours 
(highlighted in chapter three) such that they are now evolving in response to 
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these architectural developments57.  DRMs operation in relation to content 
distribution now presents users with a stark choice of sticking to the 
prescribed, or DRM-assigned market for content, or acting illegally by 
choosing to consume content via other means58.  In this way, DRM acts to 
re-enforce the market structure which was originally threatened and 
ultimately consolidated by action against p2p networks.   
 
The role of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Information Society Service 
Providers (ISSPs) was also necessary to examine in chapter six59.  At a 
broad level, the legal regulatory picture is complex and has not been dealt 
with coherently across Europe60.  A variety of other legal issues have also 
been implicated and these have led to competing forms of legal regulation.  
The availability of the architectural controls that ISPs already possess for 
other means (such as bandwidth throttling and traffic management systems) 
may now be turned towards tackling digital copyright infringement61.  
Furthermore, the pure availability (in contrast to the suitably) of these 
controls seems to be regarded as sufficient for employing them as 
architectural constraints against infringement.  It appears that they can also 
be implicated in, and even held responsible for, infringements committed via 
other ISPs62, with the rulings in the Newzbin cases extending knowledge 
beyond the Napster ruling63.  The decisions here also appear to oblige ISSPs 
to monitor the traffic on their networks, contrary to article 15 of the E-
commerce Directive which prohibits any such responsibility64.  This has 
potentially related implications for the architectural design principles that lie 
at the heart of the Internet; notably the end-to-end (e2e) principle65.  The 
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traditional normative understandings of ISSPs, based on European E-
commerce provisions regarding liability, have allowed them to enjoy a 
relative immunity66.  However, there are also signs that their normative 
operation may be changing, as evidenced by the fact that they are 
increasingly becoming providers of content, and thus rely on a degree of co-
operation with rightsholders in order to provide this67.   
 
The Creative Commons (CC) movement warranted consideration in chapter 
seven68 as a positive reaction against the rightsholder-led initiatives that 
have been predominant in the digital age, and which have been analysed 
across the thesis.  CC appears to operate with the benefits to the digital 
medium in mind, and by placing authors and users in closer social proximity 
it should foster a positive norm of take-up and adherence to the licence 
agreement69.  However, CC assumes that copyright is an intrinsic hurdle in 
the creation of new works70 which is not necessarily the case, despite 
depending on the underlying copyright system.  There appears to be a 
dichotomy between the ideology and practice of the movement; it seeks to 
relocate power to authors, but is grounded in the expectations of users71, 
who have their own disparate motivations.  Despite attempting to replicate 
the success of a peer-production model for software, the nature of these 
different types of content and the normative behaviour of their respective 
users are different72.  The fact that CC operates primarily on a non-
commercial basis suggests that a financially motivated market could not 
develop for such content; the rightsholders and CC market conceptions are 
diametrically opposed73.  Therefore, a market for CC content could not 
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emerge as an appreciable regulatory modality74 as it is limited by virtue of its 
own content75.  However, CC does provide important recognition of the value 
of ‘free’, the non-financial value that corresponds with this76, and the role of 
pre-existing content as creative inputs77.  For this reason the movement has 
merit, but only as an ideological standpoint78.  Its worth beyond this is 
questionable.   
 
In conclusion, the impact of copyright regulation may be felt in a variety of 
ways in relation to digital technology itself, the behaviour of users, and the 
market for digital content.  The development of digital technologies (or 
architecture) is the source of everything that has been examined in this 
thesis.  This development was perceived to negatively affect the regulatory 
ability of copyright and therefore became the focus of copyright law.  It 
engendered ‘updated’ copyright regulation for the digital era and was applied 
to render p2p architecture as unviable.  It also served to legitimise DRM as 
an architectural mechanism to control the availability and use of content.  
The role of copyright regulation also threatens to override the design 
principles at the heart of the Internet in light of developments regarding ISP 
liability.  Norms are, to an extent, based on the history and development of 
associated digital technology, it must be questioned whether the rich history 
of the Internet, and the ideologies and attitudes that accompanied it, can 
really be said to apply to the current generation of users.  Norms are in a 
state of flux and may certainly evolve in light of the changing methods of 
content distribution and consumption.  Content consumption is evolving; the 
author believes that it is becoming much more of a ‘social’ (as opposed to 
private) experience79, and there is a question mark over how changes in this 
will influence the normative behaviour of newer generations.  The market for 
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digital music content appears to be increasingly consolidated along its pre-
digital distribution practices, in sharp contrast to the possibilities afforded by 
digital technology.  This has resulted in rightsholders focussing on right of 
distribution; which had previously generated high revenue80, but which was 
impacted by digital technology.  The market still appears to be developing in 
this way with movement away from ‘permanent’ copy-based distribution 
system.  The continued emphasis on financially-driven value conforms to a 
market based on physical content, but which could, and should, have 
developed to harness digital technology.  The market and architecture share 
a close relationship; with architecture governing the market’s operation.  As 
such, the focus by rightsholders has primarily been in relation to these two 
modalities; using copyright law against and/or as an adjunct to digital 
architecture in order to maintain the market for their content.   
 
By viewing Internet regulation in this way, it can be seen that the 
convergence of copyright law has meant that all strategies to counter this 
trend have been tied to legal regulation, and have therefore been limited; 
focussing mainly on distribution.  The exposition of these modalities of 
regulation highlights the fact that the motivations and goals of rightsholders 
and users may be asymmetrical.  However, the role of these other regulatory 
factors does not mean that copyright is rendered insignificant, but rather that 
it (and thus the legal modality) should remain fluid in order to cope with 
changes brought about by these modalities and be of benefit to the user.   
 
3. The Law 
Lessig further realises that Law has a special role in affecting the other 
regulatory modalities81 (norms, market and architecture), therefore, a 
complete picture can only be realised by returning to, and re-considering, the 
operation of the legal modality as affecting the other forms of regulation 
considered in this thesis.  What (copyright) law has regulated is not the 
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‘pathetic dot’82, but primarily the architectural and related market modalities.  
Digital technologies are based on copying, and copyright has become a 
regulator of technology, or architecture; a role it was never designed to 
perform83.  As such, it was stated in 2001 that: “The role of copyright will 
change.  Its influence in fostering creativity will remain central to society, but 
will be felt in different ways.”84   
 
Although the relationship between copyright and technology is not new, 
neither is the practice of lobbying by rightsholders to advance their interests:  
 
“It is as American as apple pie to consider the happy life you have as 
an entitlement, and to look to the law to protect it if something comes along 
to change that happy life ... Thus, there’s nothing wrong or surprising in the 
content industry’s campaign to protect itself from the harmful consequences 
of a technological innovation.”85  
 
This initially occurred between the concepts of authorship and ownership86, 
but has now moved to reproduction and more so; distribution.  The 
development of digital technology, and copyright’s response, represent a 
divergence between its utilitarian goal and its economic component.  Initially, 
it could be seen that digital technology (especially the Internet) was the 
ultimate expression of copyright’s ideological vision87 engendering the 
convergence of the form and availability of content into a single digital 
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medium, benefitting of society.  Nonetheless, the response from the content 
industries and policy makers was to enforce, and consequently cement their 
rights in the digital environment: 
 
“Intellectual property lawyers and interest groups pushed early on to 
have law shore up the protections of intellectual property that cyberspace 
seemed certain to erase.”88 
 
The ‘source’ of legal consolidation were the industries that were affected in 
their different roles; from production and distribution, to regulation and 
enforcement.  Clearly, the problems engendered by digital technology were 
global, as such any unilateral action by an individual state would be 
ineffective and problematic.  Instead: “The more international conflict can be 
standardized and the more the states agree on a solution, the more it 
becomes attractive to conclude an international treaty.”89  Governments have 
a tendency to criminalise behaviour which they cannot otherwise control 
even where there is no consensus in society that certain conduct warrants 
sanction90.  This can be as a result of ‘politics’ rather than ‘principle’91.  In the 
context of digital copyright, politics may have less to do with government and 
more to do with the impact of political organisation and lobbying on the 
development of copyright law92: “Gradually, the law has lost sight of its 
original charge: to encourage creativity, science and democracy ... The law 
has lost its mission...”93   
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Although copyright is an author’s right, the rightsholders (or owners) in 
question have become increasingly large and powerful corporations who are 
capable of wielding significant lobbying power94: 
 
“And so begins the history of the ill-fated process that corrupts and 
hinders copyright legislation by making it the handmaiden of professional 
industries, drafted behind the backs of elected officials.”95 
 
This has resulted in rightsholders focussing on the right of distribution; which 
had previously generated high revenue96, but which was altered by digital 
technology.  The continued emphasis on financially-driven value conforms to 
a market based on physical content, but which could, and should, have 
developed to harness digital technology.  It also highlights the relative lack of 
standing of creator groups97, especially in the field of recorded music.  
However, “... both copyright compliance and the future health of the music 
industry depend on building mutually beneficial relationships between 
musicians and their fans.”98   
 
In this respect, the market is indispensible; through it, users and would-be 
creators consume and potentially create digital music content.  However, it 
must accept value beyond the monetary99 which was the emphasis in its pre-
existing operation.  The initial trend was one of consolidation, and 
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convergence around the right of distribution such as to maintain the music 
industry’s pre-digital business model.  Despite the fact that digital technology 
has enabled new market opportunities, which could have been built on the 
back of related norms, the market still operates to restrict content to 
prescribed outlets and emphasises financial dependence on widespread 
distribution, ‘hits’100 and ‘popularity’101.  As such, emphasis has been on 
maintaining this, rather than diversifying in terms of content output and 
delivery.  Theoretically, the importance of the market modality suggests that 
the issue is one to which the industry (and by implication, the market) must 
react.  There is nothing in copyright law to stop this; just because it has been 
used to regulate in one way, does not mean that it cannot regulate in the 
opposite way.  Nonetheless, regulation through copyright has taken 
precedence over the goal of copyright itself. 
 
4. And finally 
Copyright has been deployed as a regulatory mechanism to override the 
conflicting regulatory forces of norms, the market and architecture such that 
in the digital environment, copyright has become a byword for distribution.   
Copyright should not be exclusively about distribution, it should be about 
copyright.  Copyright is not broken, it never was, but it needs to redress the 
balance between distribution and creation as a means of justifying its 
utilitarian vision.  The necessary economic incentives should be to create, 
not to distribute.  The ultimate distribution network is already in place, over 
and above those implemented by the content industries and the music 
industry in particular – that is the Internet. 
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